Notice bibliographique
Résumé
This doctoral thesis contains three essays on equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism. In Chapter One, we study the impact of equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism on the policies of the regional governments. This chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a fiscal federalism in which two asymmetric regions provide their residents with non-productive public expenditures (a flow) and public capital (a stock). In our model, each regional government behaves strategically in choosing its policies to maximize the discounted welfare of its own residents, under the equalization transfer scheme. Our analysis indicates that the the tax on the use of the private capital input is equal to zero in the steady state. In addition, we observe that the only change induced by the equalization transfer scheme is an increase in the non-productive public expenditures in less-endowed region (Quebec) with an offsetting fall in the non-productive public expenditures in more-endowed region (Ontario). The results of the numerical exercise we carry out also suggest that an equalization scheme in a federal state lowers the welfare gap between a rich and a poor region. In Chapter Two, we investigate how the equalization transfer formula is determined and how the equalization transfer program affects a region’s policies. This chapter presents a political economy model of equalization payments in a fiscal federalism in which asymmetric regional governments, who care about the welfare of its own residents, lobby the (incumbent) federal government, who takes into consideration both the welfare of the federation and the political support it receives from the states when allocating equalization transfers. It is shown that if the federal government allows politics to distort its economic policy it actively implements an equalization transfer program that is different from the one it would implement if it behaved like a benevolent dictator. The equalization transfer scheme implemented by the federal government induces a fall in the investment of public capital in both regions, and if the political power of the poor region is sufficiently higher than that of the rich province, then the equalization transfer scheme induces a higher level of the non-productive public good in the poor region than in the rich region. A numerical example is provided to illustrate this result. Chapter Three presents a model of equalization transfers in a federation in which each regional government has private information on its own technology for public service delivery. The aim of the federal government is to design an equalization transfer scheme that is Bayesian incentive compatible and satisfies the interim participation constraint in order to achieve the goal of providing residents of a poor region with at least a certain level of utility without imposing an excessive burden on the giving region. We show that the equalization transfers allow the recipient region to raise its private consumption above the level it would have attained in the absence of equalization transfers because some of the transfer is allocated to raise private consumption. Furthermore, it is shown that the equalization transfers are also lower if the federal government can observe the type of the poor region.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,003 | 0,007 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,003 | 0,006 |
| Communication savante | 0,003 | 0,004 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,003 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,003 | 0,005 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,012 | 0,002 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».