Making of the New Afghan National Army: Challenges and Prospects

Abstract The paper attempts to examine diverse challenges to the making of the new Afghan National Army (ANA), and its future prospects. The issue assumes significance as the Taliban shift battle lines outside the Pashtun areas and there is growing difference among Western countries regarding the means and approaches to be used to stabilize Afghanistan. The paper is broadly divided into four sections. The first section seeks to identify and critically examine the role played by key institutional structures responsible for the training and mentoring of the new national army. The second section deals with the challenges confronting Afghanistan which have a bearing on the development of the ANA as an effective force. The third section explores the dilemmas confronting the West, and the final section offers key assessments on the ANA's future prospects. Notes 1. Jim Garamone, ‘Afghan Army Making Tremendous Progress; Police Trail’, January 16, 2007, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=2709 (Accessed March 4, 2008). 2. After Kabul fell to the Taliban in September 1996, the UN-recognized government of President Burhanuddin Rabbani shifted its headquarters to Faizabad in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan. 3. The Afghan National Army is known as Afghan Ordou-e Melli in Dari language. 4. President Hamid Karzai announced the decree during a UN conference on ‘Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability’ held on December 2, 2002, in Germany. Among the high ranking officials present on the occasion were German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi, and High Representative of the European Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana. The decree is also known as the Petersberg Decree. 5. See ‘Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Stability’, Petersberg (Bonn, Germany), December 2, 2002, at http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/decree%20on%20army.pdf (Accessed January 6, 2008). 6. See the official Website of the ANA, at http://www.mod.gov.af/ (Accessed February 28, 2008). 7. Ali Ahmed Jalali, a former Afghan army colonel, was also the Afghan interior minister (2003–2005). He identifies at least three occasions since the late 19th century in the military history of Afghanistan when the Afghan monarchs had to recreate a state army—(i) in the 1870s by Amir Sher Ali Khan during the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); (ii) in the 1880s by Amir Abdur Rahman; and (iii) the army was remodelled by King Amanullah Khan following the third Anglo-Afghan War of 1919. The newly remodelled army, however, suffered a lot during the civil war of 1929 when a Tajik upstart occupied the Kabul throne for less than a year. As a result of this, King Nader Shah had to recreate the army after his accession in 1929 which continued under successive regimes until 1992. See Ali A. Jalali, ‘Rebuilding Afghanistan's National Army’, Parameters, 2002, pp. 72–86. 8. See, the official Website of the Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix VI, at http://www.taskforcephoenix.com/ (Accessed March 3, 2008). 9. For details visit http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/afghanistan/kabul.htm (Accessed February 29, 2008). 10. Depending upon its changing formations and command, it was first designated as CJTF-180 and later as CJTF-76. Since February 2007, it has been designated as CJTF-82. 11. See ‘Combined Joint Task Force-82’, September 7, 2007, at http://cjtf-a.com/index.php/About/About.html (Accessed March 4, 2008). 12. All programmes relating to training and mentoring of the ANA since 2002 were initially coordinated by the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan (OMCA) under overall US command. Later OMCA came under the command of CFC-A, which was established in November 2003. Satisfied with the progress made on the development of the ANA, the United States expanded OMCA's role to include the entire Afghan security sector. On July 12, 2005, OMCA was re-designated as the Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSCA). On April 4, 2006, the OSCA was re-designated as CSTC-A under the US CENTCOM. 13. ‘CSTC-A Fact Sheet’, December 1, 2007, at http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/CSTC-AFactSheet.html (Accessed March 1, 2008). 14. See ‘Fact Sheet on Afghan Regional Security Integration Command’, September 2007, at http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/ARSIC.html (Accessed February 27, 2008). 15. See ‘Coalition Forces Information’, March 4, 2008, at http://www.taskforcephoenix.com/cofor.htm (Accessed March 4, 2008). 16. See ‘Fact Sheet Afghan National Army’, September 2007, at http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/AfghanistanArmyFacts.html (Accessed March 1, 2008). The Afghan Air Force was established in August 1924 and comprised some Russian aircrafts obtained in 1921. 17. According to an Associated Press report, the ANA had 28 aging helicopters and transport planes and the Russians had overhauled 11 of them in 2004. See ‘Afghan Military Seeks Return of Fugitive Planes’, January 11, 2005, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6814109/ (Accessed January 13, 2005). 18. Hamid Shalizi, ‘Afghanistan Army to reach Targeted Strength by March’, at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSISL5175520071202 (Accessed March 3, 2008). 19. Ibid. 20. Will Dunham, ‘U.S. Sees Three More Years in Building Afghan Army’, July 13, 2006, at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1950766&C=asiapac (Accessed July 13, 2006). 21. Najib Khilwatgar, ‘Number of Afghan Troops to Be Raised to 86,000’, January 20, 2008, at http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=48854 (Accessed January 23, 2008). According to some Western sources, the total strength of the ANA would be 82,000 and not 86,000 by the end of 2008. 22. James Blitz, ‘US Calls on Nato Allies to Fund Afghan Army Growth’, September 19, 2008, at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8f85ffa2-85e3-11dd-a1ac-0000779fd18c.html?nclick_check=1 (Accessed September 20, 2008). 23. The author did not come across any latest information on the ethnic composition/breakdown of the ANA. 24. Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Afghanistan's National Army: The Ambiguous Prospects of Afghanization’, May 1, 2008, at http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2374139 (Accessed May 3, 2008). 25. Scott Baldauf, ‘A “Half Full” Afghan Army’, February 10, 2006, at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0210/p06s02-wosc.html?s=widep (Accessed February 10, 2006). 26. Formally known as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. It is also often referred to as the United Front. 27. It is interesting to note that the Taliban would carry out a spontaneous disarmament programme as they captured a city. For instance, when they captured Jalalabad they disarmed the entire city. However, each household was allowed to retain one weapon for their personal security. See ‘Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Afghanistan’, February 12, 2004, at http://www.jca.apc.org/∼jann/Documents/DDR.pdf (Accessed February 4, 2006). 28. The security sector reforms which were initiated in 2002 basically focused on reforms in five areas—military reforms led by the United States; police reforms led by Germany; a DDR programme led by Japan; judicial reforms led by Italy; and counter-narcotics programmes led by the United Kingdom. 29. There were also differences with regard to the process of identification and the total number of militiamen to be disarmed. According to the United Nations, there were about 94,000 combatants to be disarmed, much less than the figure provided by the Afghan MoD which was around 250,000. See Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘From Soldier to Civilian: Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration in Afghanistan’, DIIS Report, 2006, p. 16, at http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2006/RP2006-7web.pdf (Accessed June 8, 2006). 30. See the fact sheet of the DDR, ‘DDR: Reintegration Has Been Completed in Time and Within Costs’, July 1, 2006, at http://www.undpanbp.org/Overview/factsheet.htm (Accessed March 6, 2008). According to a report by the Danish Institute of International Affairs released in 2006, only about three per cent of the demobilized militiamen actually joined the ANA and most of them were young and inexperienced. See Peter Dahl Thruelsen, n. 29. 31. According to a report published in the New York Times quoting officials involved in the process, nearly 40 per cent of the weapons collected under the DDR and ongoing DIAG process were not functional. See Kirk Semple, ‘Afghan Ex-Militia Leaders Hoard Arms’, October 28, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/world/asia/28weapons.html?_r=1&th=&oref=slogin&emc=th&pagewanted=all (Accessed October 28, 2007). 32. See the DIAG Website at http://www.diag.gov.af/history.htm (Accessed March 4, 2008). 33. Ahmad Khalid Moahid, ‘500 Officials Hold Illegal Arms’, January 25, 2007, at http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=30892 (Accessed January 27, 2007). 34. The Afghan field commanders informed him that ANA soldiers ‘try to seize weapons from the Taliban who they believe are much better armed’. The report observes that the ANA units ‘do not have mortars, few machine guns, no MK19 grenade machine guns, and no artillery. They have almost no helicopter or fixed wing transport or attack aviation now or planned. They have no body armor or blast glasses. They have no Kevlar helmets. They have no up-armored Humvees or light armor tracked vehicles (like the M113A3 with machine gun cupolas and with slat armor)'. See General (Retd.) Barry R. McCaffrey, ‘Academic Report-Trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan (May 19–May 26, 2006)', June 3, 2006, pp. 6–7, at http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/McCaffreyBarry.VisitToAfghanistan.05.06.pdf (Accessed March 7, 2007). 35. Ibid., p. 7. 36. After Action Report of General (Retd.) Barry R. McCaffrey's visit during July 21–26, 2008, at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/08/general-mccaffrey-afghanistan-1/ (Accessed August 10, 2008). 37. Sumit Dayal, ‘Afghanistan: The New National Army Strives to Professionalize’, September 21, 2007, at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav092107f.shtml (Accessed October 1, 2007). 38. Haroun Mir, ‘Bolster the Afghan National Army’, February 16, 2007, at http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/16/news/edmir.php (Accessed February 17, 2007). 39. It is noteworthy that the ANA registered a quantum jump in its strength during 2006–2007 in response to the rising threat from the Taliban and their allies. If one goes by the official Website of the ANA, the strength of the ANA rose by 10,000 soldiers between January 2006 and 2007, and by nearly 21,000 between January 2007 and December 2007, which is much higher than the average number of soldiers trained earlier. As mentioned above, the earlier targeted strength of 70,000 soldiers would be achieved by the middle of 2008, which means that another 13,000 soldiers would be trained between December 2007, and say June 2008, and another 16,000 in another six months. In November 2006, Defence Minister Wardak had announced the decision to train about 2,000 soldiers every month under an accelerated programme. Currently, about 4,000 soldiers are being trained a month. See ‘Military to Double in Size in Two Years: Wardak’, November 25, 2006, at http://www.onlinenews.com.pk/details.php?id=105269 (Accessed November 25, 2006). 40. In February 2005, the United States dispatched 288 trainers for the ANA, in addition to the 300 already assigned to various ANA units since 2002. See Stephen Graham, ‘U.S. Doubles Its Troops in Afghan Army’, February 20, 2005, at http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=517696 (Accessed February 21, 2005). Major General Robert Durbin, former Commander of CSTC-A, had informed in August 2006 that as compared to 50 Afghan officers sent earlier to the United States and Germany for advanced training, around 100 were sent in 2005, and henceforth 200–300 would be sent in following years. See ‘Coalition Forces to Help Train More Afghan Soldiers, Policemen’, August 24, 2006, at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LZEG-6SYS3Q?OpenDocument (Accessed August 26, 2006). 41. See ‘U.S. to Give Afghans $2 Billion in Additional Military Equipment’, July 4, 2006, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/03/AR2006070301058.html (Accessed July 4, 2006). 42. This included more than 200 Humvees, trucks, and other armoured vehicles. 43. Interestingly, a week earlier, it was announced by senior US officials that President George Bush will ask US Congress for an extra $10.6 billion out of which $8.6 billion would be earmarked for strengthening Afghan security forces over the next two years. See ‘U.S. Donates Vehicles, Arms to Afghan Army’, February 1, 2007, at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-Afghan-US-Arms-Delivery.html (Accessed February 1, 2007). 44. Of the 3,200 marines, 2,200 joined the ISAF in the southern sector and the remaining 1,000 are helping to train Afghan army and police under US command. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘More Recruits, U.S. Arms Planned for Afghan Military’, December 5, 2007, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/04/AR2007120402086.html (Accessed January 25, 2008). 45. In May 2007, Turkey donated 24 Howitzers to the ANA. Nearly 110 ANA officers were to be trained by Turkey in using the donated weaponry. Ann Scott Tyson, ‘3,200 Marines to Deploy to Afghanistan in Spring’, January 16, 2008, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/15/AR2008011501381.html?wpisrc=newsletter (Accessed January 16, 2008). 46. See ‘Turkey Donates 24 Howitzers to Afghan Army’, May 12, 2007, at http://paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?177930 (Accessed May 20, 2007). 47. Canadapledged in early 2007 to provide ANA with C-7 assault rifles used by the Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan. The British Defence Secretary, Des Browne, during his Afghan visit in December 2007 assured the supply of necessary equipment, especially the IED jammers, to the ANA. The Afghan defence ministry announced in December too that Germany would soon be delivering 27 Leopard tanks and 22 military helicopters. The visiting Portuguese defence minister in December 2007 pledged a team of 15 Portuguese military trainers by early 2008. Similarly, the Australian defence minister also announced in February 2008 that a team of 70 Australian instructors and troops would be soon sent to train the ANA. David Loyn, ‘Afghan Army to “Treble in Size”’, December 2, 2007, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7123876.stm (Accessed March 30, 2008) and Brendan Nicholson, ‘Australians to Join Afghans in Battle’, February 20, 2008, at http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/australians-to-join-afghans-in-battle/2008/02/19/1203190822599.html (Accessed February 20, 2008). 48. There were reports that the corps will receive three Mi-17 helicopters from the Czech Republic and two Antonov transport planes from the Ukraine in December 2007. The United States has also committed four Antonov aircrafts and ten helicopters. See Ann Scott Tyson, n. 45. 49. Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, ‘Afghanistan's Air Corps Struggles to Rebuild’, November 28, 2007, at http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2007/november/nov282007.html#4 (Accessed March 2, 2008). 50. In addition, on March 5, 2008, NATO officials announced that Uzbekistan has again allowed some members of NATO, including the United States, to use one of its air bases as a transit point for NATO troops and equipment for the operations in Afghanistan. See ‘US Permitted Use of Uzbekistan Base’, March 5, 2008, at http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-NATO-Uzbekistan.html (Accessed March 5, 2008). 51. Russia had delivered ‘motor vehicles, fuel and lubricants, communication equipment, topographic maps, truck-mounted repair workshops and automobile and armor equipment spare parts’. See ‘Russia Ready to Resume Military Aid to Afghanistan—Diplomat’, March 5, 2007, at http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070305/61570158.html (Accessed March 7, 2007). 52. See ‘Russia to Supply Afghan Army’, October 10, 2005, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/09/AR2005100900985.html (Accessed October 10, 2005). 53. Vladimir Socor, ‘Russia Returning to Afghanistan with Not-so-Soft Power’, March 16, 2007, at http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372016 (Accessed May 28, 2008). 54. Ibid. 55. Ahmad Khalid Mowahid, ‘Beijing to Provide Kabul Military Equipment’, October 23, 2005, at http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=8023 (Accessed January 14, 2007). 56. Ahmad Khalid Mowahid, ‘China to Train Afghan Soldiers on Logistics’, June 24, 2006, at http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=20374 (Accessed January 14, 2007). 57. See ‘US Seeks Indian Troops for Kabul’, June 5, 2006, at http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/june-2006/us-seeks-indian-troops-for-kabul (Accessed September 25, 2006). 58. Prem Shankar Jha, ‘The Nyet Flight to Kabul’, July 3, 2006, at http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fodname=20060703&fname=Col+Prem+Shankar+Jha+%28F%29&sid=1 (Accessed July 7, 2006). 59. Sujan Dutta, ‘US Appeal for Afghan Help’, November 17, 2006, at http://www.telegraphindia.com/1061118/asp/frontpage/story_7018528.asp (Accessed November 20, 2006). 60. According to the channel, the Indian team comprising about 10–12 officers would be mainly drawn from the infantry and education corps. Apart from teaching English to the ANA officers, the Indian team would also be reportedly involved in training the ANA in weapon-handling, map-reading, and other basic battalion procedures. See Nitin Gokhale, ‘India's “Great Game” in Afghanistan’, April 24, 2007, at http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20070009786 (Accessed May 1, 2007 ). Also see ‘Indian Officers to Train Afghan Army’, April 26, 2007, at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1955363.cms (Accessed April 27, 2007). 61. See ‘In Response to a Question Regarding a News Report on a Proposal to Send Indian Army Personnel to Afghanistan for Training the Afghan Army’, April 26, 2007, at http://meaindia.nic.in/. 62. ‘India Rules Out Military Involvement in Afghanistan’, April 8, 2008, at http://in.news.yahoo.com/indiaabroad/20080408/r_t_ians_nl_general/tnl-india-rules-out-military-involvement-b9e311f.html (Accessed April 11, 2008). 63. See ‘NATO Seeking Help from Muslim Nations to Train Afghan Army’, November 28, 2007, at http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2007/november/nov282007.html#4 (Accessed March 2, 2008). 64. Turkey has 750 personnel, Albania has 140, Jordan has 90, and Azerbaijan has 40 personnel. ‘ISAF Troops Placement’, April 1, 2008, at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf (Accessed April 23, 2008). 65. Ahmad Khalid Moahid, ‘Defence Minister Leaves for Jordan’, March 4, 2007, at http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=32708 (Accessed March 6, 2007). 66. In December 2007, The Daily Telegraph reported that British secret service agents from MI6 have held half a dozen rounds of meeting or jirgas with senior Taliban fighters in Helmand where most of the British forces are deployed. British commanders had earlier signed a pact with the ‘local elders’ of the Musa Qala in Helmand in October 2006 to keep the Taliban at bay. The pact was soon rendered redundant as Taliban recaptured Musa Qala in February 2007 and held on to it for nearly ten months. See Thomas Harding and Tom Coghlan, ‘Britain in Secret Talks with the Taliban’, December 27, 2007, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml;jsessionid=YAMVHMBG1YNHBQFIQMFSFGGAVCBQ0IV0?xml=/news/2007/12/26/wafg126.xml (AccessedJanuary 2, 2008). 67. Established in 2006, the auxiliary police is said to comprise thousands of mercenaries, including militias and criminal elements on government payroll. They are supposed to undergo a ten-day training course at the end of which the recruits are provided with an automatic weapon and posted at their home districts. See ‘Worries Arise about Quality of Afghan Auxiliary Police’, November 26, 2006, at http://www.canada.com/topics/news/world/story.html?id=1010b37b-a02e-4a2f-9dc7-8ab1dc40c92d&k=2965 (Accessed November 26, 2006).

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