Notice bibliographique
Résumé
During the German EU and G8 presidencies, and climate change were prominent issues on Berlin's summit agenda. This was also re- flected in the thematic emphasis of the Canada-EU high-level meeting in early June 2007 in Berlin. The concluding joint statement specifically de- clared energy and climate security to be one of the three main areas for fu- ture cooperation.1 No doubt and climate change are topics that are very much in vogue these days. However, as this article will argue, there are even larger tectonic shifts at work that will affect German and EU foreign policy in the long run and thus potentially impinge on future Ger- many-Canada relations. One irreversible change has been the emergence of as an integral part of foreign policy. This applies to national as well as EU levels. Another development has been the linkage of and climate change in the German and European discourses. A third dimension is not so much a change but a strengthening of an existing trend and that is the German fascination with the Arctic, which has become part and parcel of the political symbolism of climate change policies.Despite recognizing and climate change as topics for future cooperation, these new developments could cause some serious challenges to Canada's relations with Germany and the EU. One particular problem for Canada could arise from the German strategy of addressing and climate change issues outside of NATO, one of Canada's traditional forums for ongoing transatlantic consultation and dialogue. Controversial oil and gas exploration in the high north may be the harbinger of an older pattern of conflict over resource management in the north Atlantic and Arctic, which has pitched Canada and the EU against each other over products such as fish and sealskin. In addition, in any confrontation between the various Arctic nations it is not clear whether Germany would side with Canada, since its priorities are maintaining EU cohesion and securing supplies from Norway and Russia. Thus, while Canada and Germany will certainly remain partners in global and climate change issues and within any NATO, UN, or G 8 framework, this cooperative trajectory is not as clearly marked for specific regional spaces such as the Arctic or the north Atlantic.GERMANY DISCOVERS ENERGY SECURITY: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICIESBefore assessing the political impact of German and European (re) definitions of and climate change on Canada and transatlantic relations, it will be useful to take a closer look at the German debate, which has also informed discussions on the European level. In contrast to many of its European neighbours, in the past played only a secondary role in foreign policy decision-making in Germany. While in most western countries foreign and defence ministries have often been involved in formulating policies, in Germany this has been the domain of the economics ministry. Historically, West Germany saw as simply an economic - not strategic - good and relied heavily on market- bas ed solutions. From the late 1950s it had been dependent on oil imports, mainly from the Middle East and later Russia and the commonwealth of independent states, but it argued that to ensure secure supplies, competitive market conditions needed to be created in which price mechanisms would foster healthy relations between demand and supply. This German belief in market regulation meant that geopolitical considerations were seldom part of any policy agenda. Energy was depoli ticized as important decisions were left to private economic actors. In addition, because of its distinct national approach, became Germany's least EU-compatible policy area.2.During the last couple of years this unique German way of conceptualizing policy has changed. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».