Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Christianity…did not establish entirely new virtues; but it changed their relative position. Certain rude and half-savage virtues had been on the top of the list; Christianity put them on the bottom. The milder virtues (such as neighborly love, pity, leniency, the forgetfulness even of injuries) had been on the bottom of the antique list; Christianity placed them above all others. – Alexis de Tocqueville Montesquieu begins Book 29 of The Spirit of the Laws with the claim that his book's purpose is to prove that the legislator must embody the spirit of moderation: Political good, he says, is always to be located between two extremes. This Aristotelian idea of virtue as a mean between extremes points us back to the beginning of Book 25, where Montesquieu highlights two extremes in the experience of religion: piety and atheism. Applying the Montesquieuian rule yields the notion that the legislator should aim at splitting the difference between piety and atheism. Piety is defined here as love of religion; atheism is defined as fear of religion. The wise legislator should neither love nor fear religion but should be guided by a third principle, namely the possible utility of religion. Or rather, attending to the utility of religion should combine an appreciation of the advantages that can come with a loving respect for a particular religion established within a given society, with fear of the evils that can arise from the reign of religion at its worst. The prudent legislator is concerned with how to use both the pious man's love for religion and the atheist's fear of religion to secure good political purposes. However, it goes without saying that someone who can think about religion both from the pious person's perspective (surveying the goods of religion) and the atheist's perspective (surveying the evils of religion) can truly inhabit neither perspective, neither that of atheism nor that of piety. Given how the Rousseauian interpretation of civil religion functions as a hub for the whole of this book, one can hardly avoid relating Montesquieu to the corresponding views in Rousseau. Let us recall the interpretation presented in Part I. The standard reading of Social Contract IV.8 is that Rousseau gives consummate expression to his illiberal politics by ending the book with the highly illiberal project of positing a state religion. Rousseau seems to point in this illiberal direction by radically contrasting the antipolitical character of modern Christianity with the politicizing function of ancient paganism. This, however, is a false impression: Although Rousseau does his utmost to highlight the political deficiencies of Christianity by playing up the civic character of paganism, he ultimately rejects the latter, saying that the “religion of the citizen” leads eventually to cruel intolerance and theocratic imperialism. The “civil religion” that Rousseau lays out at the end of the chapter falls well short of civic religion on the Roman model: Rousseau insists that “there is no longer and can never again be an exclusive national religion.” Rather, Rousseau, no less than Locke, places tolerance at the center of his teaching on the relation between church and state. I do not think it would be an overstatement to say that Rousseau concludes a supposedly antiliberal theory of politics with a celebration of liberalism.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,002 | 0,003 |
| Communication savante | 0,002 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,008 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».