Introduction to the issue—the alcohol industry and alcohol policy
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
The five papers in this special issue result from a scientific meeting on the alcohol industry and alcohol policy that was convened in Copenhagen by the Nordic Centre for Alcohol and Drug Research (NAD) and the Society for the Study of Addiction (SSA), with financial support from the Norwegian Government 1-5. The meeting brought together people involved in research, agenda-setting and decision-making in the field of public health from Canada, Europe, New Zealand and the United States. The industry's marketing practices, its advantages from trade agreements, lessons from tobacco control and possibilities for pursuing legal action in Europe were some of the topics discussed. Typical situations were described in a handful of case studies from different regions and countries. A sister issue of the Journal Nordic Studies on Alcohol and Drugs includes other papers, case studies and commentaries from the meeting 6. As Sally Casswell notes in her Editorial 1, there has been a remarkable increase in the attention paid to the alcohol industry in recent years by those working in the public health field, representing a much-needed change. She notes that this change is, of course, a reflection of the changing context for alcohol use and alcohol-related harm and a changing industry: trans-governmental corporations of all types are engaged in marketing their products directly to the consumer and are involved increasingly in the policy process. However, as Casswell points out, although industry activities are increasingly being documented there remains a dearth of scientific literature in this field. David Jernigan 2 reminds us that the globalized segment of the alcohol industry is large and concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of companies. The top five brewers hold about 50% of the global beer market and the top five spirits companies hold about 50% of the global spirits market between them. Jernigan points out that these companies employ a range of activities to promote themselves and their products. He notes that although longitudinal studies have been conducted to assess the public health impact on young people of a small subset of activities, for the most part public health research has not kept up with the ability of this industry to innovate in its marketing and its organization, and that there is a need for further studies on the health and political impacts of the global alcohol industry. Donald Zeigler 3 describes how trade agreements can impact on alcohol policies, noting that the alcohol industry seeks to influence agreements and can be expected to work through trade agreements to reduce tariffs, increase market access and seek to restrict effective domestic regulations. He concludes that public health experts must be brought into trade deliberations to provide input so that trade policies are less likely to stimulate alcohol use and related consequences. He proposes two supporting strategies: (i) to treat alcohol as an extraordinary commodity, with measures affecting the supply, distribution, sale, advertising, promotion or investment in alcohol beverages being excluded from international trade agreements; and (ii) advocate for a Framework Convention on Alcohol Control to deal effectively and collectively with alcohol issues at the global level. Jim Mosher 4 describes the lessons that can be learnt from the litigation experience in the field of tobacco, concluding that litigation is a powerful tool in addressing aggressive marketing by the purveyors of addictive products such as alcohol. However, Mosher notes that to be effective at both the national and international level, litigation should encompass a broad array of legal tactics designed to identify and restrict unfair, deceptive and misleading alcohol marketing tactics and should be utilized in conjunction with complementary prevention strategies. This requires further research on the impact of alcohol marketing on youth alcohol consumption and problems. Finally, Thomas Babor 5 concludes that while alcohol industry involvement in research activities is increasing, it constitutes currently a rather small direct investment in scientific research, one that is unlikely to contribute to alcohol science, lead to scientific breakthroughs or reduce the burden of alcohol-related illness. None the less, Babor writes that the fact that the industry proudly supports research and prevention activities is evidence that they recognize some responsibility for the damage caused by their products. The fact that governments use general tax revenues to conduct health research, provide treatment for alcohol problems and support prevention policies suggests that the alcoholic beverage industry should contribute to the public good in proportion to the damage caused by its products. However, as Babor notes, with few exceptions industry support of science tends to be self-serving, contributing little to the advancement of science. Thus, Babor concludes that professional organizations dealing with alcohol research and the advancement of alcohol science should develop a declaration of principles identifying alcohol industry practices that create conflicts of interest, and provide guidance to their members about the conditions under which collaboration with the alcoholic beverage industry is neither warranted nor advisable. We hope that this small collection of papers will stimulate thinking about the alcohol industry and alcohol policy and will act as a spur to further research in this area. None.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,001 | 0,003 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,002 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».