Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections
Notice bibliographique
Résumé
To what extent should those charged with interpreting national constitutions into account the lessons that might be taught by experience? In asking this question, I do not mean to confine myself to the relevance of such legal materials as cases from other courts; there is no reason to confine oneself to such material if one is seriously interested in learning more about comparative approaches to similar problems. Obviously, this is a general problem, and the lawyers, academics, judges, and other public officials concerned about adhering to their duties of constitutional fidelity could be members of any of the more than 150 countries with written constitutions who are considering the possibility of looking to the of any other given country, near or far. I am interested primarily in the advisability of lawyers, academics, and judges from the United States taking cognizance of the structuring and operation of legal institutions in other countries when interpreting the U.S. Constitution. The principal reason is, of course, that this is the system that I know best; a second reason is that the issue is now the subject of an unusually heated debate among justices of the U.S. Supreme Court. (A third reason, provoked by my having decided to co-teach a course at The University of Texas School of Law on comparative constitutional law, is a degree of perplexity as to exactly why we wish to compare constitutions and what we think the practical payoffs, if any, are likely to be.) Let me note at the outset that I am not remotely interested in a decidedly different jurisprudential problem, which is the potential authority of non-U.S. law with regard to the decision of American an authority that could derive from treaties entered into by the United States or, most controversially, from the reception of international law into American law. Whether one should feel bound by international legal norms is an entirely different subject from whether an American judge should merely take into account experience while making decisions about the shape of American constitutional law. One obviously need not believe that there is an obligation to be bound by that experience-indeed, I know of no one who makes such a foolish argument-in order to believe that it is simply prudent practice to become knowledgeable about such and to apply the lessons one finds there to comparable dilemmas facing us here in the United States. In order to set the stage for the debate here in the United States, it is helpful to look at the practices of at least one other American country, just north of us. In an examination of the citation practices of the Supreme Court of Canada, three political scientists note the frequency with which that court has looked to especially following the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights in the early 1980s.1 Almost 45% of the 858 cases that were decided between 1984-1995 contained at least one citation to a British case, though some might dispute whether this really counts as a foreign citation, given the particular historical relationship of Canada to the United Kingdom.2 Consider, then, that 30% had at least one citation to a U.S. case, with 58% of these U.S. citations being to cases decided after 1970.3 This suggests, among other things, an interest in how such courts are confronting similar problems at present. (Another 18% of the citations were to cases decided between 1950-1970; only 24% were to old cases, including presumably classic chestnuts of American constitutional law.)4 Citations per se obviously provide only limited, albeit suggestive, information. Consider, then, two representative comments from Canadian judges. In a concurring opinion in a case involving self-incrimination and right-to-counsel claims by someone charged with child molestation and sexual assault, Justice L'Heureux-Dube wrote that . . . …
Récupéré en direct depuis OpenAlex et désinversé. Les résumés ne sont pas conservés dans cette base de données : les index inversés représentent 8,6 Go des 9,3 Go de texte de la base, et le serveur dispose de 13 Go libres.
Comment cette classification a été obtenuedéplier
Prédiction distillée sur la base complète
Imitation des enseignantsNi prévalence calibrée, ni vérité terrain. Validation humaine à venir. Apprise à partir de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Codex et de 10 348 étiquettes directes de Gemma. Le mode candidate est l'union des têtes enseignantes seuillées; le consensus est leur intersection. Ces sorties portent le statut machine_predicted_unvalidated et ne sont ni des étiquettes humaines ni des étiquettes directes de modèles de pointe.
Scores Codex et Gemma par catégorie
| Catégorie | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Métarecherche | 0,001 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens strict) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Méta-épidémiologie (sens large) | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Bibliométrie | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Études des sciences et des technologies | 0,004 | 0,001 |
| Communication savante | 0,000 | 0,001 |
| Science ouverte | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Intégrité de la recherche | 0,000 | 0,000 |
| Charge utile insuffisante (le modèle a refusé de juger) | 0,001 | 0,000 |
Scores machine (provisoires)
Les deux têtes enseignantes du modèle étudiant, lues sur ce travail. Un score ordonne la base pour la relecture; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie, et le statut de validation accompagne chaque rangée tel quel.
Scores de référence d'un modèle non mature (critères de maturité non atteints, 7 itérations). Un score ordonne; il n'affirme jamais une catégorie.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · tel quel depuis la passe de notation : score_only signifie que le nombre peut ordonner les travaux, et qu'aucune étiquette de catégorie n'en découleClassification
machine, non validéePrédiction automatique; un appel candidat d’une seule tête enseignante, pas un consensus.
Le détail, modèle par modèle et score par score, se trouve en fin de page sous « Comment cette classification a été obtenue ».