Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program
Pourquoi ce travail est dans la base
Une base qui oublie comment elle a trouvé un travail ne peut pas être vérifiée. Voici les voies qui ont admis celui-ci.
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
I. Introduction When the United States, Mexico, and Canada began negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), immigration, as well as labor and environmental, concerns arose among the discussions of free trade.1 While the countries came to sign NAFTA-related side agreements on labor rights and the environment, Mexico and the United States chose to avoid the controversial immigration issue out of fear that it would derail the whole project.2 However, there were promises that negotiations for a bilateral immigration agreement would continue after the passage of NAFTA.3 Over five years later, no such agreement has been reached despite the increasing economic integration of the two countries. Last year Mexican Labor Minister Jose Antonio Gonzalez Fernandez expressed his government's intention to ask the United States to join Mexico in examining the possibility of a worker exchange program when the NAFTA labor side-accord comes up for review in the future.4 Such a bilateral effort, the Bracero Program, was executed in the 1940s and 1950s.5 Under this program Mexican agricultural workers were legally permitted to temporarily enter the United States to work. Bracero Program remains the only example of a bilateral immigration program between the United States and Mexico.6 Since then, the U.S. government has made little effort even to discuss a new bilateral program for Mexican immigration to the United States.7 This Note will examine the bilateral nature of the Bracero Program, and the various factors that made the program possible from 1942 until 1964. That is, what brought about the air of cooperation, what drove it away, and what was accomplished in the interim. Ultimately, this examination will demonstrate that the economic and political conditions that exist today are similar to those that existed when the Bracero Program was established, providing hope that a new bilateral labor agreement between Mexico and the United States may be forthcoming. A bilateral immigration program could provide significant advantages over unilateral immigration policy. First, the two countries could more effectively achieve their migration goals through a cooperative effort since the policies of either nation can influence migration patterns.8 Additionally, cooperation and compromise in the area of immigration can improve overall relations between Mexico and the United States so that cooperation will continue in other fields, such as trade.9 However, differences in the sociopolitical atmosphere of the two countries and weaknesses in the Bracero Program itself indicate that a new agreement would not and should not follow the Bracero model. Nonetheless, the failures in cooperation and the weaknesses of the earlier program can provide some of the best insight on how any future bilateral immigration program should be structured. II. Background Information With the attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into World War II, the fear of impending labor shortages in the agricultural sector of the economy resulted in a new, more positive official attitude toward Mexican contract labor.10 Informal negotiations with Mexico culminated in the signing of a bilateral agreement on August 4, 1942, creating the Bracero Program.11 As President Truman's Commission on Migratory Labor put it: The negotiation... [was] a collective bargaining situation in which the Mexican Government [was] the representative of the workers and the Department of State [was] the representative of our farm employers.12 Over the next two decades, the U. S. government transported five million braceros13 from Mexico, providing growers and ranchers in twenty-four states with an endless army of cheap labor.14 Initially, the (now defunct) Farm Security Administration, which was part of the Department of Agriculture, conducted recruitment and contracting.15 However, control slipped into the hands of the individual growers from 1948 until 1951. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle