Burbridge, John. Cause for Thought: An Essay in Metaphysics

BURBRIDGE, John. Cause for Thought: An Essay in Metaphysics. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014. 130 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $19.95--This slender volume suggests that an adequate analysis of reality focuses on causality and begins in materialistic nature that cannot be understood as deterministic. The essay then rises above matter to consider psychological causality that, in turn, points toward possibility of divine. Accordingly, as is fitting for an essay in metaphysics, it begins with an examination of physical as indicating causes much beyond physical. Here, one finds refreshing, humbly put suggestion that, yes, indeed, sufficient reflection on material reality points to both its own lack of determinateness and to irreducibly spiritual causes, both that of human psyche and, perhaps, some entity beyond all matter that insures that, ultimately, all shall be well and well understood. In light of fact that even in most demanding natural sciences there is no compelling evidence for strict causal determinism, author takes opportunity to explore alternative, namely, presence of small contingencies. Burbridge puts forth following thesis: By adopting hypothesis that contingencies are possible, we have explored structure of reciprocal causation as well as some implications that follow. So this essay in metaphysics is itself provisional and subject to revision, reflection and refutation. It is put forward as an alternative to determinist position and it claims to do greater justice to phenomena of organic, conscious and rational agency than reductive materialism. The author delivers on above in six succinct chapters. In his first chapter, he recalls history of declination away from metaphysics beginning with Hume while noting a return to its possibility in Peirce. Following a double process or reflective equilibrium between explanatory concepts and phenomena to be explained, author tentatively suggests that determinism proves inadequate and that a focus on causality in contrast to considering solely substances proves fruitful. In second chapter, he proposes that the most plausible scenario is that, as events combine into sufficient conditions, there is no strict necessity, but one subject to contingent variations that could over time modify general pattern of regularities. To use simple conditional judgement, 'if A then B,' as Procrustean model for our understanding of forward-moving causal action is misguided. In third chapter, author follows out complex causality as found in organisms, in whose realm mechanistic deterministic causal explanations especially fail. …

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