Submarines, Oil Tankers, and Icebreakers

Canadian policymakers, academics, and the general public have long had a fascination with the Arctic. It resonates in Canada's culture and in its national identity, and it can even be found in the English version of the Canadian national anthem. There is little doubt that Canadians see themselves as a northern people - even if the vast majority live along a narrow band along its southernmost border. The harsh climate and resulting ice conditions have meant that Canadians have been able to believe that few have challenged Canadian claims to have its secure and sovereign Arctic. As climate change begins to open the Arctic to the international community, Canadian policymakers and academics are wrestling with new requirements, and there is a tendency to look to the past to determine the response to the future.1 Both the academic discourse and the existing policy framework are based on the twin assumptions that the main international issue facing Canada is with regard to challenges to its sovereignty and that these are generally from the US.But what if this narrative has missed significant elements of the full picture? What if important events, actions, or realities simply were missed or ignored by the government, academics, and the general public? Could such omissions skew Canadian understanding of this important issue? Could they undermine the existing framework that now exists?This article contends that there has been such an omission. From the early 1960s onward, American (and possibly French and British) and Soviet submarines played deadly games of cat and mouse in and around the Arctic Ocean.2 Both the maintenance of nuclear deterrence and the conduct of war if deterrence failed depended heavily on what happened within the Arctic maritime regions.3 Although fundamentally important to Canadian security and welfare, very little of this seems to have entered the deliberations of Canadian policymakers. If the government could not see it, it did not exist. This omission is also notable in the academic discourse on the Arctic. Very few studies have attempted to integrate the actions of submarines into the greater understanding of Canadian policy.4However, any effort to better understand the impact that this element of the Cold War had on Canada is shrouded in secrecy. Very little is known publicly. Therefore it is impossible to know with any degree of certainty what did happen (and what may still be happening). While this issue seems to be relevant only for the past, the current efforts of those who have developed and built nuclear-powered submarines - the US, Russia, UK, France, and China, and those who plan to bund nuclear-power submarines, like India - suggest that Canadian officials must not become complacent. The commitment of these states to dedicate substantial resources to retaining this capability points to the perceived utility of nuclear-powered submarines. Given the geographic position of the Arctic Ocean it is unlikely that some or all of these nations will forsake the opportunity to send their submarines into this region. This is not just a historical issue but one that will continue to challenge Canada.The article examines four possible scenarios. Each of these scenarios makes certain assumptions about the conduct of submarine activity in the Arctic and the Canadian government's response to it. Each of these will then be assessed for their impact on Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security in terms of policy and academic understanding. It is first necessary to discuss what is meant by Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security. The next step is to review the dominant understanding and policy framework.CANADIAN CONCEPTS OF ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITYOne of the greatest challenges for any discussion of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and security is understanding these concepts.5 Efforts to have policy reflect the terms Arctic sovereignty and Arctic security have often been frustrated by the tendency of Canadian policymakers, media, and academics to treat the two terms as separate and distinct concepts. …

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