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Enregistrement W235678183

Creating a Patent Clearinghouse in Canada: A Solution to Problems of Equity and Access

2003· article· en· W235678183 sur OpenAlexvenueaboutno aff
Lorraine Sheremeta, E. Richard Gold

Notice bibliographique

RevueHealth law review · 2003
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineMedicine
ThématiqueBiomedical Ethics and Regulation
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésEquity (law)Exclusive rightDistribution (mathematics)NormativeBusinessIntellectual propertyProfit (economics)Law and economicsPublic economicsEconomicsMarketingIndustrial organizationLawPolitical scienceMicroeconomics
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Two of the most pressing normative questions surrounding biotechnology patenting today relate to the equitable distribution of the products of biotechnological research and ensuring fair access to those products. Often discussed under the heading sharing, the problem of the equitable distribution of biotechnology's advances is a mixture of two normative concerns: whether there is a universal right to benefit from scientific progress and whether particular research subjects have a right to share in the benefits of research using their tissues. The question of access is similarly twofold. On one hand, researchers are concerned that patent rights may block second generation innovation by placing licensing and monetary roadblocks in the way of research. This is the so-called problems that has been discussed theoretically but has yet to be demonstrated or disproved empirically. The second aspect of this question is patient access to new technologies, such as new screening tests or potential treatments based on the use of stem-cells. This poster focuses on a few legal mechanisms that may facilitate both access to biotechnology's products and the equitable distribution of the benefits arising from those products. In particular, we suggest the creation of an independent and non-profit patent clearinghouse. This clearinghouse would administer patents in a particular field of study (e.g., all stem cell related patents) and would distribute income to patent holders arising from that administration. Specifically, the clearinghouse would charge a fixed fee for use of patent rights that would be distributed to patent owners. At the same time, the clearinghouse would hold back a certain percentage of profits (the HUGO Ethics Committee recommends, for example, between 1 and 3%) for redistribution to health care infrastructure in low-income countries. The clearinghouse would ensure that all researchers have fair access to innovations in the field while ensuring a fair economic return to patentees. What is a Patent? A patent is a government grant of a time-limited legal monopoly given to an inventor in exchange for the public disclosure of an invention. It can be thought of as a veto over the activities of others in respect of making, using, selling or importing an invention. It permits the inventor or an assignee (often a corporation) to commercially exploit the invention. What are the Criteria for Patentability in Canada? An invention, to be patentable, must be new, useful and non-obvious. These are legal terms that have been defined in Canadian case law as follows: New--the invention must not have been previously disclosed in a single source more than 12 months prior to the filing of the patent application. Useful--the invention must work and must be of industrial interest. Non-obvious--To be patentable, an invention must be a development or an improvement that would not have been obvious beforehand to persons skilled in the art. The Current International Trend To mitigate the anticommons effect that patents have on access to novel biotechnological applications, mechanisms to promote and to facilitate access to medicine have been suggested by the Human Genome Organization, The United Nations and the World Trade Organization. Human Genome Organization Ethics Committee, Statement on Benefit Sharing 1. In the interest of justice, there is an evolving international consensus that suggests that groups participating in genetic research should receive some benefit. 2. Permissible benefit-sharing mechanisms may include: agreements with individuals, families, groups, communities or populations that foresee technology transfer, local training, joint ventures, provision of health care or of information infrastructures, reimbursement of costs, or the possible use of a percentage of any royalties for humanitarian purposes. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Autre devis · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,843
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,223

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0000,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,000
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,204
Tête enseignante GPT0,414
Écart entre enseignants0,210 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeAutre devis
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations6
Publié2003
Routes d'admission2
Résumé présentoui

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