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Enregistrement W2903810896 · doi:10.33012/2018.15945

Study for a Resilient Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Backup Solution in Canada

2018· article· en· W2903810896 sur OpenAlexaboutno aff
Caroline Huot, Andr� Ch�teauvert, Jean Delisle

Notice bibliographique

RevueProceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (Online)/Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (CD-ROM) · 2018
Typearticle
Langueen
DomaineEngineering
ThématiqueMaritime Navigation and Safety
Établissements canadiensnon disponible
Organismes subventionnairesnon disponible
Mots-clésGNSS applicationsBackupComputer scienceComputer securitySpoofing attackGuard (computer science)TelecommunicationsAir navigationGlobal Positioning System

Résumé

récupéré en direct d'OpenAlex

Nowadays, maritime navigation relies increasingly on GNSS at all times. It has been so successful in providing accurate, continuous and reliable PNT information to mariners worldwide for free that they have developed a dependency on this service and take it for granted. For these reasons, it is important that this dependence does not become a single-point-failure. Many shipborne devices such as the Automatic Identification System (AIS), ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System), ARPA (Automatic Radar Plotting Aid) and other navigational aids onboard vessels use GNSS as their primary source of PNT information to navigate safely and efficiently around the world. A simulation performed on the CCGS Amundsen flagship confirmed these dependencies. As well, Canada presents its share of challenges being surrounded by 3 oceans with one above the 60nd parallel north where GNSS coverage is limited to 72 degrees. Together, St-Lawrence River and the Great Lakes form one of the most difficult waterways in the world to navigate safely with its deep-draft navigation system extending 3,700 km into North American heartland. Given the vulnerability of the GNSS signals to unintentional and intentional interferences, the increasing evidences of jamming and spoofing events has grown the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) concern to look into a resilient PNT backup solution to mitigate these vulnerabilities and provide a more robust solution to maritime navigation and if possible to other critical infrastructures. The Canadian Coast Guard is currently carrying a broad review of technical and operational requirements for an adequate non-GNSS alternative to provide PNT information in the event of GNSS disruptions in order to ensure safe navigation, North and South of 60 degrees. In relation to this study, CCG consulted its stakeholders on their need for a resilient PNT solution and their use and future needs related to DGPS. This review is also supported by an engineering study and an exhaustive technical analysis of existing and new potential solutions including hybrid solutions which could meet current and future navigation requirements with a special attention to the Canadian Arctic. Some of the technologies investigated include receiver resiliency improvements, space and ground alternatives solutions i.e. Locata, eLoran, Satelles Satellite Time Location (STL), Absolute Radar Positioning, Inertial Navigation System, Signal of Opportunity and the R-Mode technology, the latter which is being field tested in Canadian waters, in partnership with the Federal Waterways and Shipping Administration, Germany. Requirements in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability from consultations with other federal departments, domestic and international marine stakeholders will be correlated with the conclusions found for the maritime sector. As such, recommendations from a consulting group, the C-Core and Hickling Arthurs Low Corporation, on the assessment of public’s reliance on GNSS, including the associated risks in relation to safety and economics impacts changes from 2012 to 2017 and recommendation on a resilient PNT backup technology for the 10 Canadian Critical Infrastructure (CI) sectors is also analysed. The outcomes of this study will inform the Canadian Coast Guard on the strategy to adopt and a roadmap implementation plan for a fail-safe positioning system for mariners and identify recommendations for the future of its current Differential GPS service. As the focus of this strategy aims to respond to the maritime domain requirements, a section will describe how the potential maritime solution also satisfies the PNT requirements of other sectors and critical infrastructures. In conclusion, the Canadian Coast Guard wishes to share the results of its work in order to stimulate the dialogue and debate, as many other national authorities may have similar concerns and interests with regards to GNSS backup solutions, the future of their DGPS service and Critical Infrastructures needs that will provide the best value for taxpayer money while ensuring the safety of mariners.

Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.

Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier

Prédiction distillée sur la base complète

Imitation des enseignants

Ni prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.

score de la tête « metaresearch » (Codex)0,003
score de la tête « metaresearch » (Gemma)0,004
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aStatut de validation: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Catégories candidatesMéta-épidémiologie (sens strict)
Catégories consensuellesaucune
DomaineSignal candidat: aucune · Signal consensuel: aucune
Devis d'étudeSignal candidat: Observationnel · Signal consensuel: aucune
GenreSignal candidat: Empirique · Signal consensuel: Empirique
Score de désaccord entre enseignants0,665
Score d'incertitude au seuil1,000

Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie

CatégorieCodexGemma
Métarecherche0,0030,004
Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict)0,0010,001
Méta-épidémiologie (sens large)0,0010,000
Bibliométrie0,0010,001
Études des sciences et des technologies0,0000,001
Communication savante0,0000,001
Science ouverte0,0030,002
Intégrité de la recherche0,0000,001
Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger)0,0000,000

Scores machine (provisoires)

Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.

Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.

Tête enseignante Opus0,016
Tête enseignante GPT0,267
Écart entre enseignants0,252 · la distance entre les deux têtes enseignantes sur ce seul travail
Statut de validationscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découle

Classification

machine, non validée

Prédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.

Devis d'étudeObservationnel
Domainenon disponible
GenreEmpirique

Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».

En bref

Citations0
Publié2018
Routes d'admission1
Résumé présentoui

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Même revueProceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (Online)/Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting (CD-ROM)Même sujetMaritime Navigation and SafetyTravaux en français237 207