Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Introduction Paying research subjects money to participate in medical experimentation is not a recent phenomenon. In the late 1800s, for example, Walter Reed paid volunteers in his yellow fever studies $100 in gold for their participation. If they contracted yellow fever, he paid them a $100 bonus. (1) Subjects today continue to be paid, in varying amounts, to participate in research. Despite this practice's lengthy history and ubiquity, no consensus has developed about its ethical propriety. While most regulations and guidelines governing human experimentation permit some sort of monetary remuneration to research subjects, they provide little instruction on evaluating the amount of a payment. The regulations and guidelines reflect the apprehension expressed in the academic literature about the philosophical and practical ramifications of both paying and not paying research subjects. This paper explores the historical development of the debate about paying research subjects. A review of the debate over the last 30 years reveals that payments have mainly been conceived of as a threat to voluntary consent. Further, the issues discussed in the 1970s are largely the same issues being discussed today. I suggest that a preoccupation with voluntary consent may have slowed the progress of the debate and is part of the reason why consensus remains elusive. The importance of achieving some sort of consensus is that it translates into practical and ethical guidance in evaluating the propriety of a given payment. In recent years, there has been a slight shift in emphasis in the discussion such that issues that were historically on the periphery of the payments debate are receiving increased attention. This may signal a turning point in the debate which may lead to practical and ethically sound guidance about how to evaluate payments to research subjects. Prison Experiments The appropriateness of paying research subjects began to be explored in a meaningful way in the context of prison populations. During World War II, American researchers increasingly used prisoners for medical experimentation. The ability of prisoners to freely consent was challenged both during and after the war, (2) especially where rewards were offered. (3) American researchers, however, insisted that all prisoner-subjects freely chose to participate and prison research flourished in the post-war years. (4) This emphasis on voluntariness would dominate the debate about payments for the next 50 years, even after prisoners ceased to be used. After World War II, news of illness and death associated with prison research prompted formal hearings to consider the ethics of certain prison experiments. Rather than focus on the health problems caused by the experiments, excessive reward was often seen as the key ethical concern. In particular, some feared subjects might conceal symptoms rather than risk disqualification from the experiment and the reward. Consequently, the validity of the research results was jeopardized. (5) In the late 1940s, publicity about the terrible side-effects associated with the wartime malaria research conducted in an Illinois prison prompted the Governor of Illinois to form a committee to investigate the ethics of the research. The committee found the research conformed to ethical rules and focussed its attention on the issue of rewards to prisoners. It found a subject's sole motivation ought to be to contribute to human welfare. If that was the motive, then a reduced sentence was a reward, not an undue inducement. The Commission, however, deliberately and explicitly did not consider when a reward is excessive. Rather, it said this should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. (6) This reluctance to identify when a reward is excessive is a trend which regulatory bodies unfortunately have continued. By the 1960s, the pharmaceutical industry had well-established drug-testing programs in American prisons. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,016 | 0,207 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,003 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».