Where the Money Is: Willie Sutton Wasn't the Only One to Recognize a Deep Pocket When He Saw One. Now the Plaintiffs Bar Is Targeting Banks. (Risk Management)
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
nation's biggest class-action law firm has dropped a bomb on the banking industry in the form of a $25 billion lawsuit linking nine and brokerage firms to the Enron disaster. Whether the action by high-profile litigator Millberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach will prove lethal is open to question. But, at the very least, the firm has created a whole new target class for the plaintiffs bar, adding to the list of third parties often sued for big cash awards when companies go bankrupt and leave their cupboards bare. In this environment, anyone near an accounting problem is potentially at risk, and among the potential targets are commercial and investment banks says Michael Young, a partner at the New York law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher and author of Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud (Aspen, 2002). The ground is shifting beneath everybody's feet and it's tough for all the players to keep their balance, says Young. Litigators are casting a wide net in a search for parties who may be in some subtle way facilitating accounting manipulations. While the ground shifts, it's often difficult to distinguish the good guys from the bad. Greed is not unknown in corporate life. But it's also true that in our increasingly litigious culture, the innocent can get swept away with the culprits. Whatever the case, shareholders who lost money in the Enron collapse obviously are hoping to increase their chances for recovering their losses by going after that did business with Enron. Enron gives litigators a big boost plaintiffs bar is the nemesis of the accounting industry, targeting many firms as third parties in shareholder lawsuits when companies go belly up. For more than a decade Big 5 firms have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to settle these deep-pocket lawsuits in an effort to cut their potential losses--though many of the suits lacked merit. With the strong support of the accounting industry, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, a law designed to reduce frivolous lawsuits that are based solely on guilt by association. But that law has not stemmed the tide. Although frivolous lawsuits seem to be on the decline, the total number of shareholder suits filed in the federal courts in 2001 was actually more than double the number filed in 1995, when the law was passed. increase was fueled at least partly by a growth in corporate bankruptcies in a declining economy. It was in this sour economic climate that Enron toppled and fell. And the collapse of the Houston energy giant has given shareholder litigators a new lease on life. Soon after Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001, Milberg Weiss, a firm that has prosecuted hundreds of shareholder lawsuits, filed a consolidated class action suit against Enron in U.S. District Court in Houston, accusing particular Enron executives and the company's auditor Arthur Andersen with violations of the federal securities laws. complaint claimed the executives engaged in massive insider trading while the accounting firm was accused of making false and misleading statements about Enron's financial performance. Details of the complaint Then on April 8 Milberg Weiss dropped the bomb, amending its complaint to target nine financial institutions, including J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), Bank America, Barclays Bank, Deutsche Bank and Lehman Brothers. huge 502-page document claims the institutions participated in fraudulent transactions that ultimately cost Enron shareholders more than $25 billion. complaint also says a number of top bank executives profited personally from the alleged schemes. It is the policy of each of the institutions targeted not to talk about matters in litigation. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,003 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,002 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,002 | 0,001 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,010 | 0,002 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; les deux têtes enseignantes s’accordent sur ce qui est montré ici.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».