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Enregistrement W2158687433 · doi:10.1111/j.1541-1338.2011.00496.x

Climate Change Regionalism in North America

2011· article· en· W2158687433 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Henrik Selin, Stacy D. VanDeveer

Notice bibliographique

RevueReview of Policy Research · 2011
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineEnvironmental Science
ThématiqueAtmospheric and Environmental Gas Dynamics
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésPoliticsMulti-level governanceClimate changeCorporate governancePolitical scienceEnvironmental governanceRegionalism (politics)SovereigntyNegotiationDemocracyPolitical economy of climate changeEuropean unionPolitical economyEconomicsInternational trade

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Global institutions and debates about climate change governance attract considerable academic and media attention. The main multilateral forums are arenas for high-profile political negotiations, inter-state conflicts, and thousands of nongovernmental actors. Similarly, national climate change politics and policy are significant to decision makers and scholars, and local and urban climate change activism and planning also draw notable interest. However, outside the European Union (EU), much less analytical and political attention is paid to issues and possibilities of regional-level climate change governance—despite the fact that regional cooperation and institutional arrangements offer a multitude of political, economic, and environmental benefits not readily available in local, national, or global settings (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2010; Jordan, Huitema, Van Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010; Patt, 2009). Furthermore, regional policy making around economic integration and trade has proliferated in recent decades, resulting in scholarly and political debates about the complementarities and conflicts between global and regional trade initiatives, state sovereignty, and democratic governance (Kuhnhardt, 2010; Laursen, 2003). Even as North American trade and economic integration deepened significantly over the last 20 years, little public debate about regional options for better climate change and energy governance has followed. In fact, few leading North American national politicians—some in Canada and Mexico but practically none in the United States—have paid serious attention to continental alternatives for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and addressing adaptation needs, even as the dynamic nature of multilevel climate change governance driven by subnational policy leadership across the continent is growing (Selin & VanDeveer, 2009a, 2009b) However, it is possible to identify potential benefits for North American countries of more coordinated action across Canadian, U.S., and Mexican public and private sector entities. Furthermore, global GHG emissions cannot be adequately reduced—and the goal of keeping average global temperatures from increasing more than 2°C over preindustrial levels cannot be met—without significant cuts in North American emissions. This viewpoint article intends to stimulate both scholars and practitioners to engage in more serious reflection and critical debate about opportunities for further coordinated North American responses to climate change. It draws attention to expected intellectual, economic, political, and environmental advantages of expanded continental climate change and energy governance for all three North American societies. First, we briefly address the notion of climate change regionalism and highlight ways to think about multilevel governance arrangements already developing in North America. This is followed by a discussion of four broad areas of potential benefits of expanded continental climate change policy making: gaining from policy learning, capturing economic efficiency gains, meeting adaptation challenges, and exercising global leadership. The article ends with some remarks on the future of North American climate change governance, calling for more regionally focused empirical research and analysis. It is generally recognized that EU organizations, European states, civil society organizations, and private sector actors have developed the world's most comprehensive set of regional institutions and policies to address challenges posed by climate change (Jordan et al., 2010; Selin & VanDeveer, 2010). The EU experience offers valuable lessons for other regions—including both successes and failures in policy design and implementation—as well as demonstrates general benefits of regional cooperation and policy making. Yet, the EU consists of a unique set of institutions emergent from particular historical, political, social, cultural, and economic contexts. Contemporary European governance is the result of over five decades of institutional development. Because this is not the case in North America, the idea that other regions may learn from the EU experience of regional climate change governance does not suggest the states outside Europe can, or even should, simply copy the EU. Regionalism is a contested concept that engenders different definitions across scholarly disciplines and theorists. Nevertheless, the notion of a region often refers to contiguous political jurisdictions. These connected jurisdictions offer politically and environmentally salient geographic spaces around which environmental problems and institutions may be framed. Recently, analysts have distinguished between three types of regional governance, including those organized mostly on the basis of interstate governance, those based on an “ecoregion” that may not correspond well to political boundaries, and those seeking to construct regionally framed sustainable development (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2010). This article about North American climate change regionalism generally focuses on the prospects for greater interstate governance, but it does so in the context of three states with dynamic forms of environmental federalism sharing ecological space and resources on a common continent (Selin & VanDeveer, 2009a, forthcoming). North American climate change regionalism refers to a dynamic, political, multilevel context in which local, state, provincial, and federal actors formulate economic, environmental, and energy policies within their own jurisdictions. Furthermore, the exact number and definition of the particular levels of jurisdiction is neither always clear, nor static. As such, “local” politics might include small towns, counties, large cities, or multi-jurisdictional metropolitan areas. Similarly, states and provinces make policy individually, but they also work in groups both within and across national boundaries. For example, the six New England states collaborate with each other, with states outside New England, and with Canadian provinces around sets of climate and energy policies. Similarly, California is a leader in climate change and energy policy development by itself, but it also works with other U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and Mexican states. Thus, “regional” is a multi-scalar concept that may refer to continental geographic spaces, such as Europe or North America, as well as to smaller spaces or subregions. Understanding multilevel regional governance requires appreciating the multidirectional nature of politics and policy-making authority and shifting boundaries between states and societies (Piattoni, 2010). In Europe, the concept of “subsidiarity” refers to debates over the most appropriate level at which to vest governing authority for particular policy problems or tasks. In North America, similar federalist debates take place both within and among each of the three large states on the continent. Ideally, “cooperative federalism” involves actors at different governance levels supporting each other toward the fulfillment of shared goals—different federal levels acting in a complementary manner. However, Derthick (2010) argues that U.S. climate change politics is better understood as “compensatory federalism.” Rather than subnational jurisdictions taking actions in conjunction with federal laws and goals, subnational entities are compensating for a lack of meaningful federal action. Much the same might be said of climate change politics in Canada and Mexico (Gore, 2010; Stoett, 2009). Early stages of North American climate change politics can be characterized as “bottom-up expansion” (Selin & VanDeveer, 2009a). As a growing number of federal and subnational actors become active, the bottom-up dynamics begin to look more like “complex multilevel coordination.” Then, federal authorities establish minimum standards with which a wide range of public and private subnational actors must comply—as seen in recent increases in energy efficiency standards for vehicles and some electronic equipment as well as in debates over renewable energy mandates. Simultaneously, subnational authorities may be allowed (or even encouraged) to exceed at least some federal standards, as federal action establishes policy “floors.” This leaves room for more ambitious policy action at the supranational level as well as for collaborative initiatives by groups of states and provinces or transnational networks of cities and private actors. Still, the diversity of policy preferences and interests ranging from the local to the regional makes multilevel climate change governance more than a little challenging. Based on a minimal definition of multilevel governance of policy actors and stakeholders operating across horizontal and vertical levels of social organization and jurisdictional authority, such governance is emerging in North America around climate change. Importantly, Canadian, U.S., and Mexican federal political systems do not divide climate change-related decision-making authority in identical ways, and many issues of authority remain unsettled as federal, state/provincial, and municipal officials and organizations struggle over policy-making rights and responsibilities. Nevertheless, enhanced North American cooperation offers opportunities to reap shared short- and longer-term benefits. Taking into account the history and current state of North American regionalism, including in the area of climate change, there are at least four sets of potential benefits of increased continental collaboration: gaining from policy learning, capturing economic efficiency gains, meeting adaptation challenges, and exercising global leadership (Selin & VanDeveer, 2009b). A common argument in federalism and multilevel governance literatures is that policy experimentation across multiple jurisdictions with a diversity of policy instruments and goals yields success in the search for appropriate and cost-efficient measures to address particular economic, social, and environmental issues (Rabe, 2009, 2010; Selin & VanDeveer, forthcoming). Important lessons can be drawn from Massachusetts's declining GHG emissions, California's suit of climate change and energy policies, British Columbia's carbon tax scheme, and hundreds of other policy experiments across the continent. Expanded North American multilevel cooperation provides avenues of policy diffusion and learning. The North American federal systems offer numerous opportunities for policy learning from which jurisdictions across the continent can benefit. North American policy leaders in the public, private, and civil society sectors also already work to disseminate their policy initiatives and lessons to other jurisdictions and across national boundaries (Gore 2010; Selin & VanDeveer, 2007, 2009a). For example, under The Climate Registry, over 60 member states, provinces, and tribes from all three North American countries collaborate, serving as a basis for continental standardization of GHG estimation and reporting. Through the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), a set of U.S. and Mexican states and Canadian provinces cooperate to address climate change and implement a joint strategy to reduce GHG emissions. Six U.S. states and five Canadian Provinces formulated a joint action plan under the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, and are developing intra-jurisdictional policies and programs toward meeting shared policy goals and GHG reduction targets. The same New England states and four others launched the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a GHG cap-and-trade scheme, in late 2008, following a period of collaboration and rule making dating back to 2003. By late 2010, officials from RGGI states were sharing expertise and information and working with officials and activists in WCI states and provinces (among others), seeking ways to collaborate on rules, standards, and programs across jurisdictions and with federal authorities. State- and provincial-level renewable portfolio standards currently contain a plethora of differing mandates and definitions (Carley, 2011). Some of these experiments in renewable energy generation and carbon governance are more effective, easier to implement, and/or more efficient than others. State and provincial officials are also engaged in policy diffusion and lesson learning, seeking to improve individual and collective standards and mandates. There are also practical reasons for lesson drawing and harmonization across subnational jurisdictions, as regulatory diversity and contradictions in basic definitions of what constitutes “renewable” energy or an “energy efficient” product may obstruct or distort trade (Rowlands, 2009). States and provinces currently have very different levels of renewable energy in their grids and substantially different legal and regulatory institutions related to environmental protection and energy production and consumption. Greater continental cooperation for climate change and energy policies offers enumerable learning opportunities from these diverse contexts and policy experiments, while reaping benefits of at least some policy harmonization. Alongside the many institutionalized cross-border forums for North American policy diffusion and lesson learning, a growing number of policy leaders use organizations and professional and personal networks to move information about climate change policies and management actions across public, private, and civil society sectors. Many policy advocates in public, private, and civil society sectors rely on such connections for information and advice. This may lead to changes in professional norms and interests, as meetings and training programs in professions such as transport and land-use planning, wastewater treatment, and public accounting incorporate climate change mitigation and adaptation into their normal activities. Of course, various levels of governance authority may encounter limits in their ability to lead and influence others—a point demonstrated by Gore's (2010) analysis of Canadian municipal networks. North America is a long way from standardized governance, but policy diffusion and learning may build increased normative agreement around the need to reduce GHG emissions over time and adapt to a changing environment (Selin & VanDeveer, 2007). The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) created a single trilateral marketplace. It is one of the world's largest regional trading blocs and has governed continental trade for almost 20 years. By 2008, all NAFTA duties and quantitative restrictions had been eliminated. NAFTA covers electricity, as well as the trade in tens of thousands of goods and services which create and use energy. The NAFTA market includes more than 440 million people producing $17 trillion in goods and services every year. These economic activities also generate over 8.3 billion tons of GHG emissions, constituting over 20 percent of global emissions. Yet, there remains markedly little trilateral cooperation and debate among Canada, the United States, and Mexico around important climate change issues. Recognizing the importance of NAFTA when planning and implementing GHG policies, continental climate change cooperation affords opportunities to increase economic efficiencies and reduce the costs of green technology expansion, clean energy development, and the introduction of liquid carbon markets in all three countries. With respect to the introduction of green technologies, economies of scale dynamics dictate that average cost per unit falls as the size of the market and competition increase. The development of shared standards for less carbon intensive goods commonly traded under NAFTA would facilitate growth in continental markets for more energy and fuel-efficient products such as automobiles and other vehicles, home appliances, office equipment, and heating and air conditioning units. Raising such standards may have the benefit of using the size of the NAFTA market to push North American manufacturers to develop new products that can be sold also in foreign markets, as well as drive foreign firms to make more efficient products for the NAFTA market. As European standard setters know, there is global power in high standards because the costs for foreign producers to comply are generally much lower than giving up a large market like the EU or NAFTA (Selin & VanDeveer, 2006). Continental minimum standards also help prevent a “race to the bottom.” A North American standard means that a firm cannot decide to relocate from one NAFTA jurisdiction to another to avoid compliance with GHG controls. Because of semi-integrated energy markets and shared climatological and economic conditions, provinces and states around the Canadian and U.S. border and states on both sides of the U.S. and Mexican border share common energy futures. Greater harmonization of standards would facilitate renewable energy trade along both borders. This would enhance opportunities for things like Mexican exports of wind and solar power to the United States and Canadian exports of hydropower to the United States. Better integrating energy production and distribution grids entails many years of investment and construction. Without transnational collaboration, such development may not accommodate the needs to transport renewable energy from where it can best be produced to where it is most needed. As it stands now, state and provincial renewable portfolio standards contain a plethora of differing mandates and definitions which can obstruct cross-border trade, risking legal disputes (Rowlands, 2009). Switching away from dirty fossil fuels and ineffective technologies also helps target additional air pollutants—including mercury, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, ground-level ozone, and particulate matter—through co-benefits of more stringent emission controls (Mickley, 2007; Selin, 2009; Wang et al., 2009). North American carbon markets are currently in their infancy. However, North America's 8.3 billion metric tons of annual carbon equivalent emissions suggest that with serious GHG controls, the value of a continental carbon market could quickly grow to several hundred billion dollars (even if only a portion of total emissions are covered). If carbon markets grow, it seems likely that bottom-up and complex multilevel dynamics will be at play. Regional and state markets in the United States Northeast and the United States and Canadian West are either operating or in development. There are clear benefits of linking these still disparate systems to induce common standards. Rather than building separate national and/or more subnational carbon markets, creating a continental market would capture efficiency opportunities and lower transaction costs. Such a market could potentially take advantage of existing institutions for continental economic integration. In the shorter term, there are opportunities for greater cooperation among jurisdictions willing to take the lead in developing carbon markets. As energy flows across borders, often by publicly traded companies with shareholders from multiple countries, it makes economic and political sense to expand carbon markets to drive investments and bring down North American GHG emissions. GHG mitigation is only one side of the climate change issue (and admittedly a huge one). Another one concerns adaptation. The sooner public authorities and other stakeholders in the United States, Canada, and Mexico begin addressing regional adaptation issues together, the better citizens can prepare for challenges associated with ongoing and possible climatic changes. Expanded continent-wide climate governance can help North American societies to prepare for shared and cross-border adaptation issues, such as those related to ecosystem health, extreme weather events, freshwater distribution and availability, coastal erosion, forestry and agricultural changes, and fisheries management (Karl, Melillo, Peterson, Hassol, 2009; Lemmen, Warren, Lacroix, Bush, 2008). Policy makers and researchers in all three countries have barely begun to conduct regional and local assessments and design contingency plans. Federal and subnational policy makers could use common forums to support the diffusion and implementation of effective adaptation policies at state, provincial, and municipal levels, and to ensure that these are coordinated across borders, as appropriate. Climate change adaptation is a human security issue (Dodds, Hingham, & Sherman, 2009). Many stakeholder categories of people across North America may be severely impacted by climate change, including indigenous peoples, farmers, and low-income households in both urban and rural areas. Furthermore, climate change may be viewed as an issue that also impacts more traditional national security concerns (Moran, 2011; Paskal, 2010). A growing number of North American intelligence and military analysts argue that consequences of drought, immigration, and the opening of Arctic sea lanes and new opportunities for off-shore natural resource exploitation, additional security challenges for states. It is also likely that there will be competition North American as well as other countries for to natural resources in the Arctic even if military around these issues seems at Climate 2008). These and other of national adaptation issues more regional attention. Greater North American climate change cooperation and building can help the societies political and economic challenges posed by the and other countries. the United States is for global climate change while Canada is for to implement in global and Mexico remains in a mostly the United States. to North American mitigation and adaptation associated learning potential and efficiency increased opportunities to more regional and global climate change and energy policy & Selin, 2010). Of course, climate change cooperation within North America and between North America and the of the will not be Federal and subnational and stakeholders substantially in their about the most appropriate ways to address climate change at However, expanded multilevel continental governance can important in all three North American countries. than political in global and national this would that North American countries can and will their GHG emissions. There may also be opportunities to use cooperation between Canada, the United States, and Mexico as a means to better engage other countries in the and on European lessons of regional cooperation and benefits of and standards in forums and global markets, greater North American climate change collaboration could as a for the of countries engaged in GHG and adaptation If NAFTA states can on common institutions and standards for a carbon American and other states engaged in trade with the NAFTA region might be to into this market the NAFTA agreement as a basis for trade with the United States and others in the Western if NAFTA states to implement a common set of energy efficiency standards for these will likely drive some change in product in a of countries in America, Europe, and all to the NAFTA market. Thus, greater North American collaboration offers opportunities for global economic and political influence and leadership. In all three North American states, federal policies to well of those to substantially reduce GHG emissions or to adapt to a changing In fact, Canadian, U.S., and Mexican national GHG emissions to increase. However, a growing number of climate change and renewable energy leaders on the continent and many subnational actors are and effective policy In support of these policies they are building new and institutions and transnational networks their federal Yet, important remain the future development and implementation of more North American climate change policy at all levels of For example, long can subnational leaders to expand policy and standards a more all subnational jurisdictions and federal federal authorities to subnational leadership and related of standards, or will they Many more and for based on empirical research and analysis. This viewpoint article the of North American complex multilevel governance in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation. It some possible benefits of expanded continental collaboration and or on these issues. further of general and and of regional action is needed. from the EU climate change, energy and environmental issues and about multilevel governance more likely to be in such even if much EU climate change policy making has more over while North America's remains more Nevertheless, European politics and policy that the regional level can a in addressing issues of shared and importance such as climate change. In the European regional can also refer to the EU as a as well as to smaller geographic spaces such as and other of national jurisdictions. The EU makes policies for all member states, but it also cooperation for example, the and the (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2010). In North America, climate change cooperation has the potential to build on such as the and economic, social, and ecological benefits in the Regional cooperation might include greater use of existing such as on 2010). options the use of shared institutions such as the WCI to carbon trading among states and provinces, or the for greater common standards and for emissions reporting. Much public policy and public research focuses on states, subnational levels of and/or the of levels of The challenges posed by climate change policy mitigation and for more attention to regional multilevel governance in research design and Climate change demonstrates all well that there is much to and much to

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,001
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,757
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,484

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,001
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0010,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0050,003
Communication savante0,0030,001
Science ouverte0,0000,002
Intégrité de la recherche0,0010,001
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0060,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,132
Tête enseignante GPT0,374
Écart entre enseignants0,242 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

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Citations25
Publié2011
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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Même revueReview of Policy ResearchMême sujetAtmospheric and Environmental Gas DynamicsTravaux en français237 207