Criminals and Terrorists: An Introduction to the Special Issue
Pourquoi ce travail est dans la base
Une base qui oublie comment elle a trouvé un travail ne peut pas être vérifiée. Voici les voies qui ont admis celui-ci.
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Richard Pipes, “The Trial of Vera Z,” Russian History 37, no. 1 (2010): 5–82. See also Ana Siljak, Angel of Vengeance: The “Girl Assassin,” The Governor of St. Petersburg, and Russia's Revolutionary World (London: St. Martin's Press, 2008). Alex P. Schmid, “The Links between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Crimes,” Transnational Organized Crime 2, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 66–67. Personal correspondence with David Rapoport, Sept. 6, 2011. Schmid (see note 2 above), 67–68. See David C. Rapoport, “Before the Bombs There Were the Mobs: American Experiences with Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2 (2008): footnote 11; and David Rapoport, “The Politics of Atrocity,” in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Yonah Alexander and Seymore M. Finger (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), 46–63. David Gilbert, Students for a Democratic Society and the Weather Underground Organization (Toronto: Arm the Spirit, 2001). Bin Laden said the rebels in Saudi Arabia were freedom fighters, not terrorists in an interview with CNN, as noted in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, Al Qaeda in its Own Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 52. David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004); and David Rapoport (see note 5 above, 2008), 167–194. David Rapoport (see note 5 above, 2008), footnote 11. Personal correspondence with David Rapoport. Ibid. David Rapoport (see note 5 above, 2008), footnote 11; and David Rapoport (see note 5 above, 1977), 46–63. 22 United States Code, Section 2656 (d) - cit. United States Department Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publications, April 2000), p. viii. David Rapoport (see note 5 above, 2008), footnote 12. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, Rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 40–41. Phil Williams, “Strategy for a New World: Combating Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis et al. (Oxford University Press, 2007), 195–196. Phil Williams (see note 16 above), p. 196. Loretta Napoleoni, “The New Economy of Terror: How Terrorism is Financed,” Forum on Crime and Society 4, nos. 1 and 2 (December 2004): 31–33. Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 1999), 211. Tamara Makarenko, “The Ties the Bind: Uncovering the Relationship between Organized Crime and Terrorism,” in Global Organized Crime: Trends and Developments, ed. Dina Siegel, Henk Van De Bunt, and Damian Zaitch (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), 159–170; R. T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance and the Underworld of Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 44–87; Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation,” Studies of Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 1 (2001): 43–58; Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 49–61; John T. Picarelli, “Turbulent Nexus of Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism: A Theory of Malevolent International Relations,” Global Crimes 7, no. 1 (2006): 1–24; Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed, and How to Stop it (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003); Louise Shelley and John Picarelli, “The Diversity of the Crime-Terror Interaction,” International Annals of Criminology 43 (2005): 51–81; and Louise Shelley and John Picarelli, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 39–55. Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism,” Global Crime 6, no. 1 (February 2004): 129. Loretta Napoleoni (see note 18 above), 31–33. Makarenko (see note 21 above), 135; James J. F. Forest, ed., Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). See James J. F. Forest, “Engaging Non-State Actors in Zones of Competing Governance,” Journal of Threat Convergence 1, no. 1 (Fall 2010): 10–21. James J. F. Forest, “Collaboration between International Organized Crime and Terrorist Networks,” Annual Joint Conference of the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association and the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association, Providence, RI, 2010. Mark Galeotti, “Hard Times – Organized Crime and the Financial Crisis,” Jane's Intelligence Review (July 24, 2009). Vanda Felbab-Brown and James Forest, “Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa,” Terrorism and Political Violence (Summer 2012, forthcoming). The Failed State Index compiles a variety of social, economic, and political indicators and is produced annually by The Fund for Peace and published in Foreign Policy magazine. For more information, please see http://www.fundforpeace.org. For example, see Louise Shelley, John Picarelli, et al., “Methods and Motives: Exploring Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism” (June 23, 2005: Final report of research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, Grant No. 2003-IJ-CS-1019), 59–75; and case studies published by The Center for the Study of Threat Convergence at The Fund for Peace, available online at: http://www.fundforpeace.org/tc “Growing Links Between Crime and Terrorism the Focus of UN Forum,” UN Press Service, 16 March 2011, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID-37780&cr=terrorism&cr1 The White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (June 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; and The White House, National Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (July 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Strategy_to_Combat_Transnational_Organized_Crime_July_2011.pdf For studies of the latter, see James. J. F. Forest, ed., Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009); James J. F. Forest, “Exploiting the Fears of Al-Qaida's Leadership,” The Sentinel 2, no. 2 (2009): 8–10; James J. F. Forest, “Influence Warfare and Modern Terrorism,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 10, no. 1 (2009): 81–90; and James J. F. Forest, “Exploiting al-Qaida's Inconvenient Truths,” Perspectives on Terrorism (Winter 2012, forthcoming).
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle