Post-9/11 Canada–US Security Integration: Of the Butcher, the Baker, and the Intelligence-Policy Maker

Abstract Will the post-9/11 environment revive Canada–US intelligence cooperation and catalyze a security community? A comparative study based on intelligence principles, ideas, norms, orientations, and institutions drawn from the literature predicts cooperation but not necessarily a security community, owing to different (a) histories, (b) security interpretations/agenda placements, (c) political and legislative cultures, (d) degrees of public acceptance, and (e) domestic–international inclinations. Waning British influences, evaporating Anglo-Saxon identities, and changing strategic interests compel Canada to play Thomas Hughes's butcher role, and the US the more encompassing intelligence-policy maker role. Acknowledgments I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their probing comments, and to support from John Purdy and Kathy Reigstad. Though I have not always heeded some valuable comments, I am indebted to those from the following colleagues in various seminar presentations who offered them: David Barrett, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, Stuart Farson, Lowell Gustafson, Anil Hira, Eric Hershberg, Edward D. Mansfield, Jorge Nowalski, Satya Pattnayak, and María Pía Taracena Gout. Of course, I alone remain responsible for omissions and commissions. The article is rooted in study and thought that eventually became a book, North American Homeland Security: Back to Bilateralism (2008), co-authored with Hira and Pattnayak in the Praeger Security International Series. I wish to record my appreciation to Praeger for being allowed to lean on one chapter of that book for some of the sections in this article, to the Canadian government for a 2008 Faculty Research Program grant, and to El Programa Interinstitucional de Estudios sobre la Región de América del North (PIERAN), coordinated by El Colegio de México, which funded research for the book. Notes 1. Deutsch, Burrell, and Kann (Citation1957) found this functional in the 1950s. 2. Taplin (Citation1989). 3. Hughes (Citation1976). 4. In addition to Hughes (Citation1976), see Hastedt (Citation1986). 5. Peter Gill (Citation1994) popularizes this term. 6. Hewitt (Citation2002, 166, 165–84). 7. Wannall (Citation1990). 8. Theoharis (1990). 9. Hitz and Weiss (Citation2004, 4–6, 1–41). 10. Hitz and Weiss (Citation2004). 11. Farson (Citation2000, 226, ch. 11). 12. Rempel(2004, 641–3, 634–54). 13. Goodman (Citation2003, 59, 59–71). 14. Weller (Citation2001, 51, 49–61). 15. Donald M. Snow (Citation2007, 57) adds a second questionable rationale for the US invasion: ties to terrorism, al Qaeda specifically. He does not go as far as to call these rationales false, only as being "essentially discredited," though "policymakers were generally given the benefit of doubt." That is not the message coming across in the 2006 media, nor consistent with election messages and follow-up congressional investigations. Richard L. Russell (Citation2005, 468, 466–485) is more blatant, calling these rationales "a catastrophic intelligence failure … arguably one of the greatest intelligence failures since the CIA's inception in 1947." 16. Weller (Citation2001, 54). 17. Whitaker (Citation1997, 25–43). 18. The picture-puzzle analogy brings together what Lt. General Hoyt Sanford Vandenberg called the "overall picture" as seen by troops in their corners of the world, and what Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter described as a "gigantic jigsaw," necessitating "a researcher, engaged in hard, painstaking work, poring over foreign newspapers and magazines, reference works and similar materials, endlessly putting fact upon fact, until the whole outline appears and the details begin to fill in." Vandenberg was formerly head of the army's G2 until appointed the second Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), from July 1946; Hillenkoetter became the first director of the Central Intelligence Agency after the National Security Act was enacted in July 1947. (Hilsman Citation1969, 210, ch. 22). 19. Snow (Citation1995, 42–65). 20. The Constitutional Convention placed intelligence in civilian hands, and Congress authorized the first secret service fund, the Contingent Fund on Foreign Intercourse, on July 1, 1790 (Sayle Citation1986, 9, 1–27). 21. Wark (Citation2003, 184–5, ch. 13). 22. See his classic, Democracy in America, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York, NY: Library for America for Penguin Putnam, 2004). 23. Phythian (Citation2005, 654–6, 653–81). 24. Bradley F. Smith (Citation1997) traces Anglo-American cooperation "to the extremely close and warm relations which prevailed between American civil and military authorities on one hand, and those of Great Britain on the other," even pointing to a 1906 Admiralty memorandum indicating Britain to be "on the best of terms" with the United States. Also of interest is Colin MacKinnon (Citation2005, 654–69). 25. Mr. X (Citation1947, 575). 26. For more on this, see Peter Pigott (Citation2007, ch. 3–4). 27. I am indebted to a reviewer for specifying these. 28. Bush's homeland security speech to Congress, September 20, 2001 (Maxwell Citation2004, 258). Full speech accessed from Cynthia A. Watson (Citation2002, 200–6). 29. Turner (Citation2004, 42–3). 30. He is not the only one. Acknowledging nuances, Snow also sees this paradigm as "the dominant organizational device" for purposes of intelligence and security. See Snow (Citation2007, 70, 50–72). 31. On consociationalism, see Lijphart (Citation1968b, 216, 207–21), Lijphart (Citation1968a, 3–44), and Lange and Meadwell (Citation2002, ch. 5). 32. Canadian competitiveness involves as many actors, though perhaps makes less noise than, as in the United States. On the actors, see Farson (Citation2000, 252–3) and Rudner (Citation2002, 540–64). 33. For a useful diagram and discussions, see Richelson and Ball (Citation1985), page 85 for RCMA Secret Service and page 95 for CSIS, but see chapter 5 in general. 34. Troy (Citation1988, 253, 245–66). 35. Troy (Citation1988, 156–8). 36. Johnson (Citation2008, 58–63) and Goodman (Citation2008, 170–1). 37. Both PSEPC and PSC trace their origins to the 2002 Public Safety Act, itself the product of Bill C-55 of April 29, 2002 which died when the Parliament was prorogued in September. 38. For the post–Cold War, pre–9/11 changes, see Farson and Whitaker (Citation2008, 22–36, 28–35). 39. Charles (Citation2005, 225–37). 40. Jackson (Citation2005, 32–5, ch. 1). 41. Troy (Citation1988, 247). 42. Harry Truman's middle name is not an initial. 43. Valero (Citation2003, 91–118). 44. Figure from Rempel (Citation2004, 637–8). Compare to US OSS having over 13,000 in 1944 (Jackson Citation2005, 33). 45. Farson (Citation2000, 230–31). 46. Rudner (Citation2007, 473–90). 47. Farson (Citation2005, 110–4, 99–119). 48. Yet their capacities have been seriously questioned alter 9/11. On the CIA's limitations, see Goodman (2008), and on the FBI's, see Zegart (Citation2007, 165–84). 49. Troy (Citation1988, 256–7). 50. Crabb and Mulcahy (Citation1989, 153–68). 51. Hastedt, (Citation1986, 29–30).

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