Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society (review)

Reviewed by: Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society. By Sven Saaler. Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 2005. 197 pages. Hardcover €28.00. This is a timely and informative book on issues of crucial importance to current Japanese society, education, and politics. Begun at a 1997 workshop sponsored by the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo, Sven Saaler's work comprises three chapters about "neonationalist historical revisionism" in the Society to Create a New History Textbook (a.k.a. Tsukuru Kai), in the politics of public memory related to Yasukuni shrine issues, and in public memory fostered by the mass media, literature, films, monuments, and museums. Saaler's sympathies lie with the Japanese left, but unlike many leftists, he fears no major imminent threat from the right-wing nationalists he studied. His thesis is that, contrary to incessant claims made by Asian neighbors and mainstream Western media, most Japanese today do not foster historical amnesia or wallow in war-victim self-pity. Instead, most affirm that Japan waged a terrible war of aggression in the 1930s and 1940s, feel remorse for this recent history of imperialism and colonialism, and wish to make amends for it. This popular historical consciousness forms the bedrock of what Saaler calls "extraparliamentary opposition" to two groups. One is high-profile and seemingly dangerous, but largely ineffective, right-wing revisionists such as Kobayashi Yoshinori, Nishio Kanji, and Fujioka Nobukatsu. Such figures strive to dominate public discourse and education, glorify the Japanese past, and rekindle patriotism together with the second group: conservative lawmakers and bureaucrats. Both groups are bent on revising Article 9 of the current constitution, which renounces war as a sovereign power of the state, so as to strengthen Japanese military power and employ it freely, either through a stronger U.S.-Japan alliance or under the guise of U.N. peacekeeping efforts. Saaler is required reading to correct the egregious misconceptions—prevalent in China, South Korea, and the West—about how contemporary Japanese teach, study, [End Page 420] and reflect on their war crimes. We should appreciate and applaud his culling of English, German, and leftwing Japanese scholarship, plus his independent surveys that yield a wealth of information on key topics little known outside of Japan; e.g., the limited role of the government in textbook screening and selection, links between revisionist educators and conservative politicians, issues that divide the backers and detractors of Yasukuni shrine, museums and monuments that commemorate Japan's military and (to a lesser extent, civilian) war dead, portrayals of history in Shiba Ryōtarō's hugely popular novels, their permutations on television, and public opinion polls that gauge historical consciousness among ordinary Japanese. Yet precisely because this is a must-read book for so many people, Saaler should have lightened their burden through drastic reorganization and aggressive editing, for there is far too much repetition, signposting, and cross-referencing. He also has an irritating habit of embedding exclamation marks within brackets in his text to express disgust or exasperation. Surely these sentiments could be conveyed more subtly. Most readers will come to the subject with a fierce skepticism that Saaler must break down. Unfortunately, his writing compounds the problem; even a sympathetic left-wing reader such as myself found this book to be taxing. Saaler's optimistic contention—that "neonationalist historical revisionists" may seem to be gaining the upper hand but actually are not—fails to fully convince. My admittedly impressionistic view from Canada is that postwar generations in Japan, faced with huge fiscal woes, are slowly moving toward the right on war guilt issues, especially after mass anti-Japanese rioting in China these last two years. Some questionable judgments and errors of fact on Saaler's part, though few in number and not fatal to his thesis, do nothing to alter my view. For example, he cites opinion polls showing that Japanese today feel they bear "ongoing responsibility for the war" (pp. 137-43). But the key follow-up query never got asked: "Do you believe Tokyo should raise your taxes to discharge this responsibility through compensation to individual...

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