SACU at centenary: theory and practice of democratising regionalism
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Abstract The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement signed in 2002 purported to change the predominance of South African power within the institution to give other member states greater representation, thus increasing the democratic credibility of SACU. This article explores changes to decision-making procedures in SACU resulting from the 2002 Agreement and considers the extent to which the institution has thereby democratised. The paper considers the meaning of democracy in the context of supranational regional institutions before reviewing the history of SACU in terms of decision-making processes and power relations between member states. The paper argues that while democratisation of institutions implies greater legitimacy and thus longevity, the historical trajectory of SACU means that moves towards democratisation have served rather to destabilise the institution, notwithstanding the incomplete implementation of recommended democratisation measures. Keywords: SACUSouthern AfricaSouth AfricaBLNSdemocratisationregionalism Notes 1. Gibb R, ‘The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with democracy’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 3, 2006, pp. 583–603. 2. WTO (World Trade Organization), Trade Policy Review: Southern African Customs Union. Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/114. Geneva: WTO, 2003. 3. The Southern African Development Community comprises 15 states and was formed in 1980. 4. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa comprises 19 states and was formed in 1994, though it effectively replaced the Preferential Trade Area which dates back to 1981. 5. BLS states comprised Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland until Namibia officially joined SACU on independence in 1990, when they became BLNS states. However, Namibia had been a de facto member of SACU since 1920, when South Africa undertook administration of South-West Africa under the terms of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 6. Gibb R, ‘The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with democracy’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 3, 2006, p. 603. 7. Isaksen J, ‘Prospects for SACU after Apartheid’, in Oden B (ed.), Southern Africa After Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources (Seminar Proceedings). Uppsala: The Nordic African Institute, 1993. 8. Field research undertaken during 2000 and 2009/10. 9. Gibb R, ‘The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with democracy’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 3, 2006, pp. 583–603. See Simon D & A Johnston, ‘The Southern African Development Community’, Royal Institute for International Affairs Briefing Paper, New Series No. 8, 1999, for a specific review of relations during the apartheid period. 10. Erasmus G, ‘What to do about SACU’, Tralac, 26 November 2008, <http://www.tralac.org/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&news_id=56589&cause_id=1694>. 11. Molefhe R,‘Is South Africa a bully in SACU?’, Mmegionline, 26, 90, 17 June 2009, <http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=6&aid=8&dir=2009/June/Wednesday17>. 12. McGowan PJ, ‘South Africa in SADC’, paper presented to a conference New Directions in the Southern African Development Community, sponsored by United States of America State Department, Meridian International Center, Washington, DC, 10 December 1999, p. 4. 13. SACU Secretariat, Southern African Customs Union Agreement 2002. Windhoek: Southern African Customs Union Secretariat, 2003, Article 4.1. 14. Gibb R, Should Zimbabwe Join the Southern African Customs Union?, Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper 2010/04. Johannesburg: The Brenthurst Foundation, 2010. 15. Bösl A, G Erasmus, T Hartzenberg & C McCarthy, ‘Introduction: Monitoring the process of regional integration in Southern Africa in 2009’, in Monitoring Regional Integration in Southern Africa Yearbook 2009 (Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010), p. 2. 16. Hyam R & P Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 102. 17. Up to 1915 German South West Africa (Namibia) remained a German colony. 18. Hyam R & P Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 102. 19. Gibb R, ‘The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement: Dependence with democracy’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 32, 3, 2006, p. 588. 20. Hyam R & P Henshaw, The Lion and the Springbok: Britain and South Africa since the Boer War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 21. Many thanks to the peer reviewer for these insights. 22. Viner J, The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950. 23. Hancock KJ, Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 24. Hancock KJ, Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 35–36ff. 25. Gibb R, ‘Regional integration in post-Apartheid Southern Africa: The case of renegotiating the Southern African Customs Union’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 23, 1, 1997, pp. 67–86. 26. Republic of South Africa, ‘Customs Union Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of South Africa, The Republic of Botswana, the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Kingdom of Swaziland’, Government Gazette, 54, 1212, 1969. 27. Gibb R, ‘Regional integration in post-Apartheid Southern Africa: The case of renegotiating the Southern African Customs Union’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 23, 1, 1997, pp. 67–86. 28. McCarthy C, ‘Perspectives on the Southern African Customs Union’, TRALAC: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, 29 July 2009, <http://www.tralac.org/cgi-bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause_dir_news_item&news_id=70726&cause_id=1694>. 29. Held D, Democracy and the Global Order. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995; and Archibugi D, D Held & M Köhler (eds), Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. 30. Coleman WD & T Porter, International Institutions, Globalization and Democracy: Assessing the Challenges’, Working Paper Series of the Institute on Globalization and the Human Condition, 99, 4, 1999, McMaster University. 31. Coleman WD & T Porter, ‘International institutions, globalisation and democracy: Assessing the challenges’, Global Society, 14, 3, 2000, pp. 377–98, 388–90. 32. Reinicke WH, Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government? Washington, DC: Brookings, 1998. 33. Murphy R, Social Closure: The Theory of Monopolization and Exclusion. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1987. 34. Cutler C, V Haufler & T Porter, Private Authority and InternationalAffairs. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 35. WTO, ‘The WTO is NOT undemocratic’, accessed 10 November 2010, <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10mis_e/10m10_e.htm>. 36. Sinclair S, GATS: How the WTO's New Services Negotiations Threaten Democracy.Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2000. 37. Khor M, Globalization and the South: Some Critical Issues, UNCTAD Trade Papers, No. 147, 2000. 38. Werksman J, Institutional Reform of the WTO, Oxfam GB Discussion Paper, 2000, accessed 10 November 2010, <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/policy/trade/downloads/wto_reform.rtf>. 39. Oxfam and Friends of the Earth, ‘Open letter on institutional reforms in the WTO’, October 2001, accessed 9 September 2010, <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Reform.pdf>. 40. Oxfam and Friends of the Earth, ‘Open letter on institutional reforms in the WTO’, October 2001, accessed 9 September 2010, <http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Reform.pdf>. 41. Bohman J, ‘International regimes and democratic governance: Political equality and influence in global institutions’, International Affairs, 75, 3, 1999, pp. 501–2. 42. Follesdal A & S Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 3, 2006. 43. Heywood A, Political Theory: An Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999, pp. 223ff. 44. Moravcsik A, ‘Is there a democratic deficit in world politics? A framework for analysis’, Government and Opposition, 39, 2, 2004. 45. Dahl R, ‘Can international organisations be democratic?’, in Shapiro I & C Hacker-Cordon (eds) Democracy's Edges. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 33. 46. Crick B, In Defence of Politics. Harmondsworth & New York: Penguin, 1983. 47. See for example Hattingh G, ‘The New Southern African Customs Union (SACU) draft agreement’, unpublished paper, Pretoria: Department of Trade and Industry, 2002; and McCarthy C, ‘The Southern African Customs Union in transition’, African Affairs, 102, 409, 2003. 48. Garner BA, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage, 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 49. SACU Secretariat, Southern African Customs Union Agreement 2002. Windhoek: Southern African Customs Union Secretariat, 2003, Article 2b. 50. Draper P, D Halleson & P Alves, SACU, Regional Integration and the Overlap Issue in Southern Africa: From Spaghetti to Cannelloni, Southern African Institute of International Affairs, Trade Policy Report Number 15, January 2007. Johannesburg: SAIIA. 51. McCarthy C, ‘The Southern African Customs Union in transition’, African Affairs, 102, 409, 2003, p. 609. 52. EC, Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between the SADC EPA States, on the one Part, and the European Community and its Member States, on the Other Part, 23 November 2007. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 20. 53. EC, Interim Economic Partnership Agreement between the SADC EPA States, on the one Part, and the European Community and its Member States, on the Other Part, 23 November 2007. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 2007, p. 87. 54. SA DTI (South African Department of Trade and Industry), SADC EPA Group-EC Negotiations: Assessing the Emerging Outcome,30 January 2008, Pretoria,<http://www.thedti.gov.za/parlimentary/EPAoutcomes.pdf>. 55. Khumalo N & F Mulleta, ‘Economic partnership agreements: African–EU negotiations continue’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 17, 2, 2010, pp. 209–20. 56. See Draper P & N Khumalo, ‘The future of the Southern African Customs Union’,TradeNegotiations Insights, 8, 6, 2009, <http://acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/TNI_EN__8-6.pdf>. 57. Government of South Africa, ‘Southern African Customs Union (SACU) — Communique from meeting of heads ofstate/government of member states 22 April, 2010’, eGovmonitor, 29 April 2010, accessed 13 June 2010, <http://www.egovmonitor.com/node/36059>. 58. Khumalo N & F Mulleta, ‘Economic partnership agreements: African–EU negotiations continue’, South African Journal of International Affairs, 17, 2, 2010, pp. 209–20. 59. Hancock KJ, Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 60. Hancock KJ, Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 61. Hancock KJ, Regional Integration: Choosing Plutocracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. p. 120.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,002 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».