Notice bibliographique
Résumé
The day ExxonMobil announced a first-quarter profit of U.S. $8.4 billion—eliciting protests from politicians and consumer groups—its stock price dropped. The huge profits disappointed some Wall Street analysts who were expecting even larger cash flows. That underscores big oil's dilemma: trying to satisfy the short-term interests of the market and the political sphere while meeting the long-term goals of production needed to satisfy the world's growing appetite for fuel. As oil prices rise and peak-oil theorists get wider attention, some are calling on the oil industry to pump massive amounts of capital into the system to meet growing demand and to debottleneck supply constraints. The Intl. Energy Agency believes the industry should spend U.S. $7 trillion by 2030 to quench global consumption needs. But while large oil companies are reporting healthy profits this year with oil at $70/bbl, increasing production is proving to be a formidable challenge. Besides the short-term pressures of the financial markets and analysts, there is an increasing shortage of qualified technical labor for upstream projects. In a recent speech at a conference in Washington, DC, Edgard Habib, chief economist for Chevron, said the labor shortage is particularly acute in the services sector, which finds itself "maxed out." Access to promising acreage is also becoming a significant hurdle in some regions. In places such as the U.S., politics and public opinion have put many areas out of bounds to investment, such as parts of Alaska and offshore areas on the west, east, and Gulf coasts. Many national governments—eager to get a larger share of the pie now that oil prices have risen sharply, or because of leftward shifts in ideology—are narrowing the opportunities for credible investment by international oil companies (IOCs). Latin America is a primary example. In the course of just a few months, Venezuela hiked royalties significantly and increased control of upstream investment, including four heavy oil projects involving some of the largest majors; Bolivia nationalized its natural gas business; and Ecuador took control of some of Occidental's fields after canceling the company's contracts. In a tight supply/demand environment, such actions that seem to threaten available oil supplies lead to more price volatility, which increases political pressure on oil firms. Ernst & Young recently studied 10 energy "hot spots" and their investment climates. Five appeared to be favorable places to invest (Norway, Canada, Qatar, India, and the United Arab Emirates); three countries looked promising for investment with caution (China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia), and two (Nigeria and Indonesia) appeared to have challenges that might impede foreign investment significantly. Among the criteria were economic stability and tax policy, government structure, legal and regulatory systems, infrastructure, and the availability of skilled workers. IOCs walk a tightrope of pleasing the market, returning value to shareholders, and increasing long-term production. The ideal is world-class fields that provide long-term output growth, cheaper lifting costs, and opportunities for enhanced oil recovery. For the record, IOCs have been raising capital and R&D spending and have been investing in large-scale projects with promising opportunities for growth as they record healthy, sometimes even record, profits. ExxonMobil recently bought a stake in the massive Abu Dhabi Upper Zakum field; BP is pushing ahead on major projects in Trinidad, the Gulf of Mexico, and Russia; Chevron and Shell have increased investments in Canadian heavy oil ventures; and several companies have re-entered Libya. The consultancy Cambridge Energy Research Assocs. calculates that as much as 15 million BOPD of global capacity could come on line by 2010.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».