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Enregistrement W2310962433 · doi:10.14288/1.0102346

Public interest in collective bargaining

2011· article· en· W2310962433 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Robert Paul Jelking

Notice bibliographique

RevuecIRcle (University of British Columbia) · 2011
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueLabor Movements and Unions
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésPublic interestPolitical scienceEconomicsBusinessLaw

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Problem This thesis attempts to determine if the Canadian federal and provincial governments are increasing their assertion of the public interest in the collective bargaining process. The primary concern is to determine to what extent the government, through its new labour legislation will be able to affect the quality of collective agreements. The quality of collective agreements can be affected directly through arbitration or can be affected indirectly by influencing the power positions of the negotiating parties. Method of Investigation The first problem which is tackled is the definition of the public interest. The public interest is a term now being used in labour legislation, for which a precise definition is not easily derived. A literature analysis is undertaken to develop a conceptual framework of the public interest. Since this is an investigation of the changing role of the government, it is necessary to establish the traditional role of the government in the collective bargaining process. This is accomplished by examining less recent government legislation as well as case studies of the applications of the U.S. Taft-Hartley Act. The public employees of Canada and the United States are treated as a special case. Recent legislative developments in both countries have resulted in federal public servants to become active in collective bargaining. These recent developments consist in Canada of the Public Service Staff Relations Act, and in the United States of the Executive Order 10899. The new developments in provincial labour legislation consist of B.C.’s Bill 33, Saskatchewan’s Essential Services Emergency Act, and Ontario's Rand Royal Commission Report. These two Acts and the Royal Commission Report are analyzed critically for their potential effect upon the collective bargaining process. Conclusions The literature analysis of the public interest reveals that there is no universally acceptable definition of the public interest. The public interest can only be meaningfully used within a situational framework. In other words, the concept is capable of definition only within a specific situation. Despite the fact that the concept is not likely ever to be universally defined, it will undoubtedly continue to be widely used. The policy of the Canadian federal and provincial governments regarding collective bargaining has traditionally been to assist the parties to come to an agreement. The role of the government has not been one of interference. It has consisted solely of facilitating agreements by postponing work stoppages and by providing mediators. Although the effectiveness of these measures can be questioned, the intent is quite clear. The recent provincial legislation seems to reinforce the proposition that the strike is an undesirable form of social conflict. It is felt to be undesirable in the sense that the legislation encourages the parties to collective negotiations to settle their dispute without resorting to work stoppages. At the same time, it recognizes that the threat of a work stoppage is part of the collective bargaining process. The new legislation formalizes the concept that there are certain kinds of collective bargaining relationships which are heavily endowed with the public interest. Whereas government activity in these kinds of disputes had occurred on an ad hoc basis in the past, the Rand Report, B.C.'s Bill 33, and the Saskatchewan legislation established mechanisms which will provide for the assertion of the public interest in extraordinary labour disputes. In some cases, and where the parties cannot come to an agreement without resorting to a work stoppage, the new legislation will provide an agency or mechanism through which the government can submit the dispute to compulsory arbitration.

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,027
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,040
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,039
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,191

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0270,040
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,001
Bibliométrie0,0030,004
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0130,047
Communication savante0,0150,011
Science ouverte0,0040,007
Intégrité de la recherche0,0080,009
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0130,001

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,065
Tête enseignante GPT0,216
Écart entre enseignants0,151 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2011
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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