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Enregistrement W256246592

Upgrading the National Power Grid: Electric Companies Need an Economic Incentive to Invest in New Technology

2004· article· en· W256246592 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Joshua J. Franklin

Notice bibliographique

RevueRutgers computer & technology law journal · 2004
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineEngineering
ThématiqueICT Impact and Policies
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésBlackoutDeregulationElectric power industryElectricityElectric power transmissionElectric power systemIncentiveElectric powerMonopolistic competitionTelecommunicationsGridEconomicsPower (physics)BusinessEngineeringElectrical engineeringMarket economyMonopoly
DOInon disponible

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

I. INTRODUCTION On August 14, 2003, 50 million Americans lost power (1) in what marked the worst blackout in United States and Canadian history. (2) The cascading power outage first hit Toronto, then Rochester, Boston and, finally, New York. (3) It took just 13 minutes for the blackout to spread throughout the 80,000 square-mile Canada-United States Eastern Interconnection power grid. (4) Industry analysts have been predicting a failure of this magnitude for some time. In 2001, the North American Electric Reliability Council warned Congress that the grid was not designed to be used the way it is being used today. (5) The grid was originally built to transfer power from monopolistic utilities to local customers, a movement of relatively small amounts of power over short distances. (6) But deregulation of the electric power industry over the last decade has created a market-driven system in which power can be immediately traded over long distances from a region with a temporary surplus to a region with a temporary deficit. (7) This system was intended to provide consumers with access to cheaper electricity from various suppliers. (8) However, the resulting increase in the flow of electricity over congested transmission lines drastically increased the risk of major power outages and ultimately led to the blackout of August 14, 2003. (9) Currently, there is [n]o single authority ... in charge of the grid, and few have an incentive to invest the money needed to improve its reliability. (10) In this note, I examine the effects and possible causes of the blackout that occurred on August 14, 2003. I look at the regulatory history that led up to this event, as well as the case history surrounding similar events in the past. Finally, I determine: (1) whether utility companies will be held liable for damage caused to consumers for the August 14, 2003 blackout; (2) whether such liability will provide power companies with an incentive to improve the power grid; and (3) whether current regulation should be altered to provide power companies with a greater incentive to invest in the power grid. II. BACKGROUND This section will examine the regulatory history in the electricity industry as well as the case history surrounding the 1977 blackout. A. The History of the Electric Utility Industry Capitalist societies such as the United States are based on the premise that free market industry serves a valuable economic function. Free markets foster economic efficiency, technological innovation, and the creation of wealth. (11) However, in some industries, market imperfections prevent the realization of such benefits. When the market fails, the government provides regulation intended to mend the imperfections. (12) But regulation, like any human invention, is also flawed and, over time, will inevitably fail to properly balance the industry so that the desired economic effects are realized. When government regulation fails, it must be replaced with more effective regulation, or the industry must be deregulated. (13) As a natural monopoly, (14) the electricity industry only survived a short time before government regulators stepped in to curb the market power that electric companies wielded over consumers. (15) In the last century, this industry has moved from its inception, when it was totally unregulated, through periods of regulatory buildup and reform, to its current status where governments have begun to deregulate the industry. (16) 1. Competition and Consolidation In the late 1800s, the electricity industry was an unregulated competitive market. (17) It began when Thomas Edison powered up the Pearl Street Station in New York City on September 4, 1882, thereby providing electricity to eighty-five consumers. (18) Demand for the new technology grew rapidly and investors raced to enter the market. By 1922 there were 3,774 different companies producing and distributing electricity. …

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction machine sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,001
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,002
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesaucune
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Théorique ou conceptuel · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Commentaire · Signal consensuel: aucune
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,043
Score d'incertitude au seuil0,144

Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0010,002
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0000,000
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0000,000
Bibliométrie0,0000,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0010,001
Communication savante0,0060,006
Science ouverte0,0010,001
Intégrité de la recherche0,0030,003
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0430,010

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,008
Tête enseignante GPT0,230
Écart entre enseignants0,222 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.

Les modèles n’ont appliqué aucune catégorie : rien dans la taxonomie ne correspondait à ce travail.
Devis d'étudeThéorique ou conceptuel
Domainenon disponible
GenreCommentaire

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations1
Publié2004
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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