The International Politics of National Missile Defence: A Response to the Critics

INTRODUCTIONTo encourage more informed discussion of national missile defence (NMD) and to widen a dangerously narrow public debate on the subject, this article challenges critics of NMD to confront the logical and factual errors in their arguments against deployment. Because the American programme has important implications for Canadian foreign and security policies (and Canadian-American relations more generally), critics should be prepared to defend their positions beyond simply reiterating the same superficial criticisms. The Canadian public should expect nothing less from the academic community (not to mention our elected officials) than a sophisticated exchange of ideas on such an important issue.The first four sections of this article deal with the four core arguments most often used by critics to describe the aftermath of NMD deployment - impending demise of arms control agreements(1); nuclear proliferation by Russia and China; technological limitations of interceptor technology; and financial costs. Section five addresses the implications for Canadian security and defence policies.'Critic' throughout this article refers to individuals (or groups) who offer any one of the critiques evaluated below. Although there is extensive overlap in the positions of those opposed to NMD, all critics do not share precisely the same views or assign equal weight to the various arguments - there is no homogeneous position, nor is one likely to emerge in such a complex issue. Among opponents of NMD are experts and practitioners in the fields of foreign, security, and defence policies; currently serving and retired military officers; and scientists and engineers (including recipients of the Nobel Prize) with extensive knowledge of NMD and the physics of interceptor technology. Any critic, but especially those with impressive credentials, should be prepared to confront the weaknesses in the position he or she puts forward. Many critics will disagree with some or all of the points I raise.(2) But the fact remains that we desperately need a meaningful and substantive debate on the topic. Without it, the discussion (and attendant policy prescriptions) will continue to be driven entirely by political agendas and stifled by efforts to protect the intellectual capital invested in defending simplistic (and largely outdated) assertions about the dangers of defending people against ballistic missiles.THE DEMISE OF THE NPT AND ABMThe most common criticisms of NMD are associated with warnings about the demise of the Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. Signed in 1968 and 1972, respectively, these treaties are the two pillars of nuclear disarmament and arms control that, according to proponents, were responsible for slowing the pace of proliferation during the cold war and stabilizing the longest nuclear rivalry in history. Because they continue to be essential for controlling proliferation and maintaining a stable nuclear environment, it is imperative that their underlying principles and fundamental logic should not be undermined.What critics fail to point out is that the worst abuses of horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology occurred after the treaties were signed. Regardless of the indicator used to track nuclear proliferation - overall nuclear stockpiles, numbers of strategic warheads in submarine launched ballistic missiles, inter-continental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers,(3) production and stockpiles of weapons' grade plutonium, thefts of fissile material, trade in dual use technology tied to the atomic energy industry, trade in ballistic missile technology, and so on - the evidence of an increase in the pace of proliferation is clear. Recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are but the latest illustration of the same pattern. To claim that the NPT and the ABM treaty are essential parts of the international arms control structure doesn't say much for the treaties or for the prospects for serious arms control and disarmament in the future. …

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