Australia's Future as a ‘Westminster Democracy’ – threats to combat, stark choices to make…

Westminster is a relatively small precinct of central London that houses some of the principal institutions of British central government. The term ‘Westminster’ is also a colloquial descriptor signifying a system of parliamentary government that has achieved some recognition in comparative government and is used as a shorthand by practitioners and academics to label a certain set of jurisdictions (Ball and Peters 2005; Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009). In some former British colonies it is used today to convey constitutional lineage but also referenced in Europe and the USA to distinguish their systems of government from the British. Nevertheless, ‘Westminster’ remains an elusive concept that almost defies definition. There is no agreed historical era as to when Westminster was first established or fully formed. There is no single set of definitive institutions or unequivocal conventions. The systems it purports to describe have not remained static or frozen in time; they have changed and evolved as political development has occurred and contingencies have arisen. To modern day observers it can appear that the more we look for Westminster the more it seems to evade apprehension. And, as Lijphart (1999) once implied, if a strict set of institutional criteria were exercised, virtually no countries in the world would now qualify any more as Westminster democracies; he conceded that only Barbados may be counted and perhaps not even that! Paradoxically, Westminster is not a particularly common descriptive term used in the United Kingdom (UK) – where the main features of the system were originally formulated through centuries of political struggle, compromise and pragmatic ad hocery. British practitioners and academics use the terms ‘British government’, the ‘Queen's government’ or ‘Her Majesty's government’; and sometimes more technically ‘responsible government’ or ‘cabinet government’ (Jennings 1954; Birch 1964). British scholars of comparative government even use the bland term ‘majority democracy’ to contrast with ‘consensus democracy’ (Hague, Harrup and Breslin 1992: 50). Other nations that use the term Westminster to describe ‘their’ own systems of government tend to be restricted to the former British settler dominion colonies; it is a term embraced enthusiastically in both Australia and New Zealand, but far less overtly subscribed to in Canada, South Africa or Ireland (even though they still trace institutional resonances), and hardly at all in the former British colonial possessions of Asia, Africa or the micro-nations of the Caribbean. In Canada, for example, the term ‘Westminster’ is a loaded concept that is too English for their multi-lingual politics and so almost regarded as ‘politically incorrect’ to mention; so Canadians talk blandly of ‘representative democracy’ or ‘European parliamentary traditions’ blending Anglo and French parliamentarism and legalism (Jackson & Jackson 2006: Ch 2; and Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009: 61-2). It is at best a half-truth to claim that Britain developed the conventions of responsible government and then the dominions replicated the system when granted self-government. When colonial administrations began to rule themselves they selectively adopted components of Westminster that suited them. They adapted these as they considered appropriate, and added other elements as they saw fit. So, all systems were hybrid and all systems, including the UK, had evolving conventions (Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009: 57). Good examples of this are the democratic reforms of universal voting adopted in the dominions well before Britain, and the use of secret ballots and an independent electoral administration to run fair elections. Australia managed to elect its powerful upper house (the Senate) more than a century before either the UK or Canada thought of doing so, and neither have yet managed to implement this elementary initiative. And New Zealand granted Maori reserved seats in parliament as far back as 1867 to ensure representation of its native minority in the lower house, before it courageously abolished its defunct upper house in 1950. But the Westminster system never swept the world to become a globally popular political system. This is despite being an efficient, convenient and largely unconstrained system of strong executive government shrouded in royal mystique and crown privilege. When Bagehot mentioned that he had discovered the ‘efficient secret’ in the ‘English constitution’ he meant it was amendable to political action (rule from ‘behind-the-scenes’) and unconstrained by hard and fast constitutional rigidities (such as a dysfunctional ‘separation of powers’ – see Chapman 2000). Today, one might ponder why so few nations have copied the Westminster form of government (besides the aforementioned settler colonies, only India and Malaysia have absorbed some partial features as did Fiji and Singapore, see Patapan, Wanna and Weller 2005). Was it the Anglo imperialist culture that discouraged copying; was it concerns over Crown tyranny; was it a preference for greater constitutional clarity; or was it that local conditions did not favour the politics on which Westminster was premised? Furthermore, even those countries that initially fashioned their systems of responsible government on Westminster, have then deliberately undone many Westminster precepts (such as: New Zealand with its MMP electoral system, South Africa with a single list-system election for the National Assembly under proportional representation, Australia and Canada fractured parliamentary sovereignty through federalism, and even the UK has gradually broken down its unitary jurisdictional fiction and adopted PR voting in its devolved entities of Scotland and Wales). Hence, the relatively few remaining jurisdictions that identify with Westminster are all very different to each other and behave differently. Yet there remain some important similarities and similar-sounding institutions, even if their operations and practice differ markedly. Butler (1973: 7) once pointed this out in a book describing what he thought was the ‘Canberra Model’, claiming that while there were many differences between the mother parliament and its colonial offshoots, the ‘questions that came naturally to someone schooled in the British system were, almost invariably, wholly appropriate questions to ask in Australia’ (meaning Canberra) – except, of course, that we had no Lords or hereditary aristocracy in parliament, no seats handed out to Anglican bishops, no undisputed sovereignty of the Commons, a powerful, party-based, elected Senate, significantly different voting systems and, most importantly of all, enormously complex intergovernmental relations between semi-sovereign jurisdictions that could not be so easily pushed around. So, is there an essential checklist of criteria that signifies Westminster or qualifies a jurisdiction to claim membership of this cluster? Some academics have tried to find such a list (see Patapan, Wanna and Weller 2005: 4-6; Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2009: Ch 1), but the purported list is full of contentions, aberrations and exceptions. For instance, besides the widely accepted features of Westminster listed below, some scholars cite unicameralism, a free press, a national public broadcaster, transparency and open government, the separation of church and state, and a central bank dependent on the executive. The range of supposed criteria can be truly amazing. Many features of old-style Westminster were pre-democratic (or adopted in a partially democratic environment) and have since adjusted to the exigencies of disciplined, mass party politics (Jennings 1957). Traditionally, Westminster emerged from ‘the “capture” of the authority of the Crown by the parliament and later still by the cabinet’ (Kemp 1988: 106). It should also be noted that many of these features listed as components of Westminster are found in other parliamentary systems and even in some presidential systems (ministers answerable to the legislature, governments accountable to the legislature, the importance of cabinet government, a reliance on legislative ‘confidence’ or numerical support etc). In addition, classical Westminster did not operate from written constitutions, federal structures or have high courts determining what could be decided. At its most extreme, Westminster institutionalises the tyranny of the majority (Jennings 1954); almost approaching an elected dictatorship (a claim frequently made in New Zealand politics from the 1950s to the 1990s, see Palmer 1979; Mulgan 2004: 63-64), with few constraints on executive power or what governments can or cannot do. Political actors such as Margaret Thatcher, Robert Muldoon, Robert Menzies, or Mackenzie King, all Westminster ‘diktats’, subscribed to the strong majoritarian view, namely: ‘give us absolute power, we undertake to use it responsibly, and you, the electorate, get to judge us on election-day deciding our fate’. They would also not have wanted anyone poking in too much into what they got up to on a day-to-day basis – it was the overall assessment of government performance relative to what the opposition offered that was the final arbiter of responsible power. Hence, Westminster is a highly political-based system (as opposed to a rechtstaat or constitutional-based system); it traditionally calls on politics to resolve differences or chart new courses of action, unimpeded by artificial separations of powers, anachronistic constitutions or legalistic high courts, relying purely on a popular mandate and the prime minister's or dominant party's sense of what was appropriate and defensible. Yet, today we are constantly and increasingly putting cages and legal norms around this fluid and amoebic political system, reflecting the ‘swings and roundabouts’ of politics and administration. And, in so doing, we are fundamentally changing traditional Westminster practices. Then there is the further issue of interpretations made by different participants. As a general rule, officials subscribe to the time-honoured sanctities of Westminster far more than passing politicians ever do. It is part of their defence against the potentially excessive intrusion of ‘politics’; a shielding discourse; it's a way of coping with uncertainty; it provides a foundation for the rules and procedures that govern their worlds giving a sense of routine and orderliness even if backed only by convention and normative aspirations. Ministers, by contrast, often do not know (or much care) about Westminster practices, until they become steeped in the practices of office (puppy-trained by the officious senior public servants). Power is their real world, not some arbitrary, handed-down conventions called ‘Westminster’. At the point of becoming they have with party politics and the of office and, only then their to and questions of public and administration – most of which is to by senior officials as of the rules the of or the of the are that the system well for and has that they the support and are not up by or rules and But they over questions such as: in the public is to be considered for to their what might the have and that is or in are not their of once when that a new had as of he a by but the was was an and for the but we still on if of are often more than politicians about down their interpretations as and it as and interpretations potentially have more so there is an in Hence, officials often to have public of themselves and and or structures to the conventions from which they can from different interpretations of Westminster to to a once are accountable to the government and the government is accountable to he had one of the he had got it accountable to the It was a but the did not at such in the is both and from their are accountable and to the government in the of the or – can real over their and their as a To this to the is the most form of which has and contrast, are only accountable to parliament in a much more way for their or and their elements only then to be for a prime in a the is to a in a and by contrast, if parliament a the may be but or perhaps some And if the against political the into than The an important point about Westminster – there are many important on it in and in in and with no or There are a of with some more important and than tend to see Westminster with with some and officials may not these interpretations or may from different Hence, Westminster as a political-based system on a of elements of and between normative and are and accountable to parliament but do their to evade such It is in the prime have almost no powers, yet are far more powerful in practice than an elected in a presidential system. The is and yet it is often they as the constitutional that and The and norms one practice As one French when on British political – they could be and of is a of such is a and it is subscribed to and also in the it is if and when or and to the prime minister's accepted authority by (see Wanna The and governments had to with the and had to with had both and themselves for while in the first had a as and most of cabinet were to an in and then in the of when senior tried to one senior was as a more before being pushed and but was also up to in the to and with the of in would be by becoming was to and yet at the of the he was important to the government and the of were considered too are all examples of Westminster as it with while to There are many other of these and – the of the responsible for in the of normative of should operate but which are then by and conventions of prime power yet also of the to the the supposed of through the of in and an system still an anachronistic called concept on from when and wanted to their we have deliberately added other of this in Australia – the has deliberately – elements of British parliamentarism with features of and an elected and constitutional This is a hybrid that has very real and – but changing these in any way in the can on if do not have not yet managed to a purely that would electoral important many might ask today would is it appropriate for Westminster to these and were when governments were small and in and thought that they They were perhaps even in the era when governments were up their over the and had to But now our and are more are with much and more complex and to with an or to with of or it might Today, it is less and less to on to the if we to subscribe to the it increasingly in the political system, and in government, and the of Yet, Westminster remains a powerful of in many of our aforementioned and is powerful for public and senior themselves to Westminster as if it is some to accountable and cabinet to to yet the they get into office they back into and on the importance of Westminster or the Westminster as if it were some for government that should not be and their often of criteria (such as public between officials and governments – see the Westminster So, what Westminster have to about the relations between and senior public The is that not much is in a are in parliament not and are to in the political but Westminster much on what be what they what they do in or what of administration they should their as and and most of their interpretations of Westminster were gradually the and which were both in were much more in the colonies than in the UK – see and public began to the of the and ‘the of political for of these modern criteria on which to administration were from the of than in the the largely open and on the of and with the system of the and see In world, Westminster conventions have to on the relative power of on what can or or ask for from the public on should an (even though Australia has such a in the on New out or about and if so where they should be and what they should and on officials should be accountable for their performance from the It was once that was the to responsible government. The claim was made that the systems were and one would the But in Australia both have for in Canada even perhaps not or free from but with both systems remaining – and in we have a far more than the main to the traditional conventions of Westminster is by the to some perhaps powers, and procedures in the of and legal is and by in government in Crown or by courts and legal to politics to the have to the of to and it is not to some legal to the authority of cabinet despite our political that such power is can have some but also more and rules than may be or of the of practice is that it politics to other or find that it is in other has the of and not written down for if cabinet are as in New Zealand, politicians to the at from to parliamentary the of independent and the political system – either of from the political or established to the of the procedures often in to the on and independent even the or and on The of these was at politics out of or at from both of which are to under There 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we now and which become more as we we can these and but it might be more to have a considered on and perhaps some action on than these to Westminster has adapted to political that as to But is the of from parliament to a government with the range of to govern we to we can form government purely from a of the political elected to we to some terms and to become or cabinet (as South Australia has And if so should they be accountable to an of is not to and jurisdictions as different as the and both do do we from cabinet in the of cabinet is very much cabinet as a deciding on the of government Other jurisdictions do not use cabinet in this for in the UK cabinet more as a political and or In Australia with more and more now being cabinet and with and there may be far less to cabinet with the of it cabinet to with perhaps more we are a the greater separation of the executive and should we be doing and far should we down this The adopted a much more separation of through its constitutional than Westminster with its of But now with the has become a largely dysfunctional system at the federal Yet we are in a but with courts what governments can and and legal by to The is that parliament and the elected executive. may be where legal or is as a to and governments from is in some such as the of but also powers, political Australia have relatively to and from into opposition are and some are about the of government. this is to the the dominant party the executive and their from or from the public Yet in Westminster are the government in and they the when they form government. we more open to the government for and it is in the of the political system as a to and the yet by to and the opposition from we are the system as a at the of we should to a of for single to single (the – and not have responsible to or for of their In the government some had to came about for of political but it has not public or of the of over there have in the of yet much about the of from senior can we get more officials to and and less on day-to-day be to out more on – that the to – to public and officials often do out with authority on of but can appear and and have at for of do we to to the senior of the public – purely with or a of with executive should we and our senior to practices of often any an of and favour may have up to a but a more open and system would and and would a of over some have sometimes from but should they be more in their senior we further down the and political if we are or should we our of but political do we to in the on the constitutional of the in and as of the for the public and public the many of modern public should we officials from different jurisdictions and state, even to of from practices of administration and but such may a more and of administration where different and structures can In some federal officials are to the federal government for a of to and could for executive and with senior officials to of their in other jurisdictions as a way of and often it is at the federal that certain senior do not have their on the and are the There is an that officials as well as being in their own are also too in their own never their government would to and and the and of the different of administration. and are not the only we in the new appear we have not yet but perhaps they are some of the more we now to to what we is our Westminster

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