Pourquoi ce travail est dans la base
Une base qui oublie comment elle a trouvé un travail ne peut pas être vérifiée. Voici les voies qui ont admis celui-ci.
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Unanswered Questions:Bioethics and Human Relationships Eric J. Cassell (bio) This essay is based on a plenary address at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and the Humanities, delivered upon acceptance of a Lifetime Achievement Award. I do not consider myself primarily an ethicist, but I have spent most of my life as a physician thinking about what to do for sick people. Like many other internists, I have usually found the technical aspects of these problems easier to solve than the personal and moral issues. We are all unique individuals living in a world of others, and it is a sometimes uncomfortable fact that whatever is done for one person inevitably has implications for others, some of whom are so close to that person as to be almost one with him or her. Despite all the thought we in bioethics have devoted to these problems, and despite the considerable and continued growth of bioethics, some of our most difficult questions remain unanswered. This realization is driven home for me when I recall my inaugural experience in bioethics. I was introduced to The Hastings Center (then the Institute for Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences) at a meeting of the Task Force on Death and Dying in January 1971. Leon Kass, who went on to chair the President's Council on Bioethics, had read my essay "Death and the Physician," and Dan Callahan thought the perspective of a practicing internist might be useful. My presentation, "The Care of the Dying," responded to a chapter, "On (Only) Caring for the Dying," in Paul Ramsey's book The Patient as Person. The chapter broached many ethical issues concerning patients who are dying, but I restricted my comments to the most common problems. I included what some of my patients thought about the problems, in addition to the disparity between what patients mean by the term "dying" and what "dying" means to physicians. Ramsey asked: "Must a terminal cancer patient be urged to undergo major surgery for the sake of a few months palliation?" "How much blood are we going to give a terminal patient . . . ?" "Should transfusions for the treatment of hemorrhage from gastrointestinal cancer be discontinued when an operation to relieve this condition is not contemplated or feasible?" "Is there no end to the doctor's vocation to maintain life until the matter is taken out of his hands?" Or, put another way, "[O]ught there be any relief for the dying from a physician's search for exquisite triumphs over death in a sort of salvation by works?"1 The gist of the chapter is that physicians have no obligation to continue the lives of persons who had been "seized by their particular process of dying," and that a physician should "make room for the dispensability of extraordinary life-sustaining treatments because he as a man acknowledges that there may be sufficient moral and human reasons for this decision" (my italics). Ramsey gives an example of incompetent patients where further treatment would be of no avail and families are unable, because of guilt, to cease treatment. "[G]uilt ridden people in their grief may be unable to bear the additional burden of a decision to discontinue treatment, and they are often relieved if this decision is not wholly placed on them." "This means that the physician must exercise the authority he has acquired as a physician and as a man in relation to the relatives and take the lead in suggesting what should be done. In doing this the doctor acts more as a man than as a medical expert, acknowledging the preeminence of the human relations in which he with these and all other men stand" (italics mine).2 His emphasis on the central importance in medical relations of the person (the physician as well as the patient) and human relations was something I, a high-technology (for the times) internist, had not previously encountered. Many of his other ideas were also new to me. Even the style of the writing was very different from medical writing. As imposing as he was in print, Paul Ramsey was an even more impressive speaker. I had never before...
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle