Circumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite” – A Critique of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine

The recent oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico and ensuing questions of
\naccountability have brought a controversial legal tool to the forefront, the “responsible
\ncorporate officer doctrine.” This doctrine allows courts to hold individuals who
\nexercise control over business policies or activities personally liable for failing to
\nprevent statutory offenses by subordinates, even if they themselves were not aware of
\nany wrongdoing.
\nFor corporate officials, the RCO doctrine is dangerous because of its ability to
\nsidestep the usual requirements that apply to holding corporate agents responsible.
\nMoreover, from their viewpoint, the doctrine is troubling in that it extends statutory
\nduties of legal entities to their “responsible corporate officers” as an additional class
\nof defendants. Examined from a broader perspective, the RCO doctrine may also result
\nin additional costs, contribute to overdeterrence, and undermine the notion of limited
\nliability.
\nThis Article explains how the RCO doctrine runs contrary to established tort,
\ncriminal, and corporate law principles and why it represents an unwarranted
\naugmentation of corporate agents’ duties. It then proceeds to explain that current
\njustifications of the doctrine are not convincing and explores the doctrine’s negative
\neffects. Finally, the Article advances the idea of a “cautious approach” to applying the
\nRCO doctrine, arguing that legislatures and courts should reduce the RCO doctrine to rare and clearly delineated instances of statutory liability for intentional or knowing
\nmisconduct.

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