Self-Complexity and the Authenticity of Self-Aspects: Effects on Well Being and Resilience to Stressful Events.
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Résumé
Two studies examine the relations of self-complexity (Linville, 1987) and the authenticity of to well being. Study 1 results show that self-complexity is largely unrelated to well being, whereas the authenticity of the that constitute it is associated with greater well being. Study 2 uses a two-week, prospective design to replicate Linville's finding of a buffering effect of complexity on the negative outcomes associated with stressful events. In addition, study 2 results revealed either null or negative relations of complexity to well being, whereas the authenticity of was again positively related to well being. The findings are discussed with respect to the meaning of self-complexity for personality functioning, and the importance of having one's be authentic. According to many theorists, the diversity of roles, demands and models of identity to which people are exposed within modern cultures has fostered a greater complexity to human personalities (Baumeister & Muraven, 1996; Ryan & Deci, 2003). People adapt to such diverse demands and roles by adopting different styles, modes of behavior and faces that they can employ within different life contexts (Gergen, 1991). How this increased differentiation or complexity impacts upon health and well being remains, however, a matter of debate. A popular paradigm for investigating personality complexity and its relations with well being was developed by Linville (1985, 1987). Her procedure assesses the extent to which people report multiple aspects to their personality, and it is the number and independence of these self-aspects that comprise what she calls self-complexity. Linville specifically highlights a potential adaptive advantage of greater self-complexity--namely that it can serve as a buffer to stress. With greater self-complexity (i.e., more, and less interrelated, self-aspects) a person's eggs are not all in one basket, and thus a blow to any one self-aspect should have less negative impact on well being. At the same time, the idea that less inter-related elements would conduce to greater well being seems to contradict traditional clinical wisdom (Ryan, 1993) as well as some recent empirical evidence. Donohue, Robins, Roberts and John (1993), for example, argued that insofar as differentiation or complexity refers to the existence of dissimilar and/or functionally independent parts to one's personality, it may represent a fragmented self. They showed that the tendency to see one's self as different in different roles predicted poorer general adjustment. Linville (1987) too, despite the salience of her buffering hypothesis, suggested that complexity may be associated with chronic, low-level stress, perhaps because of role conflicts or multiple demands on time and attention (p. 672). A meta-analysis by Rafaeli-Mor and Steinberg (2002) also suggests that the benefits of self-complexity remain unclear. Their analysis of 70 studies relating Linville's self-complexity measure to well being suggested that: a) when considered as an individual difference, self-complexity is modestly and negatively related to well being; and b) the hypothesis that complexity buffers one against stress has received, at best, mixed support. The present research revisits the relations of self-complexity to well being by investigating a hypothesis derived from Self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2004). We argue that it is not complexity per se that hinders well being, but rather the presence within one's self-concept of aspects that are poorly integrated, and thus represent inauthentic ways of being. Accordingly, we examine the effects of both self-complexity and the authenticity of the that constitute it on stress and well being over time. Before turning to specific predictions we first review work on self-complexity and SDT, respectively. …
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|---|---|---|
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| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,000 | 0,001 |
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| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,001 |
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