Striking the Right Balance: Federal Infrastructure Transfer Programs, 2002–2015
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Over the last 13 years, the federal government has helped fund a wide array of infrastructure programs: A total of 8,012 projects across the country between 2002 and 2015, funded to the tune of $20.3 billion. A substantial portion of that was done in the name of recession “stimulus.” But far from all of it. And, for better or worse, federal programs have become a permanent feature of fiscal federalism. The only question now is, whether Ottawa has been spending federal taxpayer money as effectively as possible when it does fund these projects. As it turns out, federal handouts for projects in Canadian provinces and municipalities have been relatively well deployed. An analysis finds that a greater amount of federal matching funds were dedicated to projects where provinces faced a higher marginal cost of public funds than the federal government, helping to at least somewhat minimize the negative economic impacts of the additional tax burden. And that a greater amount of funds was dedicated to projects that enhanced economic productivity, such as transit and roads, which increase the probability for national spillover benefits due to the potential for increased federal tax revenue, unlike quality-oflife projects (such as recreation projects) that do not. However, the persistent fiscal imbalance in the provinces’ and the federal government’s marginal cost of raising public funds can only continue to exacerbate the demands from provinces for federal matching funds. Despite federal fiscal equalization programs that provide transfers to provinces with below-average per capita tax bases, there remain notable horizontal fiscal imbalances across the provinces, and a vertical imbalance between lower and higher government levels. Recent estimates calculate the federal government’s marginal cost to be 1.17, compared to a range of 1.41 for Alberta to 3.60 for Ontario, more than three times as high as the federal government’s cost. There are already several programs that provide large block funding transfers to provinces: The Canada Health Transfer, the Canada Social Transfer, the Gas Tax Fund, and federal equalization grants. These block transfers reduce the fiscal imbalance between Ottawa and the provinces, but they have clearly not closed the gap completely. Were the federal government to increase these block transfers, it could arguably reduce its role in funding individual infrastructure projects, thereby encouraging lower levels of government to plan infrastructure more rationally, rather than being influenced by the distortions created by federal matching offers. Indeed, among all the projects that received federal matching funds since 2002, a concerning number were smallscale projects. More than half of the 8,000 projects funded had eligible costs of $1 million or less, and a startling 92 per cent had eligible costs under $10 million. A thousand were below $100,000. Small projects may have their benefits as a stimulus response if they are “shovel ready,” since large projects may require too much planning to offer the rapid employment and spending benefits desired. But the costs of co-ordination for small projects across multiple levels of government add inefficiencies and so should generally be avoided. Again, by providing more in the form of block grants, Ottawa can leave smaller stuff to smaller governments, where it, and much else, properly belongs.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,003 | 0,003 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,005 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,003 | 0,004 |
| Science ouverte | 0,003 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».