Reining in the Crown’s Authority over Dissolution: The Fixed-Term Parliaments Act of the United Kingdom versus Fixed-Date Election Laws in Canada
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
This paper analyzes the key differences between the sources of authority of the Crown of the United Kingdom versus those of the Crown of Canada in order to compare and contrast the fixed-date election laws in Canada (at the federal and provincial levels) with the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, 2011 of the United Kingdom.The United Kingdom operates on parliamentary supremacy and an uncodified constitution; the British Parliament can therefore invoke its sovereign right to limit or put into abeyance any prerogative authority of the British Crown at will.The authority of the British Crown derives from three sources: statute, prerogative, and the Crown's capacity as a legal person.In contrast, Canada has always operated on a system of constitutional supremacy.Currently, the authority of the Crown of Canada derives from four sources: the constitutionally entrenched executive authority, the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, statute, and its status as a legal person.The first two sources of authority enjoy protection from statutory encroachment under section 41(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982.This is precisely why the Canadian fixed-date elections laws have deliberately preserved the Crown's authority over dissolution and the Prime Minister's or Premier's capacity to advise and take responsibility for early dissolution.In contrast, the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, 2011 puts the prerogative of dissolution of the British Crown into abeyance by removing the Queen and Prime Minister from dissolution altogether, and thus truly eliminates the possibility of so-called "snap elections" that First Ministers have called for their own perceived political gains.Finally, Canadian jurists and scholars have long misapplied the British concept of "prerogative" to the Crown of Canada.A.V. Dicey defined a prerogative as "the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown."Dissolution therefore cannot properly be called a "prerogative" in the Dicean sense in Canada because only a formal constitutional amendment under section 41(a) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and not a statute, could eliminate the Crown's authority over dissolution (at either the federal level or in a province) in the same manner that the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, 2011 has put the prerogative of dissolution into abeyance in the United Kingdom.The Parliament of Canada does not enjoy the unfettered sovereignty of the Parliament of the United Kingdom.In reality, the circumstances do not even have to be extraordinary -as the five precedents showed between 2008 and 2015. VII: The Early Dissolution of 2008: Constitutional Conventions and Critique of Heard, Aucoin et al., and the Conacher RulingsFurthermore, the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act also largely insulated the Prime Minister May from the consequences of leading the Conservative and Unionist Party to a loss, from majority to plurality, and provided a secure foundation for the agreement with the Democratic Unionist Party.
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Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction machine sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Le volet Gemma est une étiquette directe du modèle pour chaque travail de la base, lue sur la notice réduite au titre. Le volet Codex est un classifieur appris des 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et calibré sur les taux pondérés de l'échantillon; les champs sans appui suffisant ne portent aucun appel Codex. Le mode candidate est l'union des deux volets; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont pas des étiquettes humaines.
Scores du classifieur distillé par catégorie (deux têtes)
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,003 | 0,014 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,003 | 0,004 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,014 | 0,011 |
| Communication savante | 0,014 | 0,002 |
| Science ouverte | 0,002 | 0,003 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,003 | 0,004 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,004 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule source (Gemma direct ou Codex distillé), pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».