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Enregistrement W2167438046 · doi:10.1353/hcr.2006.0090

Privatizing the Department of Defense: A Proposal

2006· article· en· W2167438046 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Daniel Callahan

Notice bibliographique

RevueThe Hastings Center Report · 2006
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueMilitary and Defense Studies
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésPolitical science

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Privatizing the Department of Defense:A Proposal Daniel Callahan (bio) For the past few years I have spent a good deal of time arguing with economic conservatives about the value of market theory and practices for health care. I am dubious about the utility of the market and far more impressed with the universal health care systems of Europe. The Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow contended many years ago that health care was not a promising arena for market theory, and market practices in the United States have not generated robust health or economic outcomes. Nonetheless, economic conservatives continue to press their case. The market, they say, has two distinct values: it can enhance our choices in health care, and it will force us to consider the cost of the care we want, which is currently obscured by third-party payments. They also dislike "big government" and "socialized medicine." Consumer-driven health care is their moral ideal. Actually, there is a far better target for market enthusiasts than health care. It is the Department of Defense. No one has ever talked of a "socialized Department of Defense," which it surely is, nor objected to it on the grounds that it exemplifies big government in a most flagrant way. Why that has not been noticed mystifies me. But it is surely—as even conservatives might concede—bloated, inefficient, reckless about costs, and the ne plus ultra of bureaucracy. I have a proposal. Why not privatize national defense, bringing to bear on the Pentagon all the virtues the market supposedly could bring to health care? First, if we should have a choice about the kind of health care want, simply because people have different needs and desires, that principle should surely apply to national defense. We do not all want the same kind of security. Some of us want more high-tech planes and ships and antimissile systems, others more feet on the ground. Some of us like massive arsenals of nuclear weapons, while others have a taste for biological toxins or poison gas. Second, if we had more choice about the kind of defense we want, we would surely think about the cost and be willing to pay for our preferences. As it now stands we hardly have to give a thought to the defense budget because the money is just one more item of taxation—money out of our pockets, but not in a way that encourages prudent spending. But how could we have both choice and cost control? The most straightforward method would be a voucher system. The government, or our employer, would give us money to buy whatever kind of defense we fancied. That would take care of what economists call the demand side. As for the supply side, a number of commercial plans would be set up to sell us the defense we personally want, knitted together by the government in a form of managed competition. I want to stress that this proposal is not meant as a direct response to our military problems in Iraq. They have been brilliantly and efficiently managed, even if there has been a little muttering here and there. However, a really good market system in defense would have allowed us to hire our own inspectors prior to the war and to buy our own kind of military campaign once it was under way—and a few of us would probably have chosen an invasion of Venezuela, Canada, or Monaco instead of Iraq. I have failed so far to mention the most important feature of all—our right to purchase outright, or buy time shares of, the various competing armies and navies. I could have my apartment house surrounded by my own tanks, artillery, and troops. I don't have that kind of choice now, which is what you get from a socialized Department of Defense. What about pacifists and other simpering people who just don't like war and violence? They are a headache for any free country. I would not give them a voucher at all, understanding that they would be "free riders," their lives protected by the economic sacrifices of the rest of us. That gesture would surely be compassionate...

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: Empirique
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,773
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,623

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0010,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0000,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,020
Tête enseignante GPT0,277
Écart entre enseignants0,257 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2006
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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