Introduction: Philosophical Perspectives on Education for Well-Being
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
This special issue of Paideusis focuses on "Philosophical Perspectives on Education for Well-Being."Well-being as a social and political concern -sometimes under the term "happiness" -has been put into greater spotlight in public discourse and public policy in recent years (e.g., Bok, 2010;Rose & Rowlands, 2010;Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010), and a number of assessment tools to measure human well-being/quality of life have been developed at national and international levels, like the UN's Human Development Index, the OECD's Better Life Index, and the New Economics Foundation's Happy Planet Index.For the last few years the Canadian Index of Wellbeing (CIW) has been used to measure well-being of Canadians to provide a measure of social progress as alternative or complement to the sole economic measure of GDP (CIW, 2012).Different academic disciplines have been contributing to the discourse on human well-being, including philosophy (e.g., Aristotle, trans.1976;Griffin, 1986;Sumner, 1996), psychology (e.g., Diener, 1984; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999;Seligman, 2011), and economics (Frey, 2008;Jackson, 2009;Layard, 2005), and a range of conceptualizations of well-being have been proposed (for a structured overview of Western approaches to well-being, see Falkenberg, 2014).Judging by my observation of the North American public discourse on well-being, approaches to well-being that have led to empirical studies with reportable "findings" on well-being, like those linked to positive psychology (e.g., Lopez & Snyder, 2009), seem to have exerted much greater influence on public discourse and public policy concerning the school system than those that do not.Philosophy has probably the longest tradition of all disciplines in dealing with the concept of well-being, providing a range of different conceptualizations (e.g., Griffin, 1986; Talbott, 2010), albeit sometimes under the use of a different term, like happiness (Almeder, 2000), the good life (Feldman, 2004), and welfare (Sumner, 1996).Philosophical perspectives on well-being seem to have a declining impact on public discourse, and this is mirrored in the declining role of philosophy of education in teacher education and education more generally (Clark, 2006), and in Canada in particular (Christou & Bullock, 2013;Vokey, 2006).In education, a discourse has been building that gives privilege to the idea that educational practice should be guided by research that shows "what works" (for a critique of this discourse, see Biesta, 2007Biesta, , 2010)).There is, however, one philosophical perspective on well-being that has been quite influential at the policy level: the Capabilities Approach.This approach to well-being has been developed by Armartya Sen (e.g., 1993, 2009) and Martha Nussbaum (e.g., 2000, 2011).Sen was a consultant on the creation of the very prominent Human Development Index of the United Nations (Saito, 2003, p. 22), and he was also a member of the Commission on the Measure of Economic Performance and Social Progress in France, established by former French President Nicolas Sarkozy for the purpose of considering the limitations of GDP as a measure of social progress and the feasibility of alternative assessment tools (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010).I want to use the Capabilities Approach to well-being to illustrate one way in which philosophical perspectives can contribute and, in the case of the Capabilities Approach, have actually
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,003 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,002 | 0,002 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,003 | 0,004 |
| Communication savante | 0,005 | 0,004 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,003 | 0,008 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,027 | 0,006 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».