Notice bibliographique
Résumé
Despite presence in world of a great many particularist movements that would split societies into smaller units, there is also a powerful drive toward consolidation, powered primarily by an international leadership that has adopted an ethos of meliorism. In effect, philosophy is that everyone's business is our business. Important voices in United States have expressed a desire for some constraints, but even these have called for a wide scope of world intervention. All of is very much at odds with traditional American foreign policy that prevailed until 1898. Now that Cold War is over, author says, it is time for a serious reexamination of premises underlying both new and traditional policies. Key Words: International affairs, American foreign policy, world intervention, meliorism, culture. Powerful opposing forces - some centrifugal and others centripetal - are contending for preeminence in world today. In their recent book Beyond Westphalia?: State Sovereignty and International Intervention, Thomas Weiss and arat Chopra interpret as a continuation of anti-colonial breakup that followed World War II: decolonization process that began in Africa and Asia continues not only in former Soviet empire but also within newly independent states, as ethnic particularism and subnationalism surface....1 They would almost certainly agree, however, that fragmentation goes far beyond what can be attributed directly to breakup of earlier colonial system. A centrifugal flying-apart into fragments occurs in movements that in many places passionately seek local autonomy, often even secession from larger entity to which they have belonged. A short list of areas in which local peoples are asserting themselves in a great many parts of world would include United Kingsom, Spain, Corsica, Italy, Balkans, Russian Federation, Canada, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, southern Mexico, Indonesia, Philippines and many parts of Africa. The centripetal tendency, on other hand, leads toward consolidation. It entails an all-encompassing outlook that is premised implicitly on assumption that everybody's business is world's business, and presumes a proper role for policing and social welfare. Historian David Callahan speaks of an project as a whole that is backed by liberal internationalist opinion.2 The past century has seen growth - even though unevenly and with much interruption - of a global community. It often holds definite opinions about what is right and wrong, and is willing to take action to mold world, as best it can, in direction it finds desirable. Cultural historian Samuel P. Huntington says the term 'universal civilization' is used to speak of the assumptions, values, and doctrines currently held by many people in Western civilization and by some people in other civilizations. He suggests that this might be called Culture. The name comes from a very tangible presence: Each year about a thousand businessmen, bankers, government officials, intellectuals, and journalists from scores of countries meet in World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Huntington tells how Davos people control virtually all international institutions, many of world's governments, and bulk of world's economic and military capabilities.3 The meeting is, of course, just most recent sign of a consensus that has long existed among (and here I use elite in a neutral sense that denotes those in professional classes who hold most prominent positions). The name Davos Culture is useful, but consensus is much older and more expansive than could possibly be suggested from a single annual gathering. Even those who point to influence of Tri-Lateral Commission or Council of Foreign Relations, which are essentially parts of what Huntington is referring to with his term, are speaking too narrowly. …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,001 | 0,001 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».