Notice bibliographique
Résumé
WHEN THE LEADERS OF Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held their ninth annual meeting on 20-21 October 2001 the conditions were sharply different than those under which the gathering was first planned. Prior to 11 September, the priority was increased economic interdependence in the region. For the host country, China, the event was an opportunity to showcase its economic reforms and its rising place on the regional and world stages, as reflected in its admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Beijing's selection as the site of the 2008 Olympics. China's chosen theme for APEC 2001 reflected that economic fixation: 'Meeting new challenges in a new century: achieving common prosperity through participation and cooperation,' with sub-themes of 'Sharing the benefits of globalization and the new economy,' 'Advancing trade and investment,' and 'Promoting sustained economic growth.'Instead, as one official subsequently put it, 'we were hijacked by terrorism.' For the first time, geopolitical security issues - the control of (inter-state) violence and the promotion of physical safety - had an explicit section in APEC's official communique and demanded action on the part of the member economies.(1) This raises questions about the scope of APEC. Does this one instance set a precedent for broadening the organization's mandate to include geopolitical matters, such as military (im)balances and local flashpoints? And, if so, would this reinvigorate flagging confidence in APEC, as indicated by the sardonic comment that the acronym really stands for 'A Perfect Excuse to Chat'? Or, in contrast, can APEC renew its original economic agenda? With the administration of George W. Bush in the United States shifting its security focus away from Europe and toward Asia as part of its long-term strategy before 11 September, including the transfer of 65,000 soldiers there,(2) the possibility of grafting a 'high politics' security-oriented mandate onto APEC is even more relevant.The limelight at Shanghai was certainly hijacked by the terrorist attacks and the response to them. Even so, APEC's three pillars of trade liberalization, trade facilitation, and economic and technical co-operation each recorded some modest progress in the background. The Shanghai meeting also addressed some 'newer' issues of interdependence, particularly human capacity building in the new economy, a key theme on China's agenda, and the integration of greater public participation in APEC agenda-setting through a Dialogue on Globalization and Shared Prosperity, which took place in May 2002. All of these initiatives present potential avenues for the engagement of civil society.Nonetheless, thirteen years after it was first formed, questions about 'What is APEC?' and 'What is APEC for?' still remain. Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister, once called it 'four adjectives in search of a noun,' with 'forum' usually tacked on at the end. Now one of the most important of the four words, 'economic,' appears to have lost its hold on APEC's agenda.One useful function of APEC is as a 'clearinghouse' for other international matters or a network of actors who may use its annual leaders' meeting for incidental purposes, rather than an actor in and of itself. The 2001 Statement on Counter-terrorism is the most prominent example, but leaders also used the Shanghai meeting to comment on other international and regional events, such as the WTO meeting in Doha, the Chiang Mai initiative for currency stabilization in Asia, and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg.Another central function of APEC is its bilateral meetings. Bilateral free trade agreements, such as the negotiations launched by Canada's Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong,(3) are advanced through encounters on the margins of the APEC summits, although they tend to show up the sluggish progress toward Asia Pacific free trade. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,006 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».