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Enregistrement W1984018585 · doi:10.1353/crc.2014.0030

Paradigm Lost in the Interpretation of The Book of Changes

2014· article· en· W1984018585 sur OpenAlexvenueno aff

Notice bibliographique

RevueCanadian review of comparative literature · 2014
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineArts and Humanities
ThématiquePhilosophy and History of Science
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésParadigm shiftNormal scienceEpistemologyInterpretation (philosophy)Meaning (existential)Field (mathematics)PhilosophySociologyLinguistics

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Paradigm Lost in the Interpretation of The Book of Changes Keyang Dou I. Paradigm theory and the Paradigm of Yi Etymologically, philosophical use of the word “paradigm” is not new, but has been in use since classical Greece; for instance, Plato used paradeigma to name the model or the pattern in his philosophy as paradeigma (Timaeus 28A). However, it was Thomas Kuhn who first delineated the modern concept of the paradigm in a series of publications since the 1950s, among which The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (hereafter SSR) is the best known and most often quoted. Since then, the impact of the word paradigm, and the extensive debates about it which have prevailed in the field, went far beyond Kuhn’s own expectations. Today, the Kuhnian paradigm is not only a common concept in the study of the philosophy of science, but has also been more broadly deployed across academia. In China, people are already accustomed to defining a certain academic method or a system of thought as a certain paradigm, and the thorough evolution in methodology would always be called a “revolutionary paradigm”. However, despite extensive discussion, paradigm theory is yet far from a mature concept. One major reason is that Kuhn failed to give a clear and concrete definition to the concept, and this failure led to hot debate about the meaning and function of the paradigm. Within this debate, one essay, “The Nature of a Paradigm” (Masterman 1970), identified 21 possible meanings of “paradigm”. By attempting to interpret Kuhn’s intentions, people have offered various definitions and analyses of the concept of the paradigm. In response, Kuhn presented a series of articles and monologues to further clarify the theory, but in vain. The interpretation of the paradigm seemed to fall into a dilemma: sometimes “paradigm” acquired explanatory definitions as widely separated as “promise” or “community”, and was in later articles replaced by [End Page 254] the new term “disciplinary matrix” (Buchwald & George 1997). However, Kuhn’s perplexity at the nachleben of his concept did not, in any case, impede the broad acceptance of the paradigm as a deployable concept. It seems paradoxical, but it is just this paradox that reveals the key feature of the concept of the paradigm: its methodological priority to all rules. Firstly, it is the uncertainty in the definition of the paradigm which suggests that it is not a definitive rule, and it is this uncertainty that allowed for such an enormous impact on the history of science. In his SSR, Kuhn described the existence of the concept of the paradigm: “The determination of shared paradigms is not, however, the determination of shared rules…indeed, the existence of a paradigm need not even imply that any full set of rules exists” (43, 44). In Kuhn’s view, “the existence of the paradigm sets the problem to be solved; often the paradigm theory is implicated directly in the design of apparatus able to solve the problem” (27). In this sense, the paradigm can solve problems in the absence of an explicated set of rules, and apparently the latter are derived from certain paradigms, which indicates the fact that the paradigm is more like an orientation—which can transcend all specific rules—and also reversely orient all rules within its own horizon. This is what renders “paradigm” a most promising and attractive term, and what has motivated its rapid adoption across various research horizons. Nevertheless, many scholars still make the mistake of equating the paradigm to a rule, even if unconsciously. Attempts to confine the paradigm within a solid concept can only progress into deviations from the particular elasticity of the Kuhnian concept of the paradigm. Secondly, according to Kuhn, the existence of the paradigm is only expressed within an epistemological system: “The existence of this strong network of commitments—conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological—is a principal source of the metaphor that relates normal science to puzzle-solving” (Kuhn 42). Apparently, the so-called “existence of this strong network” stressed the integrity of the paradigm. This integrity is not simply one quality among others, but a theoretical system hidden amongst objective practices: “Only as experiment and tentative theory are together articulated...

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,004
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,009
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Théorique ou conceptuel · Signal consensuel: Théorique ou conceptuel
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,011
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,082

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0040,009
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,001
Bibliométrie0,0030,002
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0050,024
Communication savante0,0110,015
Science ouverte0,0020,005
Intégrité de la recherche0,0040,009
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0110,002

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,031
Tête enseignante GPT0,249
Écart entre enseignants0,218 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeThéorique ou conceptuel
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2014
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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Même revueCanadian review of comparative literatureMême sujetPhilosophy and History of ScienceTravaux en français237 207