Horsepox and the need for a new norm, more transparency, and stronger oversight for experiments that pose pandemic risks

In January, Dr. David Evans from the University of Alberta and his colleagues published a scientific paper describing the synthesis of the horsepox virus de novo [1].Horsepox doesn't cause infection in humans, but another related virus-Variola major-causes smallpox.The publication of the horsepox synthesis process lowers technical hurdles for making smallpox de novo.This commentary argues that there are serious potential adverse implications of this work that don't justify the purported benefits.It also makes the case that there should be a new norm related to experiments that increase pandemic risks and that there should be more transparency and stronger oversight for biological research and science that increases pandemic risks. Implications of synthesisHorsepox is in the same viral family as smallpox; both are orthopox viruses.There has been no prior published report of an orthopox synthesis, so this experiment is the first time researchers have published a description of how to make a virus closely related to smallpox.In doing and publishing the horsepox synthesis work, the researchers have reduced uncertainties and addressed potential barriers that scientists would encounter in an effort to synthesize smallpox.In the paper, the scientists describe how they addressed "challenges" in the work [1].For a scientific group determined to synthesize smallpox de novo, the paper would be useful.Drew Endy, a synthetic biologist on WHO's Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research (ACVVR), said about the publication, "There are things in this paper that I wouldn't know how to do and had never been done before" [2].Other virologists have commented that they did not think the paper was a major technical advance; even if this were the case, it seems quite ill-advised to publish the full prescriptive details of the synthesis in one manuscript.Even Evans and colleagues said in the conclusion of their paper, ". . .This is clearly an example of dual-use research, and observations like these pose significant challenges for public health authorities" [1].Why be concerned about making it easier to synthesize smallpox de novo?There are two primary reasons.First, there are intentional, extraordinary barriers in place to obtaining live samples of smallpox.There are only two official repositories of smallpox in the world (the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] in Atlanta, Georgia, and the State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology [VECTOR] in Novosibirsk, Russia) [3], and to do research with smallpox in one of these facilities requires the permission of the

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