Heidegger’s Naturalism: A Retrieval of Lost Beginnings? An Encounter with David E. Storey, "Naturalizing Heidegger: His Confrontation with Nietzsche, His Contributions to Environmental Philosophy"

Can Heidegger be naturalized?That is the question.It may seem rather strange to pose this question among phenomenologists and continental philosophers, especially since naturalism as a term first coined by Quine generally refers to "the recognition that it is within science itself, and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described" (Quine 21).If we are to assume that Heidegger's thinking does indeed contain some form of naturalism, should Heidegger thereby be assimilated to contemporary trends in the natural and social sciences for the sake of developing a more naturalized phenomenology?These questions will no doubt find resistance among orthodox scholars of Heidegger, and even among Heidegger himself, who was adamantly opposed to all forms of scientific naturalism.However, can we claim that a non-reductive naturalism exists within Heidegger's preoccupations with Aristotle, Jacob von Uexküll, and Nietzsche that might point the way to more robust ontology of life?If we are to concur with Heidegger's own teacher, Husserl, that the task of philosophy is indeed to be accomplished as a rigorous science, might we apply this same scientific rigor to Heidegger's own thinking?(Husserl 71) It is the central claim of David E. Storey's extraordinarily rich and insightful book that Heidegger establishes the foundation for a nonreductive naturalism that can support environmental philosophy and ethics but not without the vital assistance of Nietzsche.As Aristotle reminds us that being is said in many ways (pollachos legomenon), we might say that naturalism too is open to interpretation (Cox 5-7).If we are to contrast the scientific naturalism of Quine who subscribes to the orientation to reduce philosophy to science with the alleged anti-scientism of Heidegger, how -120 -PhænEx might we construe the kind of non-reductive naturalism that Storey proposes?Here, Storey constructively follows Ted Benton's guiding idea:A non-reductionist naturalism, making use of the ideas of a hierarchy of more or less autonomous levels of organization of matter, each with its own, qualitatively new, "emergent" powers or properties has been one fruitful way of maintaining the insights of a naturalistic approach, without falling foul of what is valid in the anti-naturalist critique.Such hierarchical, "emergent powers" ontologies enable their advocate to recognize in various subject matters of the different natural and social sciences more or less discrete and autonomous object-domains, while at the same time making no concessions to spiritualistic, vitalist, or supernatural beliefs (Storey 5).

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