Institutional analysis and irregular warfare: Israel Defense Forces during the 33-Day War of 2006
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Abstract The new attention paid to 'small wars' does not seem to translate into a better adaptation of conventional armed forces to this type of conflicts. As illustrated by the IDF's inability to get a decisive edge against the Hezbollah during the 33-Day War, Israel is no exception to such difficulty to adapt. A number of analysts have concluded that, victim of its long experience gained through the Intifadas, Israel 'over-adapted' to irregular warfare. Applying a sociological framework inspired by the seminal work of Richard Scott, this study suggests that this view is, at best, arguable. Going beyond the classical military explanations by uncovering key sociopolitical forces that have shaped the Israeli defense institutions, this study proposes that the combination of a post-heroic society and unbalanced civil–military relations have led the Israeli military institution to opt for a conventional posture articulated around technocentric tenets, which are ultimately disregarding the true nature of the asymmetrical challenge presented by the Hezbollah. Keywords: IsraelIDFinstitutional analysisirregular warfare33-Day War Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Defence Research and Development Canada Center for Operational Research and Analysis for its financial support that made this research project possible. Notes 1. CitationScott, Institutions and Organizations. 2. CitationMarch and Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism'. 3. Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 54. 4. Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 52. 5. Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 53. 6. CitationCohen, 'How did the Intifada Affect the IDF?; CitationCohen, 'Israel's Changing Military Commitments'; CitationInbar, 'Israel's Small War'. 7. CitationCohen, 'Changing Societal-Military Relations in Israel'. 8. CitationBen-Eliezer, 'Is a Military Coup Possible in Israel?'. 9. CitationLevy et al., 'From Obligatory Militarism to Contractual Militarism'. 10. CitationLevy, 'The Second Lebanon War'. 11. CitationKober, 'The Israel Defence Forces in the Second Lebanon War', 31; CitationBar-Joseph, 'Lessons Not Learned'. 12. CitationCatignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas, 190. 13. CitationCatignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas 14. Kober, 'The Israel Defence Forces in the Second Lebanon War', 17. 15. CitationElkus, 'Operational Art and Modern American Strategy'. 16. CitationVan Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, 362–3. 17. CitationSchulze, 'Israeli Crisis Decision Making in the Lebanon War'; van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive, 354. 18. CitationRubin, 'Israel's New Strategy', 111. 19. CitationKilroy, 'Do Fences Make Good Neighbors?'. 20. CitationInbar, 'How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War', 58. 21. CitationLuttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army. 22. CitationNaveh, 'The Cult of the Offensive Preemption'. 23. Kober, 'The Israel Defence Forces in the Second Lebanon War', 18. 24. CitationKober, 'Has Battlefield Decision Become Obsolete?'; CitationKober, 'A Paradigm in Crisis?'. 25. Kober, 'The Israel Defence Forces in the Second Lebanon War', 19. CitationRodman, 'The role of the Israel Air Force'; CitationAzoulay, 'Ex-IDF Chief Ya'alon: Air Force Failed'. 26. CitationYaari and Assa, 'Diffused Warfare'. 27. CitationRubin, 'Hizballah's Rocket Campaign against Northern Israel'. 28. CitationFinkel, 'Flexible Force Structure', 798. 29. CitationRodman, 'Israel's National Security Doctrine'; CitationBregman, Israel's Wars. 30. CitationLondon, 'The Dahiya Strategy'. 31. CitationKatz, 'Analysis: The Dahiya Doctrine vs. the Goldstone Report'; CitationKatz, 'The Dahiya Doctrine: Fighting Dirty or a Knock-Out Punch?'. 32. CitationHarel, 'Analysis/IDF Plans to Use Disproportionate Force in the Next War'. 33. Katz, 'Analysis: The Dahiya Doctrine vs. the Goldstone Report'; Katz, 'The Dahiya Doctrine: Fighting Dirty or a Knock-Out Punch?'. 34. Term borrowed from Michael Kobi. 35. CitationPeri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 251–7. 36. CitationPeri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 251–7 37. Brigadier General (ret.) Zeev Drori, quoted in CitationPeri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 251–7, 256. 38. For an institutional examination of this type of friction, see CitationOuellet and Pahlavi, 'Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare'. 39. Peri, Generals in the Cabinet Room, 257. 40. CitationCamilleri, 'Mind the Gap'. 41. CitationHarel and Ravid, 'IDF Worried Lebanon War Probe Report will Damage its Image'. 42. CitationDayan, 'Israel's Deterrence After the Second Lebanon War'. 43. Camilleri, 'Mind the Gap'. 44. CitationSchiff, 'Lessons of War'. 45. CitationKatz, 'Army to Upgrade Reservist Equipment'. 46. CitationMatthews, 'The Israeli Defense Forces Response to the 2006 War with Hezbollah: Gaza'. 47. CitationAtzmon, 'Saying No to the Hunters of Goliath'. 48. CitationSiegelman, 'From Lebanon to Gaza'. 49. CitationSiegelman, 'From Lebanon to Gaza', 7. 50. CitationMatthews, 'Hard Lessons Learned'; CitationLevinson, 'Israel's Ground Assault Marks Shift in Strategy'. 51. CitationRavid, 'Disinformation, Secrecy and Lies'. 52. CitationSnyder, 'Information Strategies Against a Hybrid Threat', 125. 53. See CitationPahlavi, 'The 33-Day War'. 54. CitationMor, 'Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy'. 55. CitationMor, 'Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy', 126. 56. CitationMor, 'Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy', 128. 57. CitationGoodman, 'Analysis: The Effective Public Diplomacy Ended with Operation Cast Lead'; CitationChouliarakai, 'Witnessing War'. 58. CitationCatignani, 'Variation on a Theme'. 59. Matthews, 'Hard Lessons Learned', 30. 60. CitationKershner, 'Israel Makes Big Plans for Palestinian Authority'. 61. CitationCordesman, 2009, The 'Gaza War', 32. 62. CitationRavid, 'Barak and Livni Disagree with Olmert'. 63. Cordesman, 2009, The 'Gaza War', 32; CitationRavid, 'Olmert: Gaza War Won't End Until Rockets and Smuggling Stop'. 64. Cordesman, The 'Gaza War', 68–9. 65. CitationExum, 'Drawing the Right Lessons from Israel's War with Hizb Allah'. 66. CitationHelmer, Flipside of the COIN, 69–77. 67. CitationMcmaster, 'On War'. 68. CitationMoran, 'Israel's Political fragmentation'.
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