Commentary on <scp>M</scp>c<scp>C</scp>arthy <i>et al</i>. (2012): Understanding how alcohol affects decisions to drive while intoxicated—the need to deconstruct impulsivity
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
McCarthy et al. 1 conducted a laboratory study to determine if individuals who drink and drive might also become more impulsive in response to alcohol compared with those with no history of drinking and driving. College students were surveyed about their history of driving after consuming alcohol, and the authors classified those who reported driving within 2 hours of having three or more drinks as ‘drink drivers’. The authors reported that these drink drivers became more impulsive in response to a moderate dose of alcohol compared with a control group with no history of drinking and driving. McCarthy et al. address a significant social issue. The public health costs associated with alcohol-related traffic accidents have prompted considerable research aimed at identifying characteristics of driving under the influence (DUI) offenders in efforts to improve treatment and prevention. The vast majority of this research has relied on findings from surveys and personality inventories. Indeed, personality inventories reliably show high levels of impulsivity and sensation-seeking among DUI offenders 2-4. However, self-reported traits of impulsivity provide limited insight into the specific behavioral and cognitive mechanisms that contribute to decisions to drive after drinking. McCarthy et al. take advantage of advancements in the assessment of specific behavioral mechanisms involved in impulsive behavior by employing behavioral tasks that measure two specific components of impulsivity: (i) poor inhibitory control over pre-potent actions and (ii) inability to delay reward. McCarthy et al. demonstrate a potentially important dissociation between these two aspects of impulsivity. Compared to control drivers, drink drivers were more sensitive to the impairing effects of alcohol on the ability to delay reward, but not on the ability to inhibit pre-potent action. The authors offer a reasonable interpretation for the finding by suggesting that impaired ability to delay immediate reward could contribute to the drinker's impulsive decisions to drive after drinking. Deciding to drive after drinking yields the immediate reward of convenience for the drinker, to travel home, to the next bar or elsewhere, and the decision to drive after drinking could reflect a failure to delay or forego that immediate reward. As such, McCarthy et al. have taken an important initial step towards deconstructing the specific components of impulsivity towards the goal of understanding more clearly its influence on decisions to drive after drinking. Another important contribution of the study is that McCarthy et al. recognize the importance of examining impulsivity of the driver in the intoxicated state. Factors affecting decisions to drive after drinking have traditionally been examined by self-reports of sober subjects on the likelihood of driving in hypothetical situations (e.g. ‘if I had three drinks and my drive home was less than 1 mile, I would drive’). Such studies highlight the importance of situational factors on a sober decision-making process. However, they provide no indication of how such decisions might be altered by acute alcohol intoxication. McCarthy et al. show that only under alcohol do drink drivers display more impulsive behavior than control drivers. This suggests that certain groups of drivers might have a heightened sensitivity to the disruptive effects of alcohol. Indeed, we have shown that certain groups [e.g. reckless drivers and drivers with attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD)] show greater sensitivity to the disruptive effects of alcohol on their driving performance and report greater willingness to drive while intoxicated 5-7. Taken together, these findings highlight the importance of assessing how at-risk drivers respond to alcohol, as such groups might demonstrate heightened sensitivity to the behaviorally disruptive effects of the drug at a time when these individuals are confronted with decisions about whether or not to drive. Finally, given that McCarthy et al. focus on impulsive behaviors in the intoxicated state, it was surprising that the authors did not report the blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) of the subjects. BACs were measured and the authors reported no group differences in BACs. However, information on the actual BACs of the subjects is critically important for understanding how impulsivity changes in response to alcohol. Although impairing effects of alcohol are typically BAC-dependent, the point of the authors' study is that certain groups of drivers might have a heightened sensitivity to the disruptive effects of alcohol. A heightened sensitivity implies a lower ‘threshold’ BAC for the onset of impairment, a BAC that actually might be below the legal limit for driving. This might be especially relevant in countries with higher legal limits for driving, such as Canada and the United States, where the legal limit is 0.08%. Indeed, laboratory studies of the general population find that many behavioral functions are reliably impaired by alcohol at BACs below 0.08% 8. Thus, it seems likely that at-risk populations, such as those studied by McCarthy et al., might have heightened sensitivities to alcohol that result in pronounced impairment, even at BACs below 0.08%. As such, identifying the BAC-dependence of alcohol effects on impulsive decision-making in these drivers is important in understanding when they are at increased risk for driving after drinking. None.
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Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».