What Makes ISAF S/tick: An Investigation of the Politics of Coalition Burden-Sharing¹

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 This article is built on earlier work (Hynek and Marton 2011), and contains the previously unpublished synthesis of research, in Nik Hynek, and Péter Marton, (eds.), Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction(London: Routledge 2011); it also takes that research forward in new directions. Funding provided by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic (grant P408/12/P970) is gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are our own 2 The use of the adjective ‘complex’ may be warranted given that the mission in Afghanistan is a joint, combined, interagency effort, or in other words a multinational “whole-of-government engagement” integrating IGO/NGO (inter-governmental organisations/non-governmental organisation) efforts as well, and, at the same time, as Bensahel points out, a coalition within a coalition of coalitions, Nora Bensahel, A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006) pp.35–49. 3 See note 1. 4 See Andrew Bennett, Joseph Lepgold and Danny Unger, ‘Burden-Sharing in the Persian Gulf War’. International Organisation 48/1 (1994) pp.39–75; Jyoti Khanna and Todd Sandler, ‘NATO burden-sharing: 1960–1992’, Defence and Peace Economics 8/1 (1996) pp.101–20; Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler, ‘NATO Burden-Sharing: Past and Future’, Journal of Peace Research 36/6 (1999) pp.665–-80; R.L. DiNardo and Daniel J. Hughes, ‘Germany and Coalition Warfare in the World Wars: A Comparative Study’. War in History 8/2 (April 2001) pp.166–90; H. Shimizu and T. Sandler, ‘NATO Peacekeeping and Burden Sharing: 1994–2000’, Public Finance Review 31/2 (2003) pp.123–43; David P. Auerswald, ‘Explaining Wars of Choice: An Integrated Decision Model of NATO Policy in Kosovo’, International Studies Quarterly 48/3 (2004) pp.631–62; Thomas Stow Wilkins, ‘Analysing Coalition Warfare from an Intra-Alliance Politics Perspective: The Normandy Campaign 1944’, Journal of Strategic Studies 29/6 (Dec. 2006) pp. 1121–50; Sarah Kreps, ‘The 1994 Haiti Intervention: A Unilateral Operation in Multilateral Clothes’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30/3 (June 2007) pp.449–74; Songying Fang and Kristopher W. Ramsay, Burden-sharing in Nonbinding Alliances (2007), article awaiting publication, <www.polisci.umn.edu/~sfang/alliances%20JCR%202.0.pdf> (Accessed on 23 June 2008); Jens Ringsmose,‘ Paying for Protection: Denmark’s Military Expenditure during the Cold War. Cooperation and Conflict 44/1 (2009) pp.73–97; and Sarah Kreps, ‘Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion: Why Public Opinion Hardly Matters for NATO-led Operations in Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy Analysis 6/3 (2010) pp.191–215. 5 Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (note 4). 6 Except, perhaps, for the value attached to performing successfully the role of ‘good servant’. 7 Senlis Council,Poppy for Medicine Licensing poppy for the production of essential medicines: an integrated counter-narcotics, development, and counter-insurgency model for Afghanistan, June 2007 <www.poppyformedicine.net/documents/Poppy_for_medicine_in_Afghanistan> (Accessed on 12 Oct. 2010). Subscribing to an approach whereby one only takes into account threats relatively consistently securitised also entails not considering poliomyelitis as a threat, whereas this could be debated in the case of Afghanistan. One of the only few remaining hotspots of poliomyelitis, after it has been eradicated in much of the world, is the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Armed conflicts there significantly hamper vaccination efforts which would require multiple rounds of oral vaccination to each child in need of being immunised. Given that this makes the eradication of the disease difficult in the current circumstances, the poliomyelitis virus could eventually pose a risk even to populations distant from the region, with likely carriers being members of the Afghan and Pakistani diasporas, travelling to locations around the globe by air and otherwise. 8 Péter Marton, Grand Theory meets the Afghan case: State failure and state-building in an age of opaque policy-making, doctoral thesis, Budapest: Corvinus University of Budapest, Aug. 2009. 9 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis (Boulder: CO/ London: Lynne Rienner 1998). 10 Marton (note 8) p.97. 11 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Cambridge: CUP 2006) p.20. 12 ET, ‘German terror suspects targeted “US soldiers in Europe” – Summary’, Earth Times, 10 Aug. 2009, <www.earthtimes.org/articles/news/280866,german-terror-suspects-targeted-us-soldiers-in-europe--summary.html> (Accessed on 12 Oct. 2010). 13 Yassin Musharbash, ‘Jihadists Describe Hatred of US as Reason for Terror Plot’, Der Spiegel, 12 Aug. 2009, <www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,642047,00.html> (Accessed on 12 Oct. 2010). 14 Thomas Hegghammer, ‘Lady Gaga vs. the Occupation’. Foreign Policy, 31 March 2010, <www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/31/lady_gaga_vs_the_occupation> (Accessed on 8 Sept. 2010). 15 Perhaps it would be better to write off the possibility of a counternarcotics motive overall, but this could seem to contradict an existing consensus that this motive does and should play a role. That consensus itself may be only present on the surface, and results from a number of factors. Examining this possibility, however, is not part of the investigation undertaken in this article. 16 See note 4 for a list of relevant references. 17 Kreps, ‘The 1994 Haiti Intervention’ (note 4). 18 J. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1997). 19 Wilkins, ‘Analysing Coalition Warfare from an Intra-Alliance Politics Perspective’ (note 4). 20 NATO’s Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) have been the organisation’s two main responses to this challenge so far. 21 Fang and Ramsay, Burden-sharing in Nonbinding Alliances (note 4) 22 Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (note 4). 23 Fang and Ramsay (note 4) p.4. 24 Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (note 4). 25 Ringsmose (note 4); Anessa L. Kimball,. ‘Political survival, policy distribution, and alliance formation’, Journal of Peace Research 47/4 (2010) p.407. 26 Kreps, ‘Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion’ (note 4). 27 ‘Anan’ Reader comment to: ‘Discussing European Efforts at Afghan Reconstruction’ by Joshua Foust 2010,<www.registan.net/index.php/2010/11/11/discussing-european-efforts-at-afghan-reconstruction/#comments> (Accessed 19 Nov. 2010). 28 Ringsmose (note 4); Marcus Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, ‘An Economic Theory of Alliances’, Review of Economics and Statistics 48/3 (1966) pp.266–79. 29 Hartley and Sandler (note 4) p.668. 30 In the opening chapter of: Péter Marton and –Nik Hynek, (eds.),) Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction (London: Routledge 2011). 31 Auerswald (note 4) p.643 builds an integrated model of some of Bennett, Lepgold and Unger’s component variables, one that is well-suited to analysing potentially even the case of Afghanistan, albeit it was devised to recover determinants of NATO countries’ policy towards Operation ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo. In Auerswald’s model ‘alliance dependence’ does not receive as great emphasis as in this article, given the context in which it was developed. The latter variable, important in Bennett, Lepgold and Unger (note 4), is dealt with essentially as but one component of Auerswald’s factors affecting a country’s propensity to partake in the provision of a collective good. This is one of the reasons why we propose an altered integrated model here. 32 This may be measured in quantitative terms, e.g. of the number of troops deployed, as well as by qualitative measures such as the absence or presence of caveats restricting what types of engagement a country’s troops may become involved in, or the difficulty of the geographical and social terrain which significantly vary across different areas of operations. 33 Kreps, ‘Elite Consensus as a Determinant of Alliance Cohesion’ (note 4) p.195 34 It also needs to be borne in mind that the Netherlands and Canada are not planning to completely relinquish a military role, given their involvement in the training of Afghan National Security Forces. At the same time, other aspects of their involvement will also continue past mid-2011; for example, in the wake of its mission in Uruzgan province, the Netherlands returned to the north of Afghanistan, to Kunduz province, with a police training mission. This is why the O3 option in the scheme is eventually indicated as an honorary, but potentially only partial exit. 35 ISAF-P ISAF Placemat, NATO, 4 March 2011 (http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/PLACEMAT.MARCH%2004.pdf) (Accessed 10 April 2012). 36 Ali Ashraf, ‘The politics of coalition burden-sharing: The case of the war in Afghanistan’, doctoral thesis, Univ. of Pittsburgh 2011. 37 Ibid. p.75. 38 Thies, Wallace J (1989) :”Crises and the Study of Alliance Politics,” Armed Forces and Society 15 (Spring 1989): 349-369. 39 Institutionally, capability development within NATO is coordinated by Allied Command Transformation’s Capability Development Directorate in cooperation with the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC). The Directorate is organised into five divisions. Its responsibility covers the Capability Development Process from the identification of capability development needs to overseeing implementation within the Alliance : NATO Capability Development (CAP DEV), NATO Allied Command Transformation. Date not indicated,<www.act.nato.int/index.php/organization/hq-sact/structure/capability-development> (Accessed on 22 Feb. 2012). 40 Péter Wagner, ‘9/11 és a Magyar Honvédség’, Nemzet és Biztonság, 2011/8, pp.64–71. 41 ‘Az USA 3 milliárd forinttal támogatja a Magyar Honvédséget’, Index, 24 Jan. 2012, <http://index.hu/kulfold/2012/01/24/az_usa_3_milliard_forinttal_tamogatja_a_magyar_honvedseget/> (Accessed on 2 Feb. 2012). 42 Tom A. Peter, ‘In deadly Kandahar, skepticism over gains cited in Afghan war review’, Christian Science Monitor, 16 Dec. 2010, <www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2010/1216/In-deadly-Kandahar-skepticism-over-gains-cited-in-Afghan-war-review/(page)/2> (Accessed on 18 Dec. 2010). 43 William Maley, ‘PRT Activity in Afghanistan: The Australian Experience’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.124–38. 44 Stephen Hoadley, The New Zealand PRT Experience in Bamyan Province: Assessing Political Legitimacy and Operational Achievements, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.139–56, at p.150. 45 Péter Marton and Péter Wagner, ‘Hungary’s Involvement in Afghanistan: Proudly Going Through the Motions?’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.192–211. 46 Egdūnas Račius, ‘Trials and Tribulations of the Lithuanian Participation in the NATO ISAF Mission, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.261–77, at p. 264. 47 Łukasz Kulesa and Beata Górka-Winter, ‘From Followers to Leaders as “Coalition Servants”: The Polish Engagement in Afghanistan, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.212–25, at p.223. 48 Nik Hynek and Jan Eichler, ‘Post-decisional and Alliance-dependent: The Czech Engagement in Logar’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.226–42, at p.238. 49 Joshua Foust, ‘France in Kapisa: A Combined Approach to Statebuilding’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.88–103, at pp.99–100. 50 Ibid. p.98. 51 Petros Vamvakas, ‘Turkey’s ISAF mission: A Maverick with Strategic Depth’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.243–260. 52 Anthony King, ‘Operation Herrick: The British Campaign in Helmand, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.27–41. 53 53 Sebastiaan Rietjens, ‘Between Expectations and Reality: The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.65–87. 54 Timo Behr, ‘Germany and Regional Command-North: ISAF ’s Weakest Link?’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.42–64, at pp.58–9. 55 Kristian Harpviken, ‘A Peace Nation in the War on Terror: The Norwegian Engagement in Afghanistan’, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.157–173, at p.170. 56 Behr (note 54) p.58. 57 Charly Salonius-Pasternak, ‘Finland’s ISAF Experience: Rewarding, Challenging and on the Edges of the Politically Feasible, in Hynek and Marton (note 1) pp.174–191, at p.187.

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