U.S. cross-listings, the private benefits of control, and ownership structure
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Receipts (ADRs).At the end of 2001, there were 1,322 non-U.S.firms with sponsored ADR programs, including 623 that trade on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq, with a total trading volume of $752 billion.There are numerous benefits for firms that cross-list in the U.S., including an increase in firm value, an increase in visibility, investor recognition, and investor base, an increase in liquidity, and access to public and private equity capital.Much of the early literature on cross-listing focuses on the asset pricing implications of cross-listing and whether or not firms experience a decrease in their cost of capital as they overcome barriers to international investment (market segmentation).Recent research on cross-listing focuses on the corporate governance and legal aspects of listing in the U.S. Coffee (1999Coffee ( , 2001) ) and Stulz (1999) state that there are important disclosure, governance, and legal implications for non-U.S.firms that cross-list on a U.S. exchange.They argue that firms in countries with weak corporate governance laws and standards can use a U.S. listing to bond themselves to assure minority shareholders that they are less likely to be exploited.This premise is often referred to as the bonding hypothesis. U.S. listings and the private benefits of control.Cross-listing on a U.S. exchange via a Level 2 or 3 ADR program subjects foreign firms to governance systems, disclosure standards, accounting rules, and legal rules that are more rigorous than the standards they are subject to in their home country. 2 Because foreign firms that list their shares on a U.S. stock exchange (or Nasdaq) must register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, they become subject to mandatory U.S. legal standards that are embedded in federal securities laws and much of the discretion and potential for opportunistic actions that controlling shareholders can take under other legal regimes is sharply limited. 3Coffee (1999a) states that U.S. legal standards significantly limit the rights and advantages of controlling shareholders.U.S. securities laws not only seek to improve disclosure and financial reporting, they seek to reduce agency costs and inhibit controlling shareholders by imposing substantive obligations on them.For example, 2 A foreign firm can list its shares in the U.S. either by listing its shares directly or via an ADR program.There are various types of ADR programs that firms can choose from.Rule 144a ADRs are capital raising issues that are privately placed to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) and trade over-the-counter among QIBs.Rule 144a issuers are not required to register under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, exempting them from most civil liability provisions as well as S.E.C. disclosure requirements and U.S. GAAP accounting rules.Level 1 ADRs trade over-the-counter as 'Pink Sheet' issues.Minimal S.E.C. disclosure is required and home country accounting is allowed, although the statements must be in English.Level 2 ADRs are securities that trade on the NYSE or Nasdaq.Level 2 ADRs require full registration with the S.E.C. and firms must file an annual report on Form 20-F, which includes a reconciliation of financial statements to U.S. GAAP.The companies must also meet the minimum listing standards for foreign companies set by the U.S. exchanges.Level 3 ADRs are similar to Level 2 ADRs, but include a capital raising element in addition to the listing.Canadian firms that directly list on the Pink Sheets are treated as Level 1 ADRs, and the firms that directly list on the NYSE or Nasdaq are treated as Level 2/3 ADRs.See Karolyi (1998) for further details.
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,001 | 0,013 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,003 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».