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Résumé
Canada's mission in Afghanicstan has evolved considerably. What began as a contribution to operation Fnduring Freedom in the aftermath of 9/11 has since transformed into postconflict reconstruction, counterin s urgency warfare, and nationbuilding. Yet even as the nature of the mission has changed, its justification has remained the same. Three successive governments have emphasized that it both secures national interests and projects humanitarian values. Ostensibly, Canada is in Afghanistan to protect against the threat of terrorism, demonstrate leadership on an issue of international importance, and rebuild a failed state. While these may be complementary objectives, they are also part of a new integrated approach to peacebuilding. Instead of treating defence, diplomacy, and development activities separately, Canada now aims to implement comprehensive solutions to state failure. Government departments are expected to work together to pursue common goals with coherent policy. In this respect Afghanistan is the first real test for an emerging new approach to integrated peacebuilding, and for better or worse, Canada is at the centre of the trial.So far the gap between the rhetoric of integrated peacebuilding (also labelled whole of government, or 3D peacebuilding) and reality remains significant. Critics have characterized the policy as an empty vessel or a convenient repackaging of old practices.1 The fact that the decision to go to Afghanistan was heavily influenced by the geopolitical context and the Canada- U S relationship lends credence to claims that the new approach is little more than a way to sell Canadians on a difficult mission. Moreover, instead of breaking down policy boundaries, the result may actually have been increased competition between government departments for policy ownership and access to resources.2, In this context, the prominent role of the Department of National Defence has also raised questions about the balance between defence, diplomacy, and development objectives. Finally, in each of the three component areas, results have been mixed. Development progress has been uneven, with some parts of the country enjoying growth and stability while others remained mired in poverty and violence. The resurgence of the Taliban is an unwelcome development and has dragged the military into a protracted and dangerous campaign. Disagreements within NATO - particularly about sharing the burden of combat - have in turn created diplomatic tensions. Afghanistan's national development remains plagued by corruption, the influence of regional warlords, and aid dependency.As such, Canada's approach remains halfway between an empty metaphor and an actual strategy. This is certainly not ideal. Using integrated peacebuilding as a rhetorical device to sell Canadians on the mission does the public a disservice. It diminishes debate and obscures the real challenges Canada faces. Yet implementing an integrated approach to peacebuilding poses formidable problems. It requires a significant shift in thinking and demands difficult departmental coordination. Nonetheless, there are good reasons for taking this approach seriously. Whatever the initial motives for adopting an integrated approach, it fits well with Canada's history of military and humanitarian commitments. Equally, Canada is not alone in making this shift. The move towards comprehensive solutions to state failure is a broader trend in international politics and is well supported by academic research. This approach is more than a passing fad and is likely to shape future peacebuilding efforts.Given these considerations, this article outlines the challenges Canada faces in implementing its new approach. The analysis rests on a key distinction between two challenges raised by integrated peacebuilding. The first concerns asks what an integrated policy should look like. In other words, what tactics and strategies should be employed in an integrated approach? …
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Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
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