Children and Political Violence: At the Intersection of Rights and Realities
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Following a decline in the 1990s, armed conflicts have almost tripled since 2000 (von Einsiedel et al., 2014), becoming more frequent, more complex and affecting more people (Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2016).At the same time, militant armed groups, such as Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and Islamic State, have become powerful facilitators of violence, displaying significant control over territory and people.In 2014, there were 40 recorded armed conflictsdefined by one or more states contributing troops to one or both warring sides (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015).The number of places experiencing political violence is even higher, with political violence broadly defined as violence outside state control perpetrated to achieve political goals (e.g.revolution, civil war and terrorism) (O'Neil, 2012).At the time of writing, the places experiencing the worst humanitarian emergencies as a result of political violence include Syria, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Yemen, the Lake Chad basin and Libya, while other conflicts, such as in Turkey and Burundi, are poised to deteriorate (Gu ehenno, 2016).The increase in armed conflict and political violence represents the highest level of human suffering since World War II.In May 2016, as a response to the growing number of displaced persons around the world, the United Nations convened the first-ever World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul.According to the UN Secretary General's report for the Summit (Ki-Moon, 2016), as a consequence of political violence, there are currently 125 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, and 60 million people who have been forced to flee their homes and/or countries as internally displaced persons or refugees.Research continues to demonstrate that it is children who will experience the harshest and the most permanent effects of political violence (Apfel and Simon, 1996; Boothby et al., 2006;Cairns, 1996;Garbarino, 2008;Garbarino et al., 1991; Leavitt and Fox, 1993;Machel, 2001).Globally, nearly 87 million children under the age of 7 have been growing up in conflict zones, in horrific conditions of violence and deprivation that can hinder their development and long-term well-being (Mis, 2016).Armed conflict and political violence robs children of their fundamental rights to safety and security: children may be injured, orphaned, separated from family, recruited into armed groups or killed.Moreover, where there is armed conflict and political violence, the realities of sexual violence, displacement and abject poverty often prevail (Akesson, 2005).The protective capacity of key people and systemswhether family, schools, communities, local and national governmentsthat form a potential shield around children are often weakened and severed (Boothby, 2008).Living in a conflict zone means that children must live in contexts where basic social structures and systems are degraded if not completely collapsed.These circumstances and realities, which are invariably shaped by children's age, gender, ethnicity, mobility and socioeconomic status, jeopardise their fundamental rights and protections.Moreover, contrary to popular belief, an end to hostilities does not always mean an end to violence and suffering.In some cases, 'peacetime' may be a period where violence, insecurity and deprivation linger, and a time when a host of new socioeconomic, political, gendered and psychological challenges may be introduced.In fact, many children continue to live on the margins of society and experience multiple forms of violence, despite the powerful discourse of child rights that may be adopted in the post-conflict period (Denov and Buccitelli, 2013).
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Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,002 | 0,003 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,001 | 0,002 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,006 | 0,013 |
| Communication savante | 0,010 | 0,008 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,010 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,002 | 0,006 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,014 | 0,001 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».