Notice bibliographique
Résumé
In 2008, three prominent politicians each proposed a separate legislative measure to stanch runaway CEO pay. Then U.S. Senator Barack Obama, U.S. Senator Hillary Clinton and U.S. Senator John McCain all proposed bills requiring that shareholders be given the right to an advisory vote on new executive pay packages. Whether sincere efforts or just campaign tactics, these proposals by major presidential hopefuls for a legislative answer to increasingly spectacular CEO pay reflected mounting public sentiment.The Problem: Runaway CEO PayThe impetus for these legislative initiatives is stark and unambiguous. CEO compensation at major U.S. companies continues to escalate unabated - in both absolute and relative terms.An Embarrassment of RichesIn 2005, average total compensation for the CEOs of 350 leading U.S. corporations was $11.6 million, down slightly from $11.8 million in 2004 (Lublin, 2006). To help conceptualize the relative size of CEO pay, a key reference has been the ratio of average CEO pay to average worker pay. An Institute for Policy Studies report found that this ratio rose from 42-to-l in 1980 to 411-to-l in 2006. While smaller than the 2000 peak of 525-to-l, it is nearly 10 times as large as the 1980 ratio (Institute for Policy Studies and United for a Fair Economy, 2006).What major U.S. corporations pay their CEOs is also out of kilter with what is their counterparts at major European corporations. American executives continue to leave European executives in the compensation dust. According to an Associated Press survey, in 2006 the 20 highest-paid European managers made only onethird as much as the 20 highest-paid U.S. executives (Institute for Policy Studies and United for a Fair Economy, 2007). In 2005, the average U.S. CEO earned 475 times the average employee's pay. In the same year, the multiplier was 11 in Japan, 15 in France, 20 in Canada, and 22 in the UK (Hermanson, 2006).The popular appeal of CEO pay reform may be due in part to a perception that the CEO/ average worker pay comparison is a microcosm of growing wealth inequality among Americans. Data from 2005-2006 indicates that income inequality is the highest it has been since 1928. The top 1/10 of lpercent (0.1%) of Americans- 3 00, 000earn as much as the bottom 150 million combined, and for every three-year period since 1981, the same top 0.1% of American taxpayers have gained, on average, $100 billion in total earnings, while the bottom 80 percent have lost $100 billion (Hindery, 2008).Even at companies faltering badly, CEOs have enjoyed extravagant compensation packages. According to the website of the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee:Increasingly, research indicates that executive compensation does not appear tied to company performance. Others have noted that in many instances senior executives appear to be being paid for failure. As this Committee has seen first hand, even executives of institutions that lose money, restate earnings, and face extensive regulatory scrutiny have received (and retained) substantial compensation packages (U. S. House of Representatives , Financial Services Committee, 2007).Examples of high pay despite performance abound. Consider the severance package of Angelo Mozilo, former CEO of the recently failed Countrywide Financial Corporation - considered by many the poster child of the subprime mortgage meltdown. Mozilo was going to receive: a $36.4 million cash severance payment; $400,000 per year for consulting services; plus perks that included the use of a private airplane. He walked away from most of these after a public outcry, but still left with at least $23.8 million (Alazraki, 2008). Yet Mozilo's severance pay pales in comparison with that of former Merrill Lynch CEO Stan O'Neal, who left in 2007 with a retirement package worth more than $160 million (Heisel, 2008) after Merrill suffered the biggest losses in its 93 years (Thomas & Anderson, 2007). …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Communication savante | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,001 | 0,003 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; les deux têtes enseignantes s’accordent sur ce qui est montré ici.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».