Energy from Bombs: Problems and Solutions in the Implementation of a High-Priority Nonproliferation Project

Abstract The U.S.-Russian cooperative project to convert highly enriched uranium from the Russian nuclear weapons program into reactor fuel and sell it for peaceful use in commercial power stations is a high-priority nonproliferation initiative. Implementation of this project, however, has encountered a wide variety of problems. This account examines the obstacles encountered and the practical solutions that have been developed to allow this project to realize its nonproliferation goals. Notes 1. Thomas L. Neff, “A Grand Uranium Bargain,” New York Times, 24 October 1991. Variations were introduced in Congress by Representative Jim Leach on 2 October 1991 (Congressional Record, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991, 137, pt. 17:25146) and Senator Alan Cranston on 21 November 1991 (Congressional Record, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991, 137, pt. 23:33607–33618). 2. Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, and John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, March 2003), 192–194. 3. Richard A. Falkenrath, “The HEU Deal,” in Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1996), appendix 3, 229–292; Richard A. Falkenrath, “Viewpoint: The HEU Deal and the U.S. Enrichment Corporation,” The Nonproliferation Review, 3, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 62–66; Thomas L. Neff, “Decision Time for the HEU Deal: U.S. Security vs. Private Interests,” Arms Control Today 31, no. 5 (June 2001): 12–17. 4. David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities, and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1997); Oleg Bukharin, “Analysis of the Size and Quality of Uranium Inventories in Russia,” Science and Global Security, 6, no. 1 (1996): 59–77. These assessments suggest the Soviet Union produced 1000–1300 tons of HEU for nuclear weapons. 5. The 31 August 1991 statement of President Bush and the White House “Fact Sheet on U.S.-Russian Agreement on Highly-Enriched Uranium” were placed in the Congressional Record on 5 October 1992 (Congressional Record, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 138, pt. 27 pp. 32082–32083). 6. The text of the HEU Agreement is available in the Research Library of the Nuclear Threat Initiative: “Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons” (18 February 1993), ⟨www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/heudeal/heufull.htm⟩. 7. “Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the United States, Russia and Ukraine,” Arms Control Today, 24, no. 1 (January/February 1994): 21–22. 8. The Initial Implementing Contract is attached to the FORM S-1 filed by USEC with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 29 June 1998. 9. U.S. International Trade Commission, Uranium from the U.S.S.R, USITC pub. 2471 (Washington, D.C.: December 1991), A-54, B-25. 10. Federal Register, Vol. 57, No.1 (1992), 68–69. 11. Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 107 (1992), 23380–23385. 12. Federal Register, Vol. 57, No. 211 (1992), 49235–49242. 13. “Uranium Industry Annual 2001” (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, May 2002), 7–11. 14. Federal Register, Vol. 59, No. 63 (1994), 15373–15377. 15. Congressional Record, 104th Cong., 1st sess., 1995, 141, pt. 8:11838–11840. 16. “Cameco Signs Uranium Agreement in Principle with Russia,” Press Release, Cameco Corporation, Saskatoon, Sask., Canada (18 August 1997). 17. “Discussions Suspended Concerning Russian Highly Enriched Uranium,” Press Release, Cameco Corporation, Saskatoon, Sask., Canada (11 December 1997). 18. The texts of the government-to-government agreement and the Transfer Agreement are available in the Research Library of the Nuclear Threat Initiative: “Diplomatic Notes” exchanged by the United States Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation establishing the “Assurances Agreement” (24 March 1999) and “Agreement between the United States Department of Energy and the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Atomic Energy Concerning the Transfer of Source Material to the Russian Federation” (24 March 1999), ⟨www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fulltext/heudeal/heufeed.htm⟩; for an account of the commercial contract see “Cameco Announces Deal For Uranium Derived from Russian Nuclear Weapons,” Press Release and Backgrounder, Cameco Corporation, Saskatoon, Sask., Canada (24 March 1999). 19. For a DOE description of the HEU transparency program, see “Highly Enriched Uranium Transparency Implementation Program” (September 2003), ⟨http://heu.llnl.gov/postings/openwebhandout.pdf⟩. 20. The DOE-USEC agreement is attached to FORM 8-K filed by USEC with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 21 June 2002. 21. The State-DOE-USEC Memorandum of Agreement is attached to FORM S-1/A filed by USEC with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 20 July 1998. 22. Federal Register, Vol. 65, No. 123 (2000), 39279–39280. 23. Columbus Dispatch, 6 October 2000. 24. “Energy Secretary Richardson Announces Initiative to Secure Supply of Enriched Uranium in the U.S.,” Press Release, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (6 October 2000). 25. Letter from Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Condoleeza Rice to Representative Billy Tauzin, 7 February 2001. 26. Both the DOE-USEC agreement on a modern enrichment facility and the Tenex-USEC agreement on market pricing are described in FORM 8-K filed by USEC with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 21 June 2002. 27. “Joint Statement by Secretary Abraham and Minister Rumyantsev,” Press Release, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. (17 September 2002). 28. Mathew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Wier, Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative and Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, May 2002), 65–72. The Nuclear Threat Initiative is supporting further technical assessment of the concept of accelerated blend-down of HEU.

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