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Enregistrement W2040287064 · doi:10.1353/can.2004.0085

Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: 1950-1963 (review)

2004· article· en· W2040287064 sur OpenAlexvenueaboutno aff
David J. Bercuson

Notice bibliographique

RevueCanadian Historical Review · 2004
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueMilitary and Defense Studies
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésNuclear weaponAllianceNuclear strategyPolitical scienceReputationGrand strategyLawForeign policyOffensiveNational securityPoliticsOperations researchEngineering

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Reviewed by: Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: 1950-1963 David J. Bercuson Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons: 1950-1963. Andrew Richter. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002. Pp. x, 224. $85.00 cloth, $27.95 paper The University of British Columbia Press has been rapidly establishing a solid reputation as one of a handful of presses in English-speaking Canada that provides a warm welcome for Canadian defence and security titles and Canadian military history. This book joins a recent collection that will only enhance that reputation. Andrew Richter has undertaken a daunting task in a mere 163 pages of text: to recount the signal role that nuclear weapons played in Canadian foreign and defence policy and the evolution of the Canadian military from virtually the dawn of the Cold War to the beginning of the Pearson era. Not only that, but he brings his analysis forward virtually to the recent war against Saddam Hussein. He does that to demonstrate his main conclusion - that since the late 1950s at least, Canada has pursued two contradictory policy goals to the detriment of both. What were those goals? They were to be a good ally of the United States and NATO on the one hand, but to cover Canada's basic and instinctive alliance to the western cause on the other, with outward manifestations of neutralism and pacifism. Indeed, on the very last page of his text Richter proclaims his purpose: 'It is my belief that Canada cannot identify a security policy for the new century unless it fully understands the choices made in the one just ended. Rather than continuing to accept assumptions about Canadian security that have gone untested for decades, the challenge facing students and observers of Canadian defence is to re-examine established dogmas and the truths that result from them.' This book is his contribution to the debate. The story Richter tells is basically this: although Canada had no nuclear military ambitions of its own coming out of the Second World War, it recognized the importance of developing realistic foreign and defence policies that would complement the nuclear retaliatory capabilities of the United States. Some Canadians - the late R.J. Sutherland being the best example, but not the only one - also endeavoured to ensure that those policies were not simply faint echoes of the thoughts of [End Page 572] American nuclear strategists, but were instead Canadian in conception and aimed at serving Canada's distinctive policy goals. Richter shows convincingly that the government of Louis St Laurent (1948-56) understood that Canada's chief role in a nuclear armed world was to help the US Strategic Air Command sustain its task as the West's nuclear umbrella. No one in the government loved nukes - there were no Canadian Dr. Strangeloves - but realism and an understanding of the rapidly developing nuclear power balance drove them to difficult conclusions. The hardest was that deterrence was the only defence against attack, and that the emergence of a system of mutually assured destruction ( MAD) gave at least some hope that a sanity born of terror might prevail as long as the Cold War lasted. In spite of his strong analysis, Richter is not able to avoid the occasional omission, and no one could expect such a relatively short book to cover every aspect of Canadian nuclear policy, but Richter might have also mentioned the enthusiasm with which the government began to embrace the nuclearization of NATO in the mid-1950s. Although the government was rightly concerned about both the substance and the means of announcement of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' doctrine of 'massive retaliation' in early 1954, it had no qualms about adding the first generation of 'tactical' nukes to NATO arsenals. Like the other NATO partners, Ottawa saw that the alternative seemed to be to build a military force-in-waiting that would have roughly equalled what General Dwight D. Eisenhower had under command in western Europe in the spring of 1945. After John Diefenbaker assumed office, however, Canadian policy began to go off in another direction. Richter shows convincingly - even if he does not quite explain - that Dief and Minister of Foreign Affairs...

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

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Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesÉtudes des sciences et des technologies, Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: Sans objet
GenreSignal candidat: Synthèse · Signal consensuel: Synthèse
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,111
Score d'incertitude au seuil1,000

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,002
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0020,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0000,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0010,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,036
Tête enseignante GPT0,276
Écart entre enseignants0,240 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreSynthèse

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2004
Routes d'admission2
Résumé présentoui

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