The United States and Cuba: Intimate Enemies

Marifeli Perez-Stable, The United States and Cuba: Intimate Enemies. New York: Routledge, 201 1 . xiv + 208 pp.REVIEWED BY LEROY A. BINNSDR MARIFELI PEREZ-STABLE, a sociologist at Florida International University, has been a long-time contributor to the debate on US/Cuban relations. Her latest effort delves with a balanced perspective into the annals of this ideologically driven conflict long awaiting rectification.The text is compelling in its interpretation of the abrupt termination of the Cold War in 1989 - a historic sequence of events that carried enormous consequences specifically for Cuba. Moscow's capability to subsidise the Cuban regime has been compromised, whereas Washington seizes this opportunity to pressure the Castro government towards submission. The end result is a stalemate as the lone bastion of the western hemisphere remains defiant in word and deed.A fifty-year-old uneasy association between both countries reflects a contrast of perceptions as America, the world's lone superpower, is of the belief that it reserves the right to dictate to the likes of its small neighbour Cuba because the island is considered a critical geopolitical gem in the Caribbean Basin. In contrast, the revolutionary government is reluctant, regardless of size, to surrender its sovereignty and philosophical ideals. Cuba still remembers an awkward relationship prior to the revolution in which a mutually beneficial and respectful relationship was lacking.Embodied in a fascinating read is history that introduces a series of scenarios with interactions and interpretations of a collection of players inclusive of politicians, civil individuals and groups in search of a formula to upend a stalemate. This state of ill-fated affairs has also ballooned with multilateral dimensions as the international community - the United Nations, the European Union and countries such as Spain and Canada - facilitate mediatory roles.The writer relates pre-Cold-War complications stemming from a chain of unlikely activities for which both the Soviet Union and the United States bear accountability. Expansionist/protectionist policies in the form of a US military installation in Turkey, Operation Mongoose, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban missile crisis bore elements of uncertainty for a Cuban government in its state of infancy and carried international implications as they altered US/Soviet foreign policy, national interests and economic advancement. In the end Cuba, the central figure in the dispute, was precluded from consultations as the superpowers sought to secure their own interests.Following the unanticipated assassination of President Kennedy, successive presidents sought to reverse the possibility of a growing crisis by altering the political ball game. In the spirit of detente, bilateral talks produced gestures of goodwill. Washington modified the trade embargo by licensing US foreign subsidiaries to do business on the island while Cuba reciprocated with a conciliatory posture towards its neighbour, even releasing a US citizen with CIA affiliation.Unfortunately, as suggested by the author, normalisation would suffer defeat as Cuba, with the blessing of its surrogate, the Soviet Union, internationalised the revolution, supporting the independence of Puerto Rico and sending troops to assist the movement for liberation of Angola and later Ethiopia. In addition, with the rise of Ronald Reagan, a staunch opponent of communism, US foreign policy displayed zero tolerance in confronting Marxist tendencies as displayed by resistance to Cuba, Jamaica, Grenada, El Salvador and Nicaragua. Havana in return exercised defiance in the form of the Mariel boat lift - a repeat of the 1965 opening of the Port of Camarioca.Washington was not without partners. In 1981, a group named the Cuba American National Foundation (CANF) emerged under the leadership of Jorge Mas Canosa in south Florida, supported by Radio Marti, with an extreme conservative agenda that endorsed regime change at any cost in Cuba. …

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