Notice bibliographique
Résumé
The Atlantic slave trade, which lasted from the mid-fifteenth century until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, was a distinctive event in both global history and the history of slavery. There have been, of course, other large coerced migrations in history, notably in the mid-twentieth century when millions of people in Europe and Asia were moved from place to place in a very short period of time. Moreover, voluntary migration has often exceeded the levels of migration recorded in the Atlantic slave trade. Between 1815 and 1930, 51.7 million people left Europe for other destinations, mostly in the New World, of whom the British alone contributed 18.7 million, or 36 per cent (Richards, 2004: 4-6). As Gwyn Campbell notes in Chapter 3 of this volume, the total volume of the slave trade in the Indian Ocean World probably equalled and perhaps exceeded the volume of captives in the Atlantic slave trade. Yet the Atlantic slave trade was distinctive in a number of important ways. As DavidEltis and David Richardson argue, the Atlantic slave trade was “a new phenomenon in the human experience”. It was “the largest transoceanic forced migration in history” whereby “relatively small improvements to the quality of life of a people on one continent [Europe] … were made possible by the removal of others from a second continent [Africa], and their draconian exploitation on yet a third[the Americas]” (Eltis and Richardson, 2008: 1, 2, 45). As other essays in this volume show, the Atlantic slave trade was the means whereby the Americas were repopulated by Africans, and made profitable to Europeans in the process. The repopulation process was demographically very significant. Before 1820, about four Africans arrived in the Americas for every single European. Between 1760 and 1820, this emigrating flow amounted to 5.6 Africans per one European. By the end of this period, nearly 8.7 million Africans had been taken against their will to the Americas, as opposed to just 2.6 million Europeans, only a small proportion of whom came to the Americas voluntarily (ibid.: 45). Without the Atlantic slave trade, and the continual inflow of forced labour that wentto the plantation societies of the American South, the Caribbean and Iberian America, the Americas would have been much less profitable, much less quickly than they were. As Barbara Solow (1991) notes, it was slavery that ensured colonial economic growth: those areas that had slaves prospered, those that were too poor to be able to exploit slaves languished. Through the Atlantic slave trade, African chattel slavery was made possible in the Americas and, in turn, the plantation system was able to succeed. The disease environment in tropical and sub-tropical regions of the Americas was malign,and the work that labourers were forced to do, especially when required to cultivate sugar cane, proved very injurious to health. Before the nineteenth century, no sugarproducing region and few plantation areas outside the American South were able to have a self-sustaining labouring population. In order to keep the plantation system going, a system that, as Richard Follett argues in Chapter 7 of this volume, devoured human lives, fresh inputs of labour were always required. These inputs were achieved through the increasingly more economically efficient transportation of captive Africans from West and Central Africa in what became known as the triangular trade (ships coming from Europe, picking up slaves in Africa, and depositing them in the Americas before returning to Europe). The consequences of this trade were profound for all four continents involved. It was a primary way in which an Atlantic world was created in “one of the most ambitious experiments in social engineering of the early modern era: the establishment of slave plantations” (ibid.; Osterhammel and Petersson, 2005: 47). Nevertheless, the Atlantic slave trade was more than just an economic event. It wasboth a profound tragedy, one of the worst and most sustained crimes committed in history, and also an arena of dramatic social transformation. The Atlantic slave trade was the most visible indication in the Atlantic of how the Columbian encounter had opened up a virtually unconstrained form of capitalism, in which morality was placed below economic gain, and where slave traders devised new and ingenious ways in which to reduce everything, including people, to the status of commodities. The commodification of people was, as Stephanie Smallwood argues, an ultimate expression of the power of the market to alter social sensibility. The Atlantic slave trade, she suggests, was where “individual paths of misfortune merged into the commodifying Atlantic apparatus – the material, economic, and social mechanisms by which the market molded subjects into beings that more closely resembled objects – beings that existed solely for the use of those that claimed to hold them as possessions”. At bottom, the slave trade became a battle for souls, to use the religious language favoured by abolitionists in late-eighteenthcentury Britain, who saw in the slave trade a visible manifestation of original sin. Slavers tried to deny slaves’ full personhood through the commodification of Africans into slaves. Africans, as Smallwood states, “tried to restore through her unassisted agency the pulse of social integration that saltwater slavery threatened to extinguish”. The Atlantic slave trade, therefore, was crucial in helping to shape African diasporas in the New World (Smallwood, 2007a: 63, 182, 187).
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,004 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,006 | 0,004 |
| Communication savante | 0,004 | 0,003 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,028 | 0,002 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».