Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Irrespective of his field of study, the strategist, who is today's somewhat more scientific counterpart of the sorcerer and soothsayer of yesteryear, should in time be able to recognize at what point and to what extent the dynamics of a system shifts from a familiar earlier world to a relatively unknown new world.-Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann(1)CANADIAN PROBLEMS WITH AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY are unlikely to fade, even in the improbable event that the Democrats unseat the president in November 2004. Global political-strategic relationships are in the midst of a profound transformation that will end in either an essentially democratic, environmentally sustainable global community by the middle of this century, or a hell on earth, as a beleaguered, affluent, mostly white minority fight to protect their privileged, apartheid-like existence. George W. Bush's imperial, hegemonic, and primacy-seeking America is currently attempting to take charge of the core security issues of this process by demanding that the United States be given the primary legitimate authority to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the continuing threat of international terrorism. It is far from clear that Bush's foreign policy will be politically sustainable in the US. His administration's conduct of the Iraq war is not popular at home and deeply distrusted abroad. Bush has defined his task to include the democratization of Iraq, which is almost certainly beyond his army's abilities, given their too small numbers, lack of cultural familiarity with Iraq and inexperience in peacebuilding.(2) A few thousand more war dead and the transparent failure of Iraqi-ization might damage Bush so badly that reelection will be impossible. A precipitate American withdrawal from Iraq coupled, perhaps, with another major terrorist attack against the US--one far worse than 9/11 involving a WMD--could pave the way for an era of neo-isolationism in American foreign policy.A neo-isolationist America would be just as, if not even more, consequential to the outcome of the global transformation process. A critical debate has been occurring within the American national security policy community involving the most fundamental choices about US for over a decade. Canadians will be powerfully affected by the outcome, and have more than a little interest in promoting a moderate, multilaterally inclined result--the selection of an American geopolitical strategy that does not entail a quest for permanent military superiority over all potential peer competitors.(3) It is one thing to end up after an evolutionary historical process with military dominance, but it is quite another to set about as a matter of declared national policy to perpetuate that dominance indefinitely. Such hubris has already inspired fear among allies and rivals, and if continued will lead to balancing behaviour from other major powers and future crisis instability.(4)Largely because of Canada's 15-year-long extraction of a deficit-fighting peace dividend from the Canadian Forces, Ottawa's ability to influence American grand strategy choices is minimal to nil. Canadian international security policy challenges, at their most basic, derive from the severe fiscal myopia of the national political elite, as well as Canadians' wilful ignorance of global geostrategic relationships. In effect, Canada's self-imposed disarmament has said no to the Bush team's appeal for help in Iraq far more effectively than dino Chretien's skeptical insistence on a legitimating UN framework as the sine qua non for Ottawa's direct involvement. Chretien's careful underreaction and studied avoidance of the language of crisis was part of a broader foreign policy approach that eschewed military involvement--and by implication rejected the American call for an international policy on counterproliferation. If Canadians were to fight for reasons of alliance solidarity (i. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,005 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».