The Postwar Yankees: Baseball’s Golden Age Revisited (review)

Reviewed by: The Postwar Yankees: Baseball’s Golden Age Revisited John Paul Hill David G. Surdam. The Postwar Yankees: Baseball’s Golden Age Revisited. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. 438 pp. Cloth, $45.00. During the 2008–2009 off-season, the New York Yankees spent an unprecedented $450 million on player acquisitions. These high value deals took place against the backdrop of the national recession, angering many observers who argued that such large expenditures were not justifiable given the economic climate. Some fans undoubtedly harkened back to earlier eras of the sport, when the game had supposedly not been tainted by greed, scandal, and overblown egos. David G. Surdam, an assistant professor of economics at the University of Northern Iowa, identifies the period 1946 to 1964 as one such “golden age.” During that era, Willie, Mickey, and the Duke enthralled millions, New York Giants outfielder Bobby Thomson hit the “shot heard ’round the world,” and the New York Yankees captured ten World Series crowns, thereby establishing one of the greatest sports dynasties. Surdam argues, however, that the age was actually not so “golden.” Major- and minor-league attendance declined during the 1950s, the integration of the sport proceeded haltingly, and several stadiums fell into disrepair. He also observes that some of the problems [End Page 181] that fans associate with today’s game—greed and competitive imbalance, for example—were already apparent in the 1950s. Surdam explores these problems from an economic perspective in this meticulously researched volume. By examining the game’s economic past, he also hopes to shed light on baseball’s current economic status. Drawing on a wide array of data, including ticket prices, mean revenues, and concession profits, Surdam demonstrates that major-league franchise profitability dwindled during the early 1950s. The owners blamed increasing player salaries for their woes, yet other expenditures, such as hotel and meal expenses and player development costs, rose even faster, thus driving down profitability to a greater degree than salary outlays. Moreover, attendance began shrinking in the 1950s due to changing leisure patterns, a development that eroded profits even further. Some owners tried to reverse the decline through a serious of promotions, including Ladies’ Days and more night games, and by adding additional parking to accommodate the transportation needs of an increasingly suburban fan base. Other owners tried to boost fan turnout by building new ballparks that featured more comfort and greater amenities than the old stadiums. Between 1966 and 1971, for example, the Cardinals, Phillies, Pirates, and Reds each moved into new ballparks. According to Surdam, the new venues successfully increased attendance in the short term, as new stadiums still do today. Surdam also examines how owners of the poorer, less-talented teams tried to keep pace with the wealthy, talented-laden franchises like the Yankees, hoping to bring a more competitive balance to the game. To this end, he maintains that the owners tried four measures: revenue sharing, integration, franchise relocation, and the amateur draft. Surdam demonstrates the difficulty of implementing an effective revenue-sharing plan. The American League tried gate sharing, for example, in which visiting teams would receive a percentage of the gate receipts. Presumably, such a system would benefit teams that drew poorly at home when they played road games against teams that drew well. Surdam contends, however, that gate sharing did not achieve its intended goal because the plan rested on the erroneous assumption that strong teams always draw better at home than on the road. Surdam also argues that integration produced far from perfect results. The Brooklyn Dodgers and the Giants quickly achieved contender status after signing their first black players, but with the exception of the Cleveland Indians, American League franchises that integrated early on (the St. Louis Browns, the Chicago White Sox, and the Philadelphia Athletics) did not see their records improve. By contrast, franchise relocation was more successful in boosting teams’ fortunes: “[T]he franchise relocations of the weaker teams during the 1950s, as well as the Dodgers and Giants, benefited, to varying degrees, the teams that moved” (199). Surdam [End Page 182] asserts that the amateur draft, first used in 1965, likewise helped diminish the talent disparity between wealthy...

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.