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Enregistrement W233315158

Session 4: New Policies

2001· article· en· W233315158 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Philip K. Robins, Charles Michalopoulos, Christopher Jencks, Thomas MaCurdy

Notice bibliographique

RevueFederal Reserve Bank of New York Economic policy review · 2001
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueGender, Labor, and Family Dynamics
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésWelfare reformLegislationEntitlement (fair division)Aid to Families with Dependent ChildrenIncentiveEarningsReceiptWelfareSocial Security ActGovernment (linguistics)Work (physics)Federal fundsBlock grantFinancial independenceEconomicsPublic administrationPublic economicsPolitical scienceFinanceLawAccountingSocial security
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

PAPER BY Philip K. Robins and Charles Michalopoulos COMMENTARIES BY Christopher Jencks Thomas MaCurdy USING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO ENCOURAGE WELFARE RECIPIENTS TO BECOME ECONOMICALLY SELF-SUFFICIENT Philip K. Robins and Charles Michalopoulos I. INTRODUCTION On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which radically altered the structure of the welfare system in the United States. Among other things, the act replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, a federal entitlement, with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, a system of block grants to states. One of the primary goals of TANF is to move welfare recipients into work and economic self-sufficiency. Although states were given much flexibility in how to achieve this goal, the federal government imposed some guidelines in the form of requirements that welfare recipients be participating in a work-related (work participation requirements) and time limits on length of welfare receipt. The focus of this paper is on alternative financial incentive schemes that are being used or could be used to help states meet the work participation requirements specified by the federal legislation. In particular, the paper considers whether an earnings supplement conditioned on full-time work would encourage more people to work than the enhanced earnings disregards currently being used or tested by many states. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a background of the PRWORA legislation and describes methods that states have been using to encourage employment and economic self-sufficiency among the welfare population. The discussion focuses on various financial incentive schemes adopted by the states. Section III describes a financial incentive scheme currently not being used in the United States (but being used on an experimental basis in Canada) that conditions benefits on full-time employment. Section IV discusses how such a scheme might be implemented in the United States. Section V presents estimated effects of such a scheme based on results from a microsimulation model. Finally, Section VI summarizes the results and offers some concluding observations. II. BACKGROUND The federal PRWORA legislation stipulated that 25 percent of the caseload in a particular state had to be participating in work activities by fiscal year 1997.(1) The minimum work participation requirement has been and will be increasing by 5 percent each year until fiscal year 2002, when it will reach 50 percent. States failing to meet the work participation requirements might not receive the full value of the federal TANF block grant. Since 1997, continued economic prosperity and substantial declines in welfare caseloads have left states with substantial TANF surpluses, and no state thus far has failed to meet the work participation requirements (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2000, pp. 41-3).(2) The federal legislation defines an allowable work activity as unsubsidized employment, subsidized private sector or public sector employment, on-the-job training, job-search assistance for up to six weeks, community service programs, vocational education training for up to one year, and education for persons who have not yet completed high school. The legislation emphasizes work activities and places caps on the number of people who can be placed in educational activities. Reducing the caseload can also count toward the participation requirement. States have considerable latitude in penalizing household heads who fail to comply with the work requirements. Benefits can be reduced or terminated, at state discretion. States can exempt certain people from the requirements, such as single parents of young children, but they must meet federal requirements for the percentage of their caseload participating in work activities. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,013
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,023
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: Sans objet
GenreSignal candidat: Autre · Signal consensuel: Autre
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,293
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,980

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0130,023
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,001
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,002
Bibliométrie0,0010,002
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0090,003
Communication savante0,0160,012
Science ouverte0,0040,009
Intégrité de la recherche0,0250,023
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,2930,113

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,087
Tête enseignante GPT0,364
Écart entre enseignants0,278 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreAutre

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2001
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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