MétaCan
Menu
Retour à la cohorte
Enregistrement W2497097457

The U.S. Airline Industry in 2015

2015· article· en· W2497097457 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Duane Helleloid, Seong‐Hyun Nam, Patrick Schultz, John Vitton

Notice bibliographique

RevueJournal of the International Academy of Case Studies · 2015
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineSocial Sciences
ThématiqueInternational Law and Aviation
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésProfitability indexRevenueBusinessCompetitor analysisFinanceProfit (economics)Profit marginEconomicsMarketing
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

INTRODUCTION [T]he airline business has been extraordinary. It has eaten up capital over the past century like almost no other business because people seem to keep coming back to it and putting fresh money in. You've got huge fixed costs, you've got strong labor unions and you've got commodity pricing. That is not a great recipe for success. (Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway CEO, as quoted in Reed, 2013) The U.S. airline industry has been plagued by financial losses, bankruptcies, union disputes, and expensive mergers over the past decade. Since 2009, profitability has returned for most airlines (MIT, 2015). The International Air Transport Association projected combined profits for North American airlines (predominantly U.S. airlines, but also including Canadian and Mexican airlines) of almost $12 billion in 2014 and over $13 billion in 2015 (IATA, 2014 a). Four large U.S.-based airlines (American, United, Southwest, and Delta) each reported 2104 operating profits of over $2 billion (MIT, 2015). A combination of an improving economy, lower oil prices, reduction in the number of competitors, increases in ancillary revenue, and cost cutting efforts all contributed to this improved profit picture. It was unclear, however, whether these changes were structural in nature and would lead to a period of higher profitability, or whether the airlines might again face financial losses and another round of bankruptcies. Regardless, the record profitability had attracted the attention of regulators and politicians. In July 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice announced it was initiating an investigation to determine whether airlines had colluded to keep airfares high (Harwell, Halsey, and Moore, 2015). New York's Senator Schumer issued a statement questioning why fares weren't falling in accordance with oil prices, while an industry group responded that competition remained intense, to the benefit of consumers (Naylor, 2015). REGULATION OF THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY The history of the U.S. airline industry has been influenced throughout the past 100 years by changing regulation. The Air Mail Act of 1925 authorized the postmaster general to enter into contracts for the transportation of mail by air. This was rewritten by the Air Mail Act of 1934, which required that aircraft manufacturers divest their ownership in airlines and required that rates be set by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Until 1936, airlines earned more revenue from carrying mail than they did from carrying passengers. The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created a system whereby all passenger routes between city-pairs (e.g., Chicago-Philadelphia, Washington-Boston) were regulated by the federal government, which could decide which airlines would be allowed to fly which routes, and what fares could be charged. This regulatory environment remained in place until the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. The 1978 legislation, which was phased in over 5 years, allowed airlines to determine their own routes and rates. It also allowed new airlines to enter the market, competing with existing airlines on some routes, and opening routes on previously unserved city-pairs. Existing airlines also took advantage of the new freedom to restructure their routes, open service on new routes, and discontinue service on undesirable routes. (Dana, 2004; Dempsey, 1984; Kou and McGahan, 1995; Millbrooke, 2006) The impact of regulation, and changing regulation, has and continues to impact the airline industry. Up until the 1978 deregulation, airlines' routes and fares were strictly regulated, which minimized competition between airlines. In order to maintain air safety, significant regulation still remains, with unions, companies, and consumer groups all trying to influence regulations to their advantage. BANKRUPTCIES, NEW ENTRANTS, AND CONSOLIDATIONS As deregulation was phased in from 1978-1984, existing U.S. airlines included six major network firms--American, United, Delta, Eastern, Braniff and Continental. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,003
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,002
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Sans objet · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: Empirique
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,575
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,276

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0030,002
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,000
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,000
Communication savante0,0000,000
Science ouverte0,0010,000
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,001
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,091
Tête enseignante GPT0,429
Écart entre enseignants0,338 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeSans objet
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations1
Publié2015
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

Explorer davantage

Même revueJournal of the International Academy of Case StudiesMême sujetInternational Law and AviationTravaux en français237 207